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3Abstract:
This thesis outlines and defends a MacIntyrean account of contemporary work. MacIntyre's virtue 
ethics seems to entail a wholesale rejection of the modern order; throughout his writings MacIntyre is 
highly critical of capitalism, large-scale modern institutions, management, regulation, and indeed of 
our whole 'emotivistic' culture (as he sees it) which he regards as being inimical to our potential to 
virtuously flourish. MacIntyre's mature period, from After Virtue (2007, originally published 1981) 
contains much that is relevant to a philosophy of work. I will  develop and update MacIntyre's own 
arguments and I will also argue that contemporary working life can be more MacIntyrean than 
MacIntyre himself realises.
Because both work as a topic, and the relevant parts of MacIntyre's writings are extremely 
diverse, my strategy will be to examine the different key elements of a MacIntyrean philosophy of 
work without decontextualising the key notions of practices, virtues and institutions from MacIntyre's 
wider moral philosophy. I will argue that MacIntyre's key concept of a practice, the first stage in his 
definition of a virtue, is able to account for productive activities and can survive a variety of 
challenges. We are best able to make sense of the notion of the narrative unity of a whole life, the 
second stage in MacIntyre's definition of a virtue, if we distinguish between lived-narratives and the 
told-narratives that best allow us to understand our lives. Despite his broad endorsement of Marx's 
critique of capitalism, a MacIntyrean account of work differs from Marx's theory of alienation. I will 
argue that a fully MacIntyrean workplace will be small-scale, will not pressurise employees to 
identify with compartmentalised roles, and will allow trust to flourish. However, because MacIntyre 
overstates the extent to which people accept the definitions of ‘success’ that are dominant within 
modernity, he is unable to see the extent to which MacIntyrean communities can survive the threats 
posed by contemporary corporations. Another element of MacIntyre's account of work which needs 
modification is his critique of the character of the manager, and I will offer an emendation of this in 
order to make it applicable to contemporary forms of management. 
Finally I show that distinctively modern phenomena of workplace governance and regulation 
can serve MacIntyrean ends and can allow us to codify broadly MacIntyrean workplace initiatives. 
However, because of the deep context-sensitivity of the key MacIntyrean notions: practices, narrative-
unity, and communities, such measures resist detailed and explicit formulation. My aim is to defend 
MacIntyre, to deepen our understanding of what a MacIntyrean philosophy of work entails, and to 
show that and how good work exists even within modernity.
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6Introduction
MacIntyre's Philosophy
Alasdair MacIntyre is one of the key figures in the resurgence of virtue ethics over the past 
few decades and After Virtue is his most important and influential text. It was the first major 
work of MacIntyre’s mature period, and it is the work in which MacIntyre first outlined his 
conception of the virtues as depending on practices, narrative unity, and the concept of a 
tradition. Two subsequent books, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? and Three Rival 
Versions of Moral Enquiry developed the concept of tradition-based enquiry first outlined in 
After Virtue, and a fourth book, Dependent Rational Animals detailed the nature of human 
dependency and provided an enriched (and somewhat modified) conception of the virtues.  
Alongside these four works stand numerous important articles on an unusually wide range of 
topics. My aim in the present thesis is to develop, and sometimes to amend, MacIntyre's 
account of work in contemporary capitalist society, and in so doing to account for how we 
might flourish at work. Before embarking on this task, however, a brief introduction to 
MacIntyre's moral philosophy is in order.
Among the central contentions of After Virtue is the claim that modern morality and 
moral theory are deeply incoherent. MacIntyre argues that the Enlightenment project – the 
quest to provide a secular morality to which any rational person could assent (e.g. Kantianism 
and Utilitarianism) – has failed. Furthermore, MacIntyre argues that our culture is 
fundamentally emotivist and possesses only fragments of a (once) coherent morality. While 
MacIntyre disagrees with emotivism as an account of the meaning of moral terms, he argues 
that emotivism captures how moral terms are predominantly used in our culture. He says,
If emotivism is true... evaluative utterance can in the end have no point or use but the 
expression of my own feelings or attitudes and the transformation of the feelings and attitudes 
of others. I cannot genuinely appeal to impersonal criteria, for there are no impersonal criteria... 
The sole reality of distinctively moral discourse is the attempt to align the attitudes, feelings, 
preferences and choices of one another with its own. Others are always means, never ends.
1
MacIntyre offers as evidence for this claim the fact that modern moral disagreements are 
apparently interminable, that debates between, for instance, those who advocate liberty and 
7those who advocate equality, between 'pro-life' groups and 'pro-choice' groups, can find no 
resolution because there is no way to secure rational moral assent within our culture. Much 
ink has been spilt by defenders of modern liberal society eager to dispel MacIntyre's worries 
about what they regard as the pluralism characteristic of modernity. While one of my aims is 
to show that we possess greater moral resources within modernity than MacIntyre sometimes 
suggests (especially in After Virtue), I will not do so by entering into this particular debate 
and will instead largely pre-suppose the truth of MacIntyre's diagnosis of our culture.
MacIntyre's definition of a virtue has three stages: practices, narrative unity, and 
traditions. Each of these three stages presupposes the former. Practices are the schools of the 
virtues. MacIntyre's definition of a practice is
any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through 
which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those 
standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of 
activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the 
ends and goods involved, are systematically extended.
2
There is obviously a great deal to be unpacked from this definition, and that is the task of 
chapter 1. For MacIntyre a good life cannot merely consist in a set of arbitrarily chosen 
practices; the demands of different practices may conflict, so MacIntyre thinks our lives must 
be ordered according to a narrative unity. This unity is presupposed by the virtue of integrity 
(amongst others), which MacIntyre argues is a precondition of genuine moral agency. Again, 
I will outline and defend this stage of MacIntyre's definition of a virtue later and so will say 
no more about it here.
The third stage in MacIntyre's definition of a virtue is that of a tradition. Just as 
practices must be contextualised by narrative unity, both receive further contextualisation 
from traditions. MacIntyre defines a tradition as "an historically extended, socially embodied 
argument, and an argument precisely in part about the goods which constitute that tradition"
3
. 
Although it is of vital importance to the MacIntyrean project, this thesis will not devote any 
time to an extended discussion of traditions. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, 
MacIntyre has devoted two books to the subject, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? and 
Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, and to do justice to those works in addition to the 
ones I have focused on would pose scholarly challenges which would make it impossible to 
discuss working life in any depth. Secondly, since the publication of Dependent Rational 
8Animals, the role of traditions is, if still epistemologically central, arguably less central to 
MacIntyre's ethics because in that particular work MacIntyre defends a conception of 
metaphysical biology which he advances as a partial justification of morality. Here is not the 
place to pursue that argument, however. Moreover, if we give MacIntyre's tradition 
requirement an 'exclusivist' reading, it's clear that most people within modernity do not 
consciously consider themselves to be part of such a tradition and do not spend time engaged 
in an argument about the relevant goods of tradition, so the concept cannot shed much light 
on the problem of working life. On the other hand, if we give the tradition an 'inclusivist' 
reading and accept either that the liberal, Anglophone social order constitutes a tradition or
that particular local communities are traditional in the relevant sense, then the notion of 
traditions does play an important part in the argument that follows, even if it does not do so 
explicitly. I leave it to the reader to decide whether this omission was well or ill-judged.
A number of important studies have demonstrated the connections between 
MacIntyre's earlier thought and his mature period
4
, but I will consider only his mature period. 
MacIntyre himself acknowledges that his thought underwent a significant change in the late 
1970s
5
resulting in the publication of After Virtue.
Aims and Scope
In “Moral Theory Put to the Question”, presented at the American Philosophical Association 
conference 1994, MacIntyre claimed “in times of crisis theorists, like everyone else, are 
sustained by the continuing inarticulate, atheoretical goodness of those whose unexamined 
lives are well worth living.”
6
That this is so is one reason to accord importance to 
philosophical reflection on, and empirical research, into everyday life. The importance of the 
ordinary itself underlines the importance of work. Most people spend around 50% of their 
waking lives at work. It is a central feature of human life, and as such any ethical theory 
concerned with how people actually live and how people actually might live (that is to say, 
any worthwhile ethical theory) is going to have some ramifications for our understanding of 
work.
Moreover, one central feature of MacIntyre's ethical theory is the belief that all moral 
philosophy presupposes a sociology. He says 
every moral philosophy offers explicitly or implicitly at least a partial conceptual analysis of 
the relationship of an agent to his or her reasons, motives, intentions and actions, and in so 
9doing generally presupposes some claim that these concepts are embodied or at least can be in 
the real world... Thus it would generally be a decisive refutation of a moral philosophy to show 
that moral agency of its own account of the matter could never be socially embodied; and it 
also follows that we have not fully understood the claims of any moral philosophy until we 
have spelled out what its social embodiment would be
7
The present thesis is a partial attempt to spell out how MacIntyre's ethics can be so 
embodied. That MacIntyre is so hostile to modernity might suggest that it is impossible to 
formulate a MacIntyrean account of contemporary work that contains anything other than 
outright hostility. Such an interpretation of MacIntyre would be a caricature. One of my aims 
in chapter 3 is to show that a MacIntyrean account of work resists reduction to a Marxist 
theory of alienation, and one of my overriding purposes is to demonstrate that MacIntyre's 
ethics is not hopelessly anachronistic
8
. MacIntyre's views on modernity are more subtle than 
this picture would suggest. In the 2007 preface to After Virtue MacIntyre states that where 
"the tradition of the virtues is regenerated, it is always in everyday life... through the 
engagement by plain persons in a variety of practices"
9
, in an interview he states "large scale 
politics has become barren"
10
, elsewhere that we must be utopians
11
, and elsewhere still that 
prudence dictates that we occasionally engage with mainstream politics
12
. Although I will not 
spend much time explicitly discussing MacIntyre's politics, it is impossible to flesh out a 
MacIntyrean philosophy of work that goes beyond a practices-virtues-institutions framework 
without addressing politics at least obliquely. The final three chapters attempt to account for 
working communities, the culture of management, and workplace governance without taking 
MacIntyre's arguments out of their political context but also without presupposing a solution 
to the evident tensions between the different strands of MacIntyre's political thought.
One thing this thesis is not, though were time and space not factors I would have liked 
it to have also been and that a complete MacIntyrean philosophy of work would need to be, is
a history of both work and of philosophical reflections on work, or an examination of the 
deeper meaning of human labour. As such figures who are critically important to both 
MacIntyre's philosophy and such a history, figures like  Aristotle, Aquinas, Marx, Ruskin, 
Weber etc. do not feature prominently.
10
Thesis Plan
According to MacIntyre,
A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us 
to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively prevents 
us from achieving any such goods
13
This is MacIntyre's primary definition of a virtue and therefore the essence of his 
Eudaimonism, and so I will begin, in chapter 1, by outlining and defending MacIntyre's 
concept of a practice. I argue that the concept of a practice can accommodate productive 
practices and that because engagement in practices can involve a re-discovery of the goods 
and ends involved, those who are not at the cutting edge of practices can still be accounted 
practitioners. I will consider some epistemological problems raised by Russell Muirhead and 
will argue that an understanding of practices is available to those at the fringes of any 
particular practice-based community, and that practices admit of gradation, but where an 
activity is practice-like it stands in an even greater need of being well-institutionalised.
In chapter 2 I turn my attention to the second stage in MacIntyre's conception of a 
virtue, the narrative unity of life. Again I will defend MacIntyre and will show that many of 
the objections raised by Lippitt, Lamarque and Mulhall can not only be dealt with by 
MacIntyre but, in the case of the self-deception problem, which according to Lippitt results 
from the temptation implicit in narrative conceptions of the self for people to select the most 
flattering narrative rather than the most accurate, is actually part of what motivates 
MacIntyre's narrative unity requirement. Key to my strategy is the distinction between told 
and enacted narratives, which MacIntyre himself fails to explicitly draw but which I argue 
seems to be implicit in much of what he says, and clearly is compatible with his argument. 
Chapters 1 and 2 complete the purely theoretical part of this thesis, and ground much of the 
later discussion of working life.
In chapter 3 I begin to explore contemporary work and will contrast a MacIntyrean 
philosophy of work with Marx's theory of alienation. The early Marx's own reflections on 
alienation apply primarily to industrial factory work. Braverman's account of white-collar 
alienation is more plausible, but not sufficiently up-to-date to provide a compelling account 
of contemporary work, so we will explore the changes to the contemporary workplace 
11
described by sociologist Richard Sennett. More broadly this chapter will provide a ground for 
the more detailed discussions of working life to follow.
Chapter 4 is a discussion of the worthwhile elements of emotion work, the problem of 
role identification and its threat to unity and integrity, and lastly the conditions of trust under 
which it becomes rational or desirable to engage in the difficult task of transforming oneself, 
particularly in the context of employment. For MacIntyre, the hard work of morality consists 
in the task of transforming our desires so that we aim at the good, and I will argue that for 
this healthy 'emotion work' to be possible, contexts must be relatively small-scale and that the 
threat to integrity posed by role-identification must be avoided. Ideally such work will take 
place under conditions in which genuine community, a relatively thick notion of trust, and 
genuine friendship are possible. At the heart of the chapter is a rejection of Christine 
Swanton's role ethics, which is incompatible with the conception of narrative unity defended 
in chapter 2.
Having outlined some of the optimal conditions for MacIntyrean work, our attention 
then turns to the prospects of communities in inhospitable working environments. I will argue 
that, despite MacIntyre's frequent criticisms of the dominant institutions of modernity, quasi-
communities of resistance can survive inside such institutions. I will argue against John 
Dobson's claim that the modern firm is a new form of practice-based community, and 
(following Beadle) against Geoff Moore's claim that business itself can be a practice, but will 
argue for the claim that moral agency is sufficiently robust, and disengagement from modern 
work sufficiently widespread, that alienation and compartmentalisation can be avoided by 
most workers.
Having seen in chapters 4 and 5 that the modern workplace, if not usually conducive 
to flourishing, is not as deeply threatening to it as MacIntyre's philosophy sometimes seems 
to imply, the final two chapters will, in their different ways, consider the role of those 'in 
charge' of the modern workplace. Chapter 6 explores MacIntyre's critique of the manager, or 
rather what he calls the character of the manager. I will outline MacIntyre's notion of 
characters, which has received surprisingly little scholarly attention, in order to better 
understand MacIntyre's critique. I will show that MacIntyre overstates his case because his 
culturalist argument underplays the extent to which individuals can pay lip-service to the role 
requirements of management without being compartmentalised agents. MacIntyre argues that 
managerial expertise is impossible and that the character of the manager embodies 
emotivism. However, as this critique was first published in 1981, and because management 
has, ostensibly, changed a great deal in the intervening decades, I will explore the concept of 
12
leadership in order to update MacIntyre's critique. I will argue that although leadership does 
not appear to depend on the kind of scientific expertise MacIntyre argued was invoked to 
justify the power and authority of technicist conceptions of management, such a justification 
is often still tacitly invoked. Furthermore, leadership remains an embodiment of emotivism.
In chapter 7 we turn away from the culture of management and back to the question of 
how workplaces might house practices, or be conducive to our virtuous flourishing. Our 
focus will primarily be on the governance of virtue, or how institutions might serve to protect 
and maintain a focus on internal goods. We will begin by examining Geoff Moore’s attempt 
to codify MacIntyrean workplace initiatives. While governance is an especially important 
issue for MacIntyrean ethics, I will argue that Moore’s account is defective  because his 
system is incompatible with MacIntyre’s account of moral education and in particular 
because it misinterprets MacIntyrean ethics in such a way that it becomes too close to the 
mere regulation of behaviour. Though I will also argue that we ought to recognise the 
importance of regulation. However, it is clear that regulation cannot itself provide the moral 
education that MacIntyre claims is provided by practices, but is crucial where work is not 
practice-based, and not intrinsically rewarding. What is appropriate to practices and 
institutions that house them, is not always what is appropriate to workplaces in which work is 
tedious and a mere imposition on the workforce. I will end by reformulating Moore's list of 
MacIntyrean desiderata in light on the arguments advanced in the preceding chapters.
By the end I aim to have shown what a MacIntyrean account of modern work is 
(though I have disagreed with MacIntyre himself about certain points), that such a 
MacIntyrean account can survive various challenges, and how work might be made such that 
it is more likely to be conducive to flourishing in MacIntyre's terms.
                                                
1
MacIntyre, 2007, p.24.
2
ibid, p.187.
3
ibid, p.222.
4
I have in mind McMylor 1994, D'Andrea 2006, and Knight 2007.
5
MacIntyre, 1998h, p.268.
6
MacIntyre, 1994b cited by Solomon, 2003, p.147.
7
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8
As has sometimes been claimed, for instance by Thomas Nagel and Martha Nussbaum, whose criticisms are expertly 
rebutted by Lutz, 2004, ch.5, and Paul Du Gay, 2000,  whose claim that MacIntyre "regards science as profoundly immoral" 
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9
ibid, xiii.
10
MacIntyre, 1998g, p.265.
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Chapter 1: Practices
For MacIntyre a 'practice' is the first of three stages in the development of his conception of a 
virtue, the second and third being the narrative unity of a human life and an account of what 
he calls a moral tradition respectively. Since MacIntyre uses the word 'practice' in a highly 
specific way, the first section of this chapter will clarify what a practice is for MacIntyre, and 
then to identify some ways in which this conception might be problematic. There are a 
number of possible criticisms of MacIntyre’s conception of a ‘practice’ such as vagueness
1
, 
elitism, inability to account for productive practices
2
and so on which, I will attempt to show, 
carry little weight once we are clear about what a MacIntyrean practice is. In particular I will 
argue that because of the propensity of practices to allow those people engaged in them to 
discover and rediscover the goods and ends involved, the notion of ‘practice’ is importantly 
richer than that of a ‘craft’. Section 1.2 will focus on epistemological worries about 
engagement in practices and in particular will consider the problem of the uninitiated 
distinguishing between practices and non-practices. I will argue that although the goods 
internal to a practice are only available to those engaged in those practices, this engagement 
admits of gradation, so those at the fringes of a practice can still know enough about it to 
assess it, and the goods internal to it, adequately. Because this admission that engagement is 
partial seems to threaten the conclusion of section 1.1, section 1.3 will examine the 
institutional preconditions of practices and also borderline practices that do not fit easily into 
either the category of clear cut practices or the category of non-practices. In this final section 
I will attempt to show that MacIntyre’s account of the role of institutions is correct and that 
borderline practices are to count as practices only if they are well supported by institutions.
1.1 The Definition of a Practice.
In this section I will be concerned to outline the range and scope of MacIntyre’s concept of a 
‘practice’. MacIntyre's definition of a practice is notorious for its complexity: 
By a 'practice' I am going to mean any coherent and complex form of socially established co-
operative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the 
course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially 
definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and 
14
human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended.
3
MacIntyre attempts to illuminate this definition by giving some examples of what he takes to 
be practices. Architecture, chess, portrait painting, physics, football and farming are 
practices, whilst bricklaying, throwing or kicking a ball with skill, and planting turnips are 
not. Let us consider the significant clauses in MacIntyre's definition in turn to see why he 
makes these distinctions. Clearly each item on MacIntyre's list of practices is coherent and it 
is equally clear that bricklaying, throwing a ball, and planting turnips etc. are also unified and 
sufficiently comprehensible to be considered coherent.
It might be argued that almost any human action is in some way complex. Skilfully 
throwing a ball is complex in that it requires a sensitive judgment of distance, weight, a sense 
of timing, and a good deal of dexterity and of course the biological processes that underpin 
even the most inept attempt at an accurate throw are complex. Complexity conceived of 
abstractly is clearly going to be of no use to us, so let us focus on the most productive of 
MacIntyre's list of practices and on the related and most banal and simple item on his list of 
non-practices: farming and the planting of turnips.  Given that the arts are so obviously 
complex in terms of development and history, I take it that to so focus is to challenge 
MacIntyre’s definition as robustly as possible.
In one sense it does seem natural to say that farming is complex and planting turnips 
is not. At the very least it is clearly true that farming as a whole is more complex than 
planting turnips on the grounds that the former can subsume the latter but the converse does 
not hold. One way to solve this problem might involve stipulating that an activity is a genuine 
candidate for the status of 'practice' if it is sufficiently complex to be interesting to the person 
doing it. If this is the case then the distinction between a practice and a non-practice is in 
danger of becoming one of subjective preference: one person may find planting rows of 
turnips to be sufficiently complex to be interesting and thus a source of enjoyment, whilst 
another is hopelessly dissatisfied with any agricultural role that stops short of full farming. 
Clearly this interpretation is not what MacIntyre intends. Indeed, he says, "a practice, in the 
sense intended, is never just a set of technical skills, even when directed towards some 
unified purpose and even if the exercise of those skills can on occasion be valued or enjoyed 
for their own sake.”
4
However, MacIntyre never fully explains what he means by complexity and how it 
might separate practices from non-practices, and this is also the case for his discussion of 
social establishment and co-operation. Whilst farming is more clearly socially established 
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than turnip planting, and in virtue of being a more diverse and multi-faceted activity tends to 
require more co-operation, turnip planting is nevertheless at least minimally co-operative in 
that each planter must learn from a more seasoned planter something about the relevant tools 
and techniques involved, and is, or might easily be, socially established. It seems that as yet 
we have no reason to draw those distinctions - between farming and planting turnips, football 
and throwing a ball, architecture and brick-laying - that MacIntyre himself draws.  
Perhaps the notions of internal goods or standards of excellence will enable us to 
understand MacIntyre's intended distinction. For MacIntyre, internal goods are those goods 
which cannot be achieved in any way other than engaging in the activity in question and are 
to be contrasted with external goods, examples of which include power, prestige, and 
money
5
. Unlike internal goods, external goods can always be achieved in a variety of ways 
and are characteristically always someone’s property and possession
6
. Perhaps there is no 
good that is unique to planting turnips, but there is certainly no incoherence in supposing that 
someone might enjoy the planting of root vegetables more generally in such a way that the 
goods enjoyed are internal and are realised in the course of trying to achieve the appropriate 
standards of excellence, so we are still unable to draw just the distinction that MacIntyre 
wants. It is important to note that, while there is no incoherence in imagining this enthusiastic 
turnip planter, there is also no reason to think that turnip planting really does contain the 
internal goods that would warrant this enthusiasm. No-one has as yet, as far as I know, made 
such claims about turnip planting. We will return to this point later.
The final clause in MacIntyre's definition of practice is the most demanding and the 
most difficult to decipher. If the realisation of these internal goods must have "the result that 
human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, 
are systematically extended" (my emphasis), then planting turnips does seem to be excluded, 
but so does farming. Farming and the turnip planting both have ends and goods but is it far 
from clear exactly how these are to be systematically extended. In elaborating this final and 
crucial clause of his definition, MacIntyre says, "Practices never have a goal or goals fixed 
for all time - painting has no such goal nor has physics - but the goods themselves are 
transmuted by the history of the activity."
7
The great painters, the great physicists, and even 
the great sports people transform their disciplines and these practices have histories 
characterised by systematic extensions of conceptions of ends and goods. This is not however 
true of the history of planting turnips, and farming seems in this respect closer to planting 
turnips than it does to physics or painting. Farming has changed over time, with the advent of 
new technologies and growth in the relevant scientific knowledge, but this history is not 
16
characterised by the same transmutation of goals as the histories of painting, physics, or even 
cricket. The ends of farming do and must include the production of food. The goals and ends 
of painting and physics on the other hand are susceptible to fairly significant change, and 
although the ends of batting in cricket must and do include scoring runs, what constitutes a 
good shot, a pure technique, a good total or run rate have changed in a variety of ways and to 
a degree that again does not seem to be true of farming. 
Without some way of interpreting this 'systematic extension' clause that allows for the 
inclusion of productive practices, McIntyre's own list of examples of practices and non-
practices is unsustainable and would leave him facing a choice between excluding productive 
crafts from his list of practices altogether (the exclusive option) and settling for an elitism 
akin to that of Aristotle, or to reduce the strictness of his requirements - thereby including the 
comparatively simple, but skilful and potentially enjoyable activities he had sought to 
exclude. The latter (inclusive option) would leave him in a position akin to that of Sennett, a 
thinker with whom he is sometimes compared.
8
Whereas MacIntyre uses the word 'practice' far more narrowly that it is ordinarily 
used, Sennett uses the words 'craft' and 'craftsmanship' in senses that are far broader than 
ordinary usage. For Sennett, 'craftsmanship' names the desire to do a job well and a 'craft' 
extends beyond the concept of skilled manual labour to any activity that requires skill, 
commitment and judgement. Examples might include computer programming, musical 
performance, parenting, etc. Sennett says that "three basic abilities are the foundation of 
craftsmanship. These are the ability to localise, to question, and to open up. The first involves 
making a matter concrete, the second reflecting on its qualities, the third expanding its 
sense"
9
and drawing on intuitive leaps to stimulate fresh thinking. It is easy to see how these 
three abilities allow us to distinguish between a craft and a non-craft, ruling out for instance 
certain tedious and uninvolving jobs such as telesales or assembly line work, and might allow 
someone to achieve the goods internal to an activity without the apparent difficulties involved 
in MacIntyre's formulation of practices, in particular the difficulties involved in cashing out 
what MacIntyre might mean by 'systematic extension' in relation to productive activities.
However even as things stand there is one attractive aspect of MacIntyre's account 
missing from Sennett's: co-operation and sociability. Sennett admits that craft "is not 
character forming in relation to other people" and that craftsmanship is "a very old-fashioned 
virtue, though it is not a sociable virtue"
10
. Sennett has been criticised for the lack of ethical 
content of his theory
11
. This is because the focus of a craft is solely on the quality of the 
work. Craftsmanship can furnish an individual with dignity and self-respect, but it need not, 
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for instance, lead to mutual respect, and this is so despite the fact that craft is clearly socially 
established and despite the fact that insofar as all crafts must be taught, it is also co-operative. 
Sennett's aims are not MacIntyre's aims, but the former does seem to have missed this 
essential sociability.
Even throwing a ball with skill admits of the three criteria advanced by Sennett. When 
an attempted throw goes awry the thrower can localise through thinking about whether it is 
the weight of the ball or the atmospheric conditions that intervened, whether some other way 
of gripping or releasing the ball might be more effective, etc. Given that Sennett defines 
questioning as “dwelling in an incipient state”
12
, it is clear that the thrower can also question. 
Finally, it is clear that the thrower can also open up the question. Sennett says “[t]he capacity 
to open up a problem draws on intuitive leaps, specifically on its powers to draw unlike 
domains close to one another and to preserve tacit knowledge in the leap between them”
13
. 
The thrower may open up the question by throwing the ball like a boomerang or a javelin 
when faced with a peculiar situation. Sennett might be able to exclude the most drearily 
repetitive activities from craft-status, but little else. If this is what the concept of a practice 
must boil down to then the internal goods seem very minimal indeed. Fortunately for 
MacIntyre this is not all there is to be said and with a little interpretative work, we can give 
more sense to MacIntyre's problematic "systematic extensions of conceptions of goods and 
ends" clause and sidestep the exclusive/inclusive dilemma altogether.
As we saw, read in light of his comments about the historicity of practices, 
MacIntyre's 'systematic extension' clause seems to entail that the notion of a practice must 
either be unacceptably exclusive or so inclusive that it becomes almost vacuous and stands in 
need of supplementation by something like Sennett's account of craftsmanship. However, 
although MacIntyre never fully explains what he means by 'systematic extension' he does 
leave clues about how we might rescue the notion of a practice from these opposing fates. In 
the post-script to the second edition of 'After Virtue' MacIntyre notes that practices are "those 
modes of activity within which ends have to be discovered and rediscovered, and means 
devised to pursue them"
14
. If it were only the case that ends had to be discovered then it 
would be hard to resist the strongly historicised reading that would rule farming out of 
contention for the status of ‘practice’, but as the rediscovery of ends is part of a practice this 
need not be so. A systematic extension then need not be aggregative. Instead we should read 
‘systematic extension’ as being opposed to piecemeal extensions, extensions in which one 
aspect of a practice is extended without that extension having some relevance or bearing to a 
greater whole. When someone is in the process of becoming a farmer he or she does not learn 
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how to carry out one task in isolation from how it is interconnected with a whole host of other 
tasks. Here we have a way of understanding the ‘systematic extension’ clause that is not only 
compatible with the weaker historicism of the rediscovery of ends, but one which also fits 
well with the requirement that practices be complex.
A systematic extension in which ends are only discovered rather than both discovered 
and rediscovered suggests that only those activities in which innovation is part of the aim, 
such as the arts and sciences, could count as practices and perhaps even that only those 
capable of significant innovations could count as genuine practitioners. This is because an 
outright discovery is liable to change the practice as a whole. In this case the likes of 
Einstein, Picasso, and Don Bradman would be almost alone as practitioners in the 20
th
century, joined only by a handful of other innovative greats. A systematic extension that 
involves the rediscovery of ends and goals on the other hand allows that individual 
practitioners and groups of practitioners can deepen their understanding of a practice by 
rediscovering for themselves what prior and contemporary practitioners have already learned, 
so when a farmer or a painter or a physicist learns the skills necessary to partake in those 
respective practices they are both personally discovering and historically rediscovering the 
ends and goods involved. So whilst we cannot spell out the goods and ends involved without 
direct experience of farming, painting or physics, we can at least see how MacIntyre's notion 
of a practice is able to cater for productive practices in addition to artistic and intellectual 
practices and thereby able to maintain a categorical distinction between activities such as 
farming and turnip planting.
What then are we to say about the absence of sociability in Sennett’s conception of a 
craft? How are practices intrinsically "character-forming is relation to other people"? 
Practices are intrinsically character-forming because virtues, which such discovery and 
rediscovery of goods enables us to acquire, are not identical to skills. Learning a skill does 
very often require at least a minimal degree of co-operation and sociability in that it must 
initially be taught but what it requires most of all is repetition. Before elaborating the 
'systematic extension' clause we noted that complexity, co-operation, and social 
establishment could be considered somewhat thin notions. Having made sense of that clause 
in light of the notion of rediscovering ends and goods we are now able to see that the 
complexity, co-operation, and social establishment must be of a sufficiently high level that 
such discovery is possible. Planting turnips is not sufficiently complex or co-operative for the 
ends and goods to admit of discovery and re-discovery. One turnip planter may be more 
efficient than another, one craftsman may be more skilful than another, and the lesser of 
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either pair can only hope to catch up by trying harder and repeating the task again and again 
in order to refine their skill, but a superior practitioner knows more about the ends and goals 
of the particular practice than does a newcomer. The newcomer is inferior and inadequate in a 
way that can only be remedied by acknowledging that fact and learning from teachers, 
contemporaries and/or historical predecessors, learning not simply how, but what it is they 
are engaged in doing.
Because the systematic extension of ends can take the form of rediscovery, 
MacIntyre's conception of a practice offers a richer account than that provided by Sennett's 
conception of craftsmanship. A craft involves the cultivation of skill and the production of 
good work whereas a practice additionally involves a continuing process of discovery and 
rediscovery. So while the goods internal to a practice must remain partially opaque to anyone 
who does not engage in that particular practice, it is clear that the concept of a practice is 
neither unduly vague nor unduly elitist and can account for productive practices. MacIntyre’s 
motivation for developing his concept of a practice as he does is because he believes that 
practices are ‘schools for the virtues’. Notice that the concept of a practice is such that 
anyone engaged in a practice will need the humility and honesty required to subordinate 
themselves to superior fellow practitioners, to give and receive criticism, and to engage in the 
continued conversation of the practice in question if they are to learn what they must. In this 
sense engagement in a practice can be extremely demanding. It is to the cognitive features of 
practices that we now turn.
1.2 Muirhead’s ‘Leap of Faith’ and Knowledge of Goods.
As we have seen above, MacIntyre’s conception of a practice is not elitist or exclusive in any 
problematic sense. We have also noted that for MacIntyre the goods internal to practices are 
only fully knowable by those engaged in each particular practice. Whilst this engagement 
criterion, as we shall call it, understood in terms of both discovery and rediscovery, helps 
MacIntyre to avoid an excessive, intellectualised and elitist historicism, it does itself create a 
different set of problems which can be codified as:
i) The Decision problem: if one cannot understand a practice without being a 
practitioner oneself, how could one rationally decide which practice(s) to engage in?
ii) The Testimony problem: would it still be acceptable to deny apparent non-
practices, such as the planting of turnips, the status of practice if a life-long turnip planter (not 
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farmer who specialises in producing prize turnips) claimed the status of practice for his 
activity? That which appears to be a practice might not be, and that which appears to be a 
non-practice might instead turn out to be a practice. There is also a problem concerning the 
testimony of those engaged in established practices. When does someone count as 
sufficiently knowledgeable or adept to be able to speak on behalf of a particular practice or 
practice-based community? 
iii) The Master-Apprentice problem: if someone engaged in an activity which is 
clearly a practice, architecture for instance, never becomes fully competent or fully able to 
articulate or understand the goods, goals, aims of architecture, would it be correct to describe 
such a person as a practitioner? This problem again suggests that there could be an excessive 
elitism implicit in the concept of a practice, which would be goodness out of the reach of all 
but the exceptionally talented. However it also suggests an unacceptable inclusiveness that 
reduces practices to the status of enjoyable activities and rules out the morally significant 
element of subordination to pre-existing, socially established standards of excellence.
These questions are raised with varying degrees of explicitness by Muirhead in his 
discussion of MacIntyre in ‘Just Work’. Muirhead believes that there can be no satisfactory 
answer to the related decision and testimony problems and so the decision to engage in any 
practice or to consider some activity a practice must involve a ‘leap of faith’, and that 
engagement in practices does not necessarily lead to greater understanding and so there can 
be no adequate answer to the apprenticeship problem.  Muirhead’s response to the testimony 
and decision problems is a direct challenge to MacIntyre who, despite his admission that 
engagement is necessary for proper judgement, clearly does think it possible to categorically 
distinguish between at least some practices and at least some non-practices. Muirhead’s 
response to the mastery and apprenticeship problems is on the other hand just a contradiction 
of MacIntyre and contains an implicit, unarticulated challenge to distinguish between 
practitioners and non-practitioners within a given practice by showing that proper 
engagement in a practice must lead to a growth of understanding. It is important to note that 
while Muirhead is critical of some of the details of MacIntyre’s own formulation of the 
concept, he does regard ‘practices’ broadly construed in a MacIntyrean sense to “offer the 
best understanding of the promise of work”
15
. Rather than seeking to overturn the concept 
entirely, Muirhead wants to modify it, make it more inclusive, and thereby soften the 
normative force that MacIntyre attaches to it.
Let us consider the would-be practitioner’s lack of knowledge of the putative practice 
in question. Muirhead says, “To participate in a practice … involves a leap of faith, or 
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commitment. We take a chance, knowing that we cannot know all we need to know in 
advance…”
16
(The decision problem). If the goods are internal then the uninitiated cannot 
know them. This is not a problem if the engagement in a practice constitutes a hobby, but if it 
is to shape a life then lack of reliable knowledge is a problem. However, we can have at least 
a minimal and partial knowledge of a practice without engaging in it. Someone who has 
never played a piano knows about scales, knows that they are boring but that they can enable 
a budding pianist to better play more enjoyable music. Someone who loves playing Rugby 
Union will be able to guess whether he or she will enjoy Rugby League, and will be able to 
give reasons for this. Such a person might be surprised by how restricting or liberating the 
alternate code is, but this response makes sense only if it is possible to have some awareness 
of relevant internal goods in advance. Someone who has both painted and tried their hand at 
carpentry will be able to have some idea what kinds of joy are to be had in sculpture on 
account of his or her knowledge of both art and working with materials. Unsurprisingly 
Muirhead admits as much, he says “This trust need not be blind… [rather] some independent 
judgement is possible”
17
but his point remains, and he still thinks the cognitive aspect of 
practices to be sufficiently mysterious to say, “It is difficult to identify the internal goods 
relevant to a particular line of work, and we should not be too quick to judge particular jobs 
or careers as simply lacking them [the testimony problem]. Internal goods may be hard to 
locate even at an individual level [the apprenticeship problem], with respect to one’s own 
work”
18
(my additions in square brackets). It is undeniable that one must sometimes make a 
decision based as much on hope and trust as knowledge and expectation, but Muirhead’s 
claim must be read in a stronger fashion if we are to make sense of his remarks on the 
difficulty of locating internal goods. Finally, in order to accurately characterise Muirhead’s 
critique we should note that he believes it only possible to locate the goods internal to a 
practice when one has been initiated into that practice (though we shall see below that this
admits of degrees), which “in turn may require sustained commitment,” and that to “realise 
the internal goods that come from a practice takes discipline; over time, as proficiency grows, 
the standards of the practice are no longer felt as constraints”
19
. So according to Muirhead we 
must be disciplined and committed even though we do not have any experience of goods 
internal to a practice, or at least any significant experience of the kind that would make it 
possible to identify and be motivated by those  internal goods. 
One questionable element of Muirhead’s way of setting up the decision problem is 
that it relies on a model of the potential practitioner as someone having to decide between a 
set of putative practices with only the little independent judgement (or as we shall shortly 
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consider, the unreliable testimony of others) that is possible available as a guide. Indeed the 
overall thesis of Muirhead’s ‘Just Work’ is that work is fulfilling when it ‘fits’ an individual’s 
abilities, wants, and needs. In one sense, there is clearly nothing wrong with this overall 
thesis; ceteris paribus it is good that any work, activity, or practice caters for someone’s 
abilities, wants and needs. However, the notion that the selection of a practice involves some 
kind of ‘leap of faith’ betrays a commitment to the belief that an individual can have no 
convincing reason for choosing to devote him or herself to one practice over any other. From 
a MacIntyrean point of view this cannot be correct for it is impossible to even be in a position 
to make an independent and informed, and so rational choice without first having been to 
some degree schooled in types of practice. Also the types of practice in which a person has 
contingently been engaged, as well as the differing degrees of social availability of types of 
practice, will partially govern the preferences and inclinations that the person selecting a 
practice possesses. 
From an engagement in games and sports, membership of a family and household, 
and the study of various academic and practical subjects in schools and at home, and so on, a 
young person will develop character-traits and preferences that prevent a problematic type of 
neutral decision that requires a ‘leap of faith’ from ever arising. This is one element of what 
MacIntyre calls the narrative unity of a life, which will be the focus of the following chapter. 
In making decisions about what to do with one's life, which practices are choice-worthy, 
which are worthy of perhaps painful subordination and diligent commitment, one must 
consider the trajectory of one's life as a whole and the pre-existing commitments that might 
render certain decisions rational when they might be inexplicable when considered in the 
abstract. The decision problem exists in theory, but in practice the narrative of one's life, and 
the long-term commitments one has, renders a decision to engage in a particular practice less 
difficult. It might be impossible to give reliable advice to a stranger, or to some disembodied 
chooser, but it is not impossible to advise a friend, and it would not be impossible to advise a 
stranger who one knew to share certain premises about the nature of a well-lived life.
In reality, no autonomous and independent agent is ever entirely ‘unpractised’ (nor 
fully informed), and it is only through engagement in practices that one can come to be able 
to choose independently. Furthermore, it is not simply the case that through a combination of 
independent judgement and experiences of certain practices one can come to make an 
educated guess as to which practice it would be best to engage in, rather the inherent 
sociability of practices we saw earlier means that everyone in part owes what he or she gains 
from a practice in terms of internal goods to certain others, others who are superior in certain 
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regards to oneself. When MacIntyre says, “If, on starting to listen to music, I do not accept 
my own incapacity to judge correctly, I will never learn to hear, let alone appreciate, Bartok’s 
last quartets”
20
he means that our tastes, interests, and preferences are largely formed in 
relation to the tastes, interests, and preferences of others. This applies also in terms of what 
options are available to us. Someone who does not recognise their own inability will not only 
be unable to appreciate Bartok but may never even know that Bartok’s music exists. The 
person who decides to make to effort to cultivate an appreciation of Bartok is not fully able in 
advance to appreciate Bartok and may never be so able, but has not made a leap of faith. The 
decision to make an effort with Bartok itself requires a particular set of conditions, as the 
tenor of MacIntyre’s broad historicism about practice suggests. It will almost certainly be the 
case that a person sat scratching his or her head when first attempting to listen to the pizzicato 
movement of Bartok’s fourth quartet may have come through similar experiences with the 
music of more obviously tuneful composers, struggled and finally succeeded in a bid to 
understand those composers and then moved on to more challenging music. It is not for 
nothing that in Austria parents take their children to see ‘The Flying Dutchman’.
The final point which needs to be made against the decision problem also tells against 
the testimony problem. As we saw when comparing Sennett’s notion of craft with the notion 
of practice, those engaged in practices learn not only skills but sociable virtues. It is part of 
MacIntyre’s account of virtue that we not only need others in order to develop virtues but that 
we both owe others a debt on account of this and that genuine virtue possession is nearly 
always at least partially other-regarding. If I, like Camus, learned all I know about morality 
and obligations from football it wouldn’t count as genuine learning if those obligations ended 
as soon as the final whistle blew. Few people are ever in the position of choosing what to 
devote their lives to in isolation from others. If being able to choose requires the acquisition 
of at least some virtues through engagement in some practices, and engagement in some 
practices and the nature of those virtues involves acquiring a debt of concern for certain 
others, then an intelligible independently made choice about one’s own good and what or 
which practices to engage in and prioritise will not be completely independent of the goods of 
those friends and family members one is indebted to, a fact that will be invoked in my 
defence of MacIntyre's conception of narrative unity is the following chapter. A person faced 
with the task of choosing a career to pursue will not simply need to make a decision based 
only on the guessed at goods internal to practices, but how such a practice fits in with existing 
commitments. Some of those will be commitments to others who have played important roles 
in that person’s development into a rational, independent agent, and the testimonies of those 
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persons will be taken more seriously than the testimony of strangers. This consideration is a 
key part of MacIntyre's notion of a tradition.
This is not simply a point about preferring to trust those close to one, that is obvious, 
but also about 'objective' factors about a subject, about bonds and commitments that really 
exist. In many cases those close to one will genuinely be able to give better advice than a 
stranger even if that stranger is more experienced in the practice in question. The inadequacy 
of practices alone to determine what is good is why MacIntyre claims both that the 
conception of practices gives us but a primary definition of a virtue, and that the category of 
'goods of excellence' extends beyond the category 'goods internal to practices'. This is why 
the notion of practice-based communities is important, a topic we will explore in some depth 
in chapter 5. Life choices are not (and for the most part, ought not be) made in isolation from 
the network of bonds and commitments that sustain our lives, and the narratives we tell to 
best understand our lives. Not all testimonies are equal. 
So, any individual may well have good reason to pay closer attention to some 
testimonies than others. Nevertheless, at the level of abstract reflection, the testimony 
problem remains. If MacIntyre’s account of practices is correct there must be some way of 
ruling out certain kinds of testimony. At the very least it might be possible to say that 
activities MacIntyre considers to be non-practices, turnip planting, bricklaying, throwing a 
ball with skill, etc. appear to possess no internal goods and have had no advocacy 
proclaiming their status as practices. One response to this would be to say that given that 
MacIntyre’s conception of a practice has only come into existence relatively recently and is 
highly specialised that this is to be expected. However it is not simply that ringing 
endorsements of turnip planting are not couched in the correct terminology, it is that they do 
not seem to be forthcoming at all. Of course people can and do find activities that are not 
practices both enjoyable and rewarding. However, if we consider the complex definition of a 
practice given by MacIntyre, any claim that something like planting turnips is actually 
characterised by the sorts of internal goods and systematic extension necessary for the status 
of ‘practice’ will have to be quite different from the claim that planting turnips is enjoyable. 
On the basis of what has been said so far such a claim is entirely conceivable. One answer to 
the testimony problem is simply that if such a situation arose it would be problematic. It is 
worth considering whether we can have any stronger grounds for thinking that such a 
testimony will not be forthcoming.
There are two reasons for thinking that a stronger case against the testimony problem 
can be made: 1) the historical and socially established nature of practices make it impossible 
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that there should be a lone voice testifying that something considered to be clearly a non-
practice by most people nevertheless is a practice, and it would be hard to believe that a 
sufficiently large community of practitioners would not be believed. 2) Non-engaged or 
imaginative knowledge of a practice need not be as restricted as the problem presupposes. Of 
course, if it can be shown that those not fully engaged in a practice can appreciate its internal 
goods, then the problems will have thereby been assuaged.
It is important to note that practices were not necessarily always practices, and so the 
concept admits of degrees
21
. Portrait painting is clearly a practice but, if we consider the 
entire and broad history of art, ultimately emerged from cave paintings, which were either a 
very different kind of practice or a communicative or ceremonial tool in another practice. The 
first children in Tudor England to protect some precursor to stumps from a ball with some 
kind of bat were not properly engaged in the practice of cricket even if they invented it. These 
proto-practitioners would not have been inclined to make claims for their activities which can 
be and are made about portrait painting and cricket because they could not have understood 
themselves as engaging in something that has evolved historically. What then of farmers? 
Farming did not evolve historically in quite the same way as portrait painting or cricket, as 
we saw earlier, and farming is not as liable to having its ends and goals systematically 
extended in the same way arts and sports. Nevertheless farming is still socially established 
and as such has historically inherited standards of excellence that can be rediscovered by 
individual farmers in a way that is not true of the proto-practitioners given as examples.
As we have seen, it is possible to have some knowledge of a practice without being 
engaged in it but it is important to emphasise the fact that we can also be partially engaged in 
a practice. When discussing how the achievements of JMW Turner and WG Grace benefitted 
their whole relevant community MacIntyre says “whether we are painters or physicists or 
quarterbacks or indeed just lovers of good painting or first rate experiments or a well thrown 
pass,” we must subordinate “ourselves within the practice in our relationship to other 
practitioners”
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. What this shows is that in addition to the fact that it is not only the historical 
greats who are to be accounted as engaged in a practice, as we saw in section 1.1, but also the 
supporting, surrounding community too. This means that one may engage in the practice of 
chess or painting without actually playing chess or painting, and we will see later that one can 
play chess or paint without being engaged in the practice of chess or painting. 
The goods internal to games, sports, and arts include those to be found in being a 
spectator, discussing and contemplating those things. A lover of great paintings is less 
engaged in the practice of painting than the painter is (unless the practice is corrupt or 
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somehow degenerate), but seeing as the lover of great painting learns how to appreciate 
painting in a similar way, through acquiring similar sensitivities, dispositions, virtues, though 
not to the same level and obviously lacks the qualities required to produce worthwhile 
paintings. On this view a great painter knows more about and is more engaged in the practice 
of painting than the critic, but the critic may be more engaged that the Sunday painter and 
whether the Sunday painter is more engaged than the layperson who loves great painting can 
only be decided case-by-case. If we accept this then the testimony problem and the mastery 
problem are not problems at all. Testimonies are to be relied upon when there is a perplexing 
situation or when one is deciding which practices to engage in, but given that engagement is 
not an all or nothing affair nothing like a ‘leap of faith’ is required.
These considerations have some bearing on the apprenticeship problem. If 
engagement can be of an indirect kind, of the spectator or admirer, then the engagement 
criterion becomes less stringent. If all of the goods involved in painting can only be known 
by painters and yet lovers of great painting are still to be considered as engaged in the 
practice of painting, then it cannot be necessary for someone to be able to fully articulate the 
goods internal to a practice to be considered a practitioner. It might appear that in order to 
solve the problems posed by Muirhead we have left MacIntyre’s concept of a practice open 
once again to the problems discussed in 1.1. Then a rediscovery-focused notion of systematic 
extension of ends was invoked in order to avoid an exclusive and/or intellectualist 
historicism. If, however, knowledge of goods internal to a practice is available to those 
remaining largely outside that practice, for example, if the goods of painting can be 
understood even by those who have never themselves painted, then it may seem that the 
notion of rediscovery becomes inert. This is not so because even those at the fringes of a 
practice have access to knowledge unavailable to those who have not so subordinated 
themselves and learned from others with deeper knowledge. A lover of great painting can 
rediscover what previous and contemporary lovers of great painting have themselves 
discovered, but not what painters have discovered or rediscovered, or if they can it is not to 
the same extent. To say that the degree of engagement is dependent on knowledge which 
itself is dependent on the degree of the cultivation of certain virtues, the humility and honesty 
mentioned earlier, simply strengthens the robust conception of a practice, it does not leave it 
open to the problem of vacuous inclusivity. This is why Muirhead’s doubts about whether 
practitioners have knowledge of their practice are misguided.
Muirhead claims that internal goods may be hard to locate within a practice and in so 
doing betrays a fatal misunderstanding of the concept. If one has no knowledge of the goods 
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internal to a practice in which one is engaged then one cannot be acting for the sake of those 
internal goods, and so one cannot be genuinely engaging in it as a practice or else the practice 
has degenerated or has been in some way corrupted. If one can truly be said to be engaging in 
a practice one must be acting for the sake of the goods internal to that practice, and 
furthermore some knowledge acquisition must be involved or else there could not be a 
systematic extension of ends and conceptions of ends involved. This is not to say that one 
must be solely motivated by the pursuit of internal goods in advance of beginning to engage 
in a practice. Consider MacIntyre’s example of members of a fishing crew. MacIntyre notes 
that a member of a fishing crew may have initially joined the crew for its external rewards (in 
this case money) but having become progressively engaged in the practice that is fishing as 
part of a crew, the member may choose to stay even if greater financial rewards can be had 
elsewhere. The member in this case will have to “have acquired from the rest of the crew an 
understanding of and devotion to excellence in fishing and to excellence in playing one’s part 
as a member of such a crew.”
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It is important to note that engagement in a practice is not 
simply a matter of 'doing' an activity in a certain way but also involves living a certain kind 
of life. 
Excellence of the requisite kind is a matter of skills and qualities of character required for both 
the fishing and for the achievement of the goods of the common life of such a crew... the goods 
to be achieved in attaining excellence in the activities of fishing and in one’s role within the 
crew will, for as long as possible, outweigh the economic hardships of low wages and periods 
of bad catches or low prices for fish.
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So if the fishing crew is the paradigmatic case of engagement in a productive practice then 
engagement must require some knowledge of the goods internal to that practice. So in answer 
to the apprenticeship problem, someone who is completely unable to articulate or locate the 
goods internal to a practice is not engaged in that practice even if that person is doing the 
activity that, at one level of description, constitutes the practice. We will have more to say 
about practices involving living one’s life in a certain way in the next chapter. The fisherman
who fishes solely for the external rewards has no good reason not to stop fishing as soon as 
even marginally greater external rewards are on offer elsewhere, and the fisherman who is 
unable to locate the goods internal to being part of a fishing crew is not engaged in the 
practice of fishing.
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1.3 Practices and Institutions
Now that we have seen that MacIntyre’s conception of a practice can be defended against the 
accusations of vacuity, excessive exclusivity or inclusivity, and the various epistemological 
critiques present in Muirhead’s account of practices it is time to further consider the scope of 
the concept and to explain the institutional setting of practices with the aim of outlining how 
and why practices can degenerate or become corrupted. These two seemingly different 
concerns belong together because in order to discuss the former we will need to discuss 
borderline cases of practices and it is these borderline practices that are most prone to 
degeneration and corruption, though such a fate can befall even the most paradigmatic of 
practices.
MacIntyre believes that practices are a universal feature of human societies though 
their significance can become obscure. Given that the arguments of section 1.2 depend in part 
on our being able to draw a distinction between someone genuinely engaged in a practice and 
someone who does the activity, so to speak, that a practice partly is without being so 
engaged, it is important to explain how this is possible.
MacIntyre gives an example of a child learning chess and the process by which that 
child comes to understand the goods internal to chess
25
. Categorically chess is a practice, but 
the child initially plays to be rewarded with candy, i.e. an external rather than an internal 
good. MacIntyre says that eventually the child will come to value the goods and excellences 
internal to chess, “the achievement of a certain highly particular kind of analytical skill, 
strategic imagination and competitive intensity”
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, etc. and play for those goods rather than 
external reward. In other contexts however it is possible to conceive of the proto-practitioner 
never coming to be motivated by internal goods. In a fictional world in which every chess 
grand master were motivated only by money and prestige, chess would still possess the 
coherence, complexity, social establishment etc. that is required for the status of practice, but 
none of the chess players would be genuinely engaged in that practice. This obscuring of 
internal goods is a danger whenever practices are not adequately safe-guarded by institutions.
As Knight puts it, the "perspective of individuals qua practitioners, the causal order 
constituted by a practice and an institution is in good order insofar as the goods pursued by 
the institution are deployed to subserve the good internal to the practice."
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Chess, like every other practice can only be engaged in as a practice to the extent that 
there is an engagement with and an understanding of the goods internal to it. This seems to 
suggest that a putative practice which is almost exclusively done for the sake of external 
29
goods will count as a genuine practice to someone who is alive to and motivated by its 
internal goods. This is somewhat misleading because the internal goods have to be of a 
particular kind to satisfy the definitional requirements of the notion of ‘practice’, that is to say 
engagement requires more than accepting an activity to be rewarding in its own right and 
because a practice pre-supposes a community of practitioners. Within the context of a 
‘practice’ in which internal goods have been forgotten, it is difficult to see how genuine co-
operation, a co-operation that transcends simple calculation and conditionality, can reliably 
occur (in chapter 5 I will argue that the notion of communities of practice extends more 
broadly than MacIntyre himself seems to think). Within practices in good order, the co-
operation involved in teaching involves the novice subordinating him or herself to the teacher 
which requires humility and a commitment to succeed at that practice in ways that may 
initially seem quite alien, but where these internal goods have been lost sight of it is hard to 
imagine anyone thus subordinating him or herself to the relevant standards of excellence. 
An individual alive to the possible existence of goods internal to that mode of activity 
will not be able to engage in them alone. Genuine co-operation and engagement in internal 
goods need not be entirely free from calculations about external goods, but it must be 
relatively so. A commitment to an internal good, even in the kinds of productive contexts in 
which the internal good is closely tied to external goods, is revealed by a willingness to 
continue with that practice even if greater external goods were available elsewhere. 
Commitment to internal goods and the co-operation required need not be absolute. Someone 
willing to genuinely co-operate may be dissuaded from doing so if what is being asked of him 
or her is clearly disproportionately burdensome, and in a productive practice like fishing or 
farming the pursuit of external goods can never be ignored. If not enough fish are caught to 
feed the members or sustain the community no amount of teamwork and courage will keep 
the practice going. However, where pursuit of external goods is the norm, co-operative ties 
are prone to become contingent and are liable to be broken as soon as a more externally 
rewarding option appears. The difference between genuine engagement in a practice for the 
sake of internal goods and a contingent commitment to an enjoyable activity primarily for the 
sake of external goods is what makes Muirhead wrong to allow any rewarding or fulfilling or 
enjoyable activity to count as a practice. In certain contexts in which practices cannot be 
properly engaged in, what is rewarding and fulfilling is precisely what is not co-operative. 
When aggressive competition is the only option, the most aggressive competitor may well be 
the most fulfilled. Practices always require some kind of institutional support, such as a 
school, a string quartet, or a chess club, and in the cases in which external goods are a 
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necessary end the practice in question must be carefully managed to avoid the loss of focus 
on internal goods.
MacIntyre himself is well aware that practices can become corrupted and so he 
acknowledges that "the making and sustaining of forms of human activity - and therefore 
institutions - itself has all the characteristics of a practice which stands in a particularly close 
relationship to the exercise of the virtues"
28
. The fact that practices are not self-sufficient is 
one motivating factor behind MacIntyre's insistence that the concept of a virtue requires two 
stages in addition to that of a practice, and in the following chapter we will explore the 
second of these stages. MacIntyre says, "no quality is to be accounted a virtue except in 
respect of its being such as to enable the achievement of three distinct kinds of good: those 
internal to practices, those which are the good of an individual life, and those which are the 
goods of community."
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Like the concept of any other practice the sustaining of forms of 
human activity is not an all or nothing affair, and I will argue in chapter 5 that MacIntyrean 
community - or something like it - can be sustained even in deeply inhospitable 
environments. 'Detective work' and 'nursing' are coherent, modern police and nursing work 
are not necessarily so, and the decision as to whether these forms of activity are to count as 
practices will have to be made case-by-case. Putative practices, such as detective work and 
nursing, will be practices when they are well institutionalised.
Let us turn to consider what kinds of characteristics an institution will require if it is 
to sustain practices. MacIntyre's favourite example of this kind of institution is that of a 
fishing crew. In such a crew, and in other paradigmatic communities MacIntyre mentions in 
this context, such as that of Welsh miners, farming co-ops in Ireland, and Mayan villages in 
Guatemala and Mexico
30
, those engaged in the relevant practices depend upon each other. 
Without the qualities of character and skills of the other members of such a group or 
community, no individual member can achieve those qualities and skills; no can any 
individual or the community as a whole pursue any good. These kinds of institutional settings 
will serve to foreground the internal goods and to prevent the appeal of external goods from 
dominating. Whilst recognising that external goods are indeed goods and are also essential to 
the survival of the practice, they must be subordinated to the social and moral requirements of 
the internal goods. Justice, courage, humility and honesty might make it impossible to 
maximally accrue external goods and because it is part of the nature and purpose of 
institutions to accrue external goods, the reigning in of this tendency is of vital importance. 
One consequences of this is that when external goods are scarce the virtues are threatened.
Let us take another example of a putative practice that requires correct 
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institutionalisation in order to be a plausible candidate for the status of ‘practice’. Muirhead 
gives the example of banking. He says, "Banking, like most work, aims to generate an 
economic return. But for banking to be a practice, it must have purposes that are specific to it. 
Profits, after all, might be realised in many other ways: making refrigerators, flying airplanes, 
writing sitcoms."
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Clearly banking, by definition, is not simply the pursuit of profit by any
means. If a group of bankers decide to take up shoplifting, they are acting outside their role as 
bankers, even if they are still acting in a way governed by those role demands. But the 
institution of banking is such that while it is possible  for outside observers to talk of a banker 
who makes good loans as a 'good banker' and a banker who is prone to making bad loans but 
overall generates far more profit as a 'bad banker', this is not the evaluative schema adhered 
to by leading bankers charged with selecting others for promotion. The external rewards of 
effective profit generation are so high (as indeed are the rewards for failure after a certain 
period of success) and so competitive and uncooperative in the long-term
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is the institutional 
atmosphere, that there is usually no reason for bankers to respect the rules of conduct of 'good 
banking' to any extent beyond legal requirement, or rather any extent beyond which the 
upholders of the law can prove. This is why high-street banking, which has a purpose other 
than profit maximisation, might be a candidate for the status of 'practice' (in circumstances 
rather different from the present, admittedly) but merchant banking seems to be ruled out. In 
an interview in Prospect magazine, MacIntyre compared being a 'good' banker to being a 
'good' burglar: here good can only mean skilful, it cannot mean virtuous.
Sitcom writers might crave success as much as bankers but because the goods internal 
to sitcom writing are further removed from external goods than are the goods that would be 
internal to banking (if it were institutionalised in such a way as to be a practice), the lure of 
including a lame joke cannot have the same lure as the falsification of accounts, or lying, 
cheating and corruption more generally. A putative practice requires a strong institution and 
highly virtuous guardians of that institution if it is to resist the ever-present corrupting 
influences, whereas the current institution of sitcoms is such that writers who use lame, 
clichéd jokes in the pursuit of cheap laughs, high ratings and financial rewards will miss out 
on both certain goods internal to sitcom writing as well as external prestige and respect 
amongst the sitcom community. Institutions are ordered best when the receipt of external 
goods matches most closely the achievement of internal goods.
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1.4 Conclusion
We have seen that MacIntyre's account of practices can survive some of the most serious 
charges levelled against it. The central problem of Muirhead's account is that he has taken the 
notion of a practice to be wholly independent. The notion of a practice is no doubt instructive 
when taken alone - it captures something that is lacking in much productive work as we will 
see in later chapters, but unless engagement in practices is further contextualised with 
relevant communities and within whole lives, problems like those that emerge in Muirhead's 
account will likely be irresolvable. Practices are not simply enjoyable or rewarding activities, 
and they are not simply 'fitting' activities. Were that the case then subjective satisfaction 
rather than virtue cultivation (perfection of character) would be of over-riding importance. In 
the following chapter we will explore another key element in MacIntyre's definition of a
virtue, that of narrative unity.
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Chapter 2: Narrative unity of life 
In chapter 14 of After Virtue MacIntyre notes that an account of virtues in terms of practices 
could only be a partial account and first account. A life lived in accordance only with virtues as 
they have been defined in relation to practices would be defective. According to MacIntyre such 
a life “would be… pervaded by too many conflicts and too much arbitrariness”
1
. In this chapter I 
shall seek to outline and defend MacIntyre’s thesis that these conflicts are and this arbitrariness is 
to be avoided by contextualising the virtues within a whole life conceived of as a narrative unity. 
It is often thought unproblematic that agents should divide their lives into distinct roles, roles 
which require them to think and to evaluate possible courses of action in distinct ways. My 
concern in later chapters
2
will be with the way in which the problem of role-structured disunity 
affects working life in particular, and this chapter will provide the foundation for that later 
discussion. The notion that one’s ‘work-self’ is distinct from one’s ‘family-self’ is common, and 
this way of thinking is compatible with there being a variety of other possible ‘selves’ 
distinguishable within those, and other, categories. Consider the following example: 
[O]rganisations, particularly large ones, are complex phenomena, and a given context may 
suggest multiple potential identities. Take the example of a manager in a task force charged with 
revamping her company’s vacation policy. Is she there as a manager, a department head, an 
organisational representative, a minority employee, all or some combination of these, or as 
something else? There are, in short, many hats of organisational membership.
3
I give this example not to single out and impugn its authors Ashforth and Johnson, who suggest  
that this picture is too simple to allow us to adequately understand social identity processes at 
work, and reject the ‘hats’ metaphor (in favour of the metaphor of facets of a diamond, which 
itself is problematic). I give the example because it captures a conception of human agency that 
MacIntyre argues is incompatible with human flourishing.
I will begin, in 2.1, by sketching MacIntyre’s arguments for this narrative unity thesis 
before outlining various problems as well as some objections raised by John Lippitt and others 
which I will examine in the later sections. In section 2.2 I will focus on Lippitt’s argument from 
self-deception and attempt to show that not only can the narrative unity thesis resist this objection 
but happily accommodates the insight that motivates the objection on the grounds that 
MacIntyre’s conception of told, as opposed to enacted, narratives is actually a conception best 
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thought of as an epistemological tool. Furthermore, an appreciation of the value of friendship 
allows us to recognise that we are partly co-authors of each other’s narratives. Finally in section 
2.3 I will consider the other arguments put forward by Lippitt, Mulhall and Lamarque. These are 
the arguments from the temporality of our nature and the argument from the nature of narrative. 
In this section I will attempt to show that in light of our discussion of narrative and self-
deception, and the conclusion that told narratives are epistemological tools than an ontological 
mode, that this tool is not damaged by the observations that types of narrative vary and that we 
can only tell narratives about our past.
4
2.1 Unity Versus Compartmentalisation
MacIntyre’s basic argument for his view that the narrative unity of life forms a key 
component in the acquisition and possession of virtues is as follows: i) individual virtues must 
apply across roles, ii) in order to so apply, virtues require contextualisation in a life that is 
unified, iii) a life that is not unified tends to be compartmentalised, and within the context of a 
compartmentalised life virtues are reduced to excellence in role performance, iv) such 
excellences cannot include crucial virtues such as justice, patience, integrity and constancy, and 
v) to avoid compartmentalisation the unity of a life must take the form of a narrative unity of the 
whole life. Below I will distinguish between the closely related concepts of narrative unity of a 
life as lived, and the narrative unity of self-understanding but for now let us look at these steps 
more closely. Of course, each step of this argument will be controversial to some degree and the 
following is intended as an overview. As with the conception of practices outlined in chapter 1, 
MacIntyre’s ethical theory will receive both application and further defence in the following 
chapters.
i) Virtues must apply across roles. A person who applies a virtue exclusively within the 
practice in which it was first learnt or in the context of any one practice but in no other contexts 
cannot be said to possess that virtue: a scientist who feels obliged to be honest only in his 
professional capacity and is quite happy to lie and deceive in his personal life can hardly be said 
to possess the virtue of truthfulness even if that professional honesty is unwavering. Someone 
who is kind to friends but cruel to everyone else could not be said to be properly kind even if that 
apparent kindness to friends is very pronounced. The virtue of kindness does not of course 
require that one be equally kind to everyone, but it is not compatible with being unkind to all but 
a select few. MacIntyre holds this because he adopts the Aristotelian line that virtues must be 
35
settled character traits that are partly valued for their own sake because they are partially 
constitutive of flourishing, which in turn helps us to distinguish virtues from skills which can be 
exercised in some circumstances but not in other similar circumstances. This is not a position that 
can be adequately defended here due to lack of space. Note however that this need not strike us 
as a claim that stands in need of a great deal of independent support. We simply would not apply 
the term ‘kind’ to someone if we knew they were frequently unkind to people.
ii) In order for any particular virtue to apply across roles in this sense, that virtue must 
be contextualised in a life that is itself unified. MacIntyre says “the unity of a virtue in someone’s 
life is intelligible only as a characteristic of a unitary life, a life that can be conceived and 
evaluated as a whole.”
5
Unless a life can be evaluated in some holistic fashion (this is not as yet 
the claim that a narrative unity of a whole life is required) then it is hard to see how it can be 
spoken of as a single life. Without some kind of overriding unity we would not be able to identify 
a ‘self’. If an agent’s life were utterly fragmented it would be impossible for that agent to take 
responsibility for any action or even to plan for the future. MacIntyre however does indeed 
require us to take this step to be a little more forceful than it might appear. He thinks that 
fragmentation leads to a lack of self-awareness that is inimical to virtue possession. As he says, 
in what is his most recent statement of the narrative unity thesis,
The characteristic modern self is in various and varying ways a divided self. This division 
of the self is at once implicitly acknowledged and yet concealed from view by the increasing 
compartmentalization of modern life, a compartmentalization whose effect is to have individuals 
focus attention upon themselves in this particular role in particular area of their lives or in that 
role in that area, rather than on themselves as unified agents. Thereby there is a lessening of 
inner conflict, but at the cost of a lack of self-awareness. And this lack of self-awareness 
obscures the underlying unity of the divided self
6
So the virtues require unity because they require self-awareness and that adequate self-awareness 
requires that we understand our lives as constituting a unity. 
Both unity and compartmentalization can have the effect of lessening conflict; unity does 
so by forcing the self to attempt to resolve conflicts whereas compartmentalization can prevent 
the self, which (ontologically) remains unified in some sense, from becoming aware of that 
conflict. It might be objected that self-awareness seems to imply conscious reflection but many 
virtues do not require conscious reflection, or indeed are incompatible with such reflection 
though we will see below that MacIntyre places special emphasis on some of the more 
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cognitively demanding virtues, such as justice and patience. Reflection in these cases is rarely a 
serious flaw. The agent who justified acting kindly by saying that he wanted to exercise the 
virtue of kindness would in most cases be guilty of a kind of ethical narcissism. Not every 
virtuous act is in fact justified by reflection, but this is not to say they could not be. The vicious 
person who wanted to transform his desires so that they aimed at the good might need to force 
himself to act kindly in just this way. In any case, MacIntyre’s claim is not that agents must
consciously justify each of their choices - doing so is clearly unnecessary - it is rather that if an 
agent fails to understand his or her life as being unified, he or she will be unable to recognise 
potential or actual incoherence.
This is not to say that those whose lives are divided into separate roles have a kind of 
multiple personality disorder. The self has a basic underlying unity even when it is 
misunderstood as being disunified. Someone might be able to identify his or her own disunity, 
but where the self is disunified in the way MacIntyre describes, there is a threat of incoherence 
and thus of irresolvable conflict. In those rare moments in which self-reflection is unquestionably 
called for: in trying to resolve an apparent dilemma
7
, in trying to decide what one really wants to 
do with one’s life, explicit unity that involves some self-conscious reflection is appropriate. 
Without such unity, a pair of contradictory commitments is unlikely to be recognised as such and 
where disunity is recognised it is likely to be distressing as when someone feels torn or unable to 
know what to think or do about something.
iii) Without unity a life tends to be compartmentalised. Let us leave aside for the moment 
the question of whether this picture adequately captures the ‘characteristically modern self’ and 
consider whether compartmentalization does lead to a lack of self-awareness. In the sense in 
which MacIntyre is using the word, ‘compartmentalization’ refers both to role-based ethics and a 
kind of psychological dissociation, so the human being remains a metaphysical unity even when 
not living as such. If the virtues of one area of life can be sectioned off from everything else 
entirely then there seems to be no way for virtue-ethics to provide an overall critique of the 
successful gangster, i.e. the gangster who possesses all of the character traits that might make 
someone a ‘good’ gangster. If we want to criticise the gangster it is because qualities needed to 
excel in a role are not the same as virtues. If we regard the gangster’s gangster-like qualities only 
as characteristics designed to make someone a good gangster, rather than as qualities designed to 
make someone a good human being, then there will be no reason for us to be critical of those 
qualities, and the same goes for an agent reflecting on his or her own life.
Though we are initially inculcated into the virtues through engagement in practices, if we 
allow those practices to remain unrelated compartments of life we will remain unable to possess 
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certain virtues, as we shall see in the next subsection, and this lack will in turn debar us from 
adequately possessing the virtues we learn through practices such that we will be unable to 
flourish. As MacIntyre says, 
What are spoken of as the virtues of a good committee man or of a good gambler or a pool 
hustler are professional skills professionally deployed in those situations where they can be 
effective, not virtues. Someone who genuinely possesses a virtue can be expected to manifest it 
in very different types of situation, many of them situations where the practice of a virtue cannot 
be expected to be effective in the way we can expect a professional skill to be.
8
Someone acting as a good pool hustler may have to identify with that role very strongly while out 
hustling in order to be able to exhibit or develop the required manipulative skills (the pool skills 
are somewhat different). Such a strong identification inhibits the ability to put those skills and 
that role into question, as I will argue in chapter 4. This lack of self-awareness is best displayed 
by considering the virtues it prevents an agent from possessing. We can conceive of a pool 
hustler or a gangster (or worse) who does possess a unity and who says “I accept my hustling 
ways as an integral part of myself, and thus am in no danger of incoherence”. But this poses no 
threat to MacIntyre’s account. Narrative unity does not guarantee possession of virtues, though it 
is a pre-requisite. Incoherence is a grave threat to the virtues, unity is required to avoid 
incoherence, and narrative unity allows those who face conflicts of the kind that require 
deliberation to avoid incoherence. It remains possible, on the basis of MacIntyre's account of 
practices and the narrative unity of life, for someone to possess integrity and live a life of vice
9
.
iv) Some key virtues cannot be made sense of in role-specific terms. MacIntyre draws up a 
list of virtues that are particularly dependent on a unified self-awareness. He says, 
[I]n different times and places the catalogue of the virtues is not always the same. But there is a 
core notion of the virtues as qualities of human beings as such and, central to it, there is an 
acknowledgement of two virtues, without which the other virtues cannot be possessed. To those 
virtues I give their traditional names ‘integrity’ and ‘constancy.’ To have integrity is to refuse to 
be, to have educated oneself so that one is no longer able to be, one kind of person in one social 
context, while quite another in other contexts. It is to have set inflexible limits to one’s 
adaptability to the roles one may be called upon to play.
10
And further,
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This divided self has to be characterized negatively, by what it lacks. It is not only without any 
standpoint from which it can pass critical judgment on the standards governing its various roles, 
but it must also lack those virtues of integrity and constancy that are prerequisites for exercising 
the powers of moral agency. It cannot have integrity, just because its allegiance to this or that set 
of standards is always temporary and context bound. And it cannot have the constancy that is 
expressed in an unwavering directedness, since it recurrently changes direction, as it moves from 
sphere to sphere.
11
MacIntyre also makes a similar claim about justice and patience. Justice, defined as giving each 
his due, requires that the various practices at which someone might be said to excel be ordered in 
such a way that it is possible to assess their relative merits and assess the achievements of people 
engaged in different practices. A brilliant scientist might deserve more praise than an adequate 
nurse, but an adequate nurse might deserve more praise than a brilliant footballer and it is the 
same sort of unity that makes a life a whole that makes such judgments possible (I qualify these 
comparisons with 'might' because they are open questions). That is, for it to be possible for 
someone to judge the merits of practices and goods as engaged in or achieved by others it must 
be possible to do so for oneself, and vice-versa. Patience requires unity in that without an 
overarching hierarchy of goods it will be impossible to decide when to remain patient and when 
to give up. A brilliant scientist patiently toiling away on some problem late into the night has no 
reason to give up qua scientist, but he or she does qua parent, or qua member of a Finnegan’s 
Wake reading group and so may decide that with little chance of a breakthrough that evening it is 
worth calling it a day and spending some time being very patient with Joyce. It is impossible to 
defend MacIntyre’s interpretation of all of these virtues in the space available here but it is 
however worth outlining his view and why he thinks it requires unity in order to render more 
plausible the interpretation I will give of the narrative unity thesis in the following section. 
v) Narrative unity allows us to avoid compartmentalisation. So finally we can see that 
MacIntyre’s is a “concept of a self whose unity resides in the unity of a narrative which links 
birth to life to death as a narrative beginning to middle to end.”
12
If a scientist’s behaviour in the 
laboratory requires contextualisation to be intelligible, then that contextual detail itself requires 
further contextualisation. The answer to the question, ‘why is that person pouring liquid into a 
test tube?’ is that he is a scientist trying to discover something about how two chemicals react 
under certain conditions. But there are further questions that may be asked about the scientist’s 
behaviour and that will require answers providing a broader context, ‘why is it worth knowing 
that?’, ‘what is that knowledge worth relative to other research projects?’, ‘why did the scientist 
39
choose that particular vocation?’, ‘how important is his work relative to his hobbies?’ etc. For it 
to be possible to provide satisfactory answers to these questions, the life (and the social context) 
must possess some kind of unity. 
When describing a study of the commitments of power company executives in the 1970s, 
MacIntyre says,
One incidental discovery… was that power company executives tended to a significant degree 
to answer what were substantially the same questions somewhat differently, depending on 
whether they took themselves to be responding qua power company executive or qua parent and 
head of household or qua concerned citizen. That is to say, their attitudes varied with their social 
roles and they seemed quite unaware of this.
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What this shows is that people are liable to meet the demands of the role the happen to play and 
where they have no standpoint from which to assess their whole lives, such contradictions may 
pass unnoticed.
Lippitt puts forward three arguments against MacIntyre’s account of the narrative unity of 
a whole life: 
A) Literary Problem. Taking literary narrative to be the default kind of narrative is 
misconceived, for narrative can be a rather thin notion which is not necessarily anything to do 
with the sort of unity MacIntyre has in mind and it is not at all clear that assigning fictional 
genres to lived lives will be any help when individuals attempt to understand their lives. 
Furthermore, given that MacIntyre acknowledges that life is characterised by unpredictability it 
seems that our lives may change genre at any moment, which renders the concept of genre otiose 
as a method of establishing a stable model of selfhood.
B) Temporality Problem. Our status as temporal beings means that we are never fully 
able to identify with ourselves and so our lives cannot be unified wholes in the required sense. 
Lippitt approvingly quotes Mulhall who says, “to take oneself as one’s own intentional object is 
to take up another state of oneself”
14
. So, when we attempt to understand our lives as narratives 
so far we cannot subsume either the present self or the future under that narrative.
C) Self-deception Problem. There are always different and possibly inconsistent 
narratives we can tell about our lives or indeed any significant event and so any story we may tell 
ourselves about our lives so far is in danger of being a retrospective illusion. One narrative may 
be more appealing than another in virtue of being a more interesting story, or being beautifully 
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expressed, or simply more flattering to the life of which it is an account and none of these 
reasons for selecting a narrative has anything to do with truth or unity.
I will outline these objections more thoroughly in the following sections but have 
provided this outline because I intend to address C), the problem of the possibility of self-
deception, first. This is because once we see how MacIntyre’s narrative thesis can help us to 
avoid self-deception we will be in a better position to see how MacIntyre can respond to the 
temporality and literary problems.
2.2 The Self-deception Problem
In his discussion of the problem of possible self deception Lippitt says,
In asking myself whether my life possesses narrative unity, I shall be waging a perennial battle 
against self-deception. What compounds this problem is that establishing truth in respect of a 
narrative is a tricky business. I can offer you an account of my life that contains not a single 
falsehood. And yet the overall narrative can still be false and dishonest.
15
About this Lippitt is right. One does not need to be a card-carrying Freudian to recognise the 
danger of this kind of rationalisation. There are, broadly speaking, five things the MacIntyrean 
might say in response to this problem: i) self deception is not limited to autobiography, rather it is 
a potential problem even for non-narrative accounts of the self, indeed it is a potential problem 
for everyone, ii) it may well be more of a problem for the non-narrative account than it is for the 
MacIntyrean, iii) the notion that a self-serving or fundamentally dishonest person is less likely to 
flourish due to his or her inability to accurately understand his or her life as a narrative unity 
squares rather nicely with MacIntyre’s Eudaimonism, iv) because of the collaborative nature of 
MacIntyre’s ethics the selection of a narrative is not made entirely alone and so the possibility of 
a self-serving rationalisation is diminished, and v) the selection of any particular narrative over 
another can be made on the same rational grounds as any other thesis, such as coherence, 
explanatory power, etc. Let us examine these responses in more detail.
i) It is not only unified narratives that can be examples of self deception and the danger of 
self deception is not limited to narratives. Even a moral agent who is resolutely determined not to 
subsume the various strands of his or her life under a single unified narrative may still create 
relatively small-scale narratives about his or her life on occasion, and may still fall prey to self 
deception on such occasions as these narratives may be deceptive. Any moral agent can be faced 
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with the task of interpreting his or her actions and intentions and so runs the risk of formulating a 
dishonest or deceptive interpretation. Any individual action can be interpreted in one way or 
another and an apparently kind offer of help may actually be patronising, and apparently well 
intentioned and just criticism may actually be born of resentment, and so on.
ii) The non-narrativist may actually be more prone to self deception than the narrativist. 
One of the purposes of thinking of one’s life as a narrative unity is to avoid just this sort of 
confusion. MacIntyre is explicitly committed to fallibilism
16
, but notes that the motivation for 
explicitly constructing a narrative of events is to attain a greater understanding of those events. 
As such explicit narratives will be drawn up at times of epistemological crisis. When the non-
narrativist confronts the question of whether his or her criticism was just or an expression of 
resentment he or she must either draw up some sort of narrative or risk de-contextualising the act 
to such a degree that there remains no reason to decide one way or the other. The minimal 
narrative must at least include such elements as the agent’s recent dealings and relationship with 
the recipient of the criticism, and in order to be adequate to the task of achieving self-
understanding may need to include various facts about the agent’s life which may have caused 
him or her to be resentful (examples might include recent personal turmoil, stresses, financial 
problems, or simply ill luck, etc.). It will be objected that this type of piecemeal, modest narrative 
may be useful on occasion to avoid self deception but that as things stand this in no way 
vindicates the far grander narrative (of a whole life) thesis. This is true. However, without 
wanting to beg the question in favour of the narrativist view by simply asserting that a whole life 
narrative is required to contextualise the smaller narrative we can at this stage note that it is easy 
to imagine examples in which a narrative far more extensive in scope than these kinds of modest 
narrative becomes, at the very least, extremely useful to the agent seeking self-understanding. 
Such an example of a whole life, or most of a whole life, might take the form of the potentially 
resentful but ostensibly just criticism of one sibling directed at another, the erratic behaviour of 
someone traumatised as a child, or the callousness of someone who has always been consumed 
by a desire to be famous. Lifelong psychological quirks will require lifelong narratives.
iii) People are sometimes deluded or lacking in self-honesty. Such vices may exist 
independently of any attempt to establish the narrative unity of one’s whole life. Virtues such as 
truthfulness and humility are required to adequately tell one’s life story and whilst it is true that 
we may all be “waging a perennial battle against self deception”, there are good reasons to think 
that some are more likely to win that battle than others. According to MacIntyre’s account of the 
virtues it is precisely those most in possession of certain virtues that are most conceivably able 
account for their lives as a narrative whole, in part because they are less likely to live 
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compartmentalised lives. According to MacIntyre's view it is in virtue of this narrative unity that 
such people are better able to possess and cultivate further virtues and therefore more able to 
pursue their good. But this pursuit might be unsuccessful. The use of a narrative tool does not 
and could not guarantee self-honesty.
To put things this way might make it seem as though I am making the apparently empty 
claim that to be a successful moral agent (where success means something like ‘possessing the 
virtues and being able to deliberate correctly’) one must already be a successful moral agent. This 
is indeed what I am saying, though I do not think it is empty on the grounds that, as we saw in 
our discussion of practices in chapter 1, no adult who is remotely capable of functioning 
intellectually or psychologically can be utterly devoid of the virtues. To the extent that someone 
does lack the virtues generally, the virtues of honesty and truthfulness that stave off self-
deception, or the virtues required to avoid compartmentalisation specifically, MacIntyre is 
perfectly willing to admit that his or her life may be defective. The virtues are mutually 
supporting: honesty and patience, for instance, will give their possessor a greater chance of 
cultivating other virtues.
iv) Because the process through which an agent may come to identify the good(s) at 
which he or she should aim and the process through which an agent may come to understand the 
narrative unity of his or her own life are collaborative processes, something necessitated by an 
account of the virtues based on practices, the possibility of selfish rationalisation or self 
deception is severely diminished. MacIntyre even goes so far as to say that it is partly because 
others know me that I am able to know myself
17
. It would be hard to have confidence in my 
judgments about myself if those who knew me most intimately entirely disagreed with those 
judgements. It is often others who correct or refine my own judgments. It might be objected that 
some judgments must be made at times or in contexts in which we are fundamentally alone. This 
may be true. What is important however is that the virtues, character traits and habits of mind 
that allow anyone to make such a decision will have been forged in relation to others, through 
engagement in practices. Furthermore, even when we make decisions that must be made alone 
we are still answerable to others (i.e. fellow practitioners, a category that can include friends and 
family). This means that there must always be a high value placed on honesty and self honesty, 
and one upshot of this is that the MacIntyrean will agree with Lippitt’s criticisms of Jeffrey 
Turner’s view that moral truth is bound up with interest value. The narrativist is both motivated 
to be honest and exists in a context in which dishonesty and self-deception are kept constantly in 
check by my relationships with others. In considering my life-narrative part of my concern will 
be with how I relate to others and why others perceive me as they do.
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v) The four responses considered thus far have been primarily concerned with why the 
problem of self deception is no more of a problem for the MacIntyrean than it is for anyone else, 
given that some contextualising narratives are essential and perhaps less of a problem for the 
MacIntyrean. Although the notion that collaboration indicates that discussion can aid decision in 
such a way that narratives become relatively unproblematic, none of the above has directly 
addressed how one narrative might be selected over another. The answer to this question must 
surely be that that we select one narrative over the alternatives for the same reasons as we select 
any theory over any other. Narratives are not theories, but they are sufficiently similar for criteria 
such as consistency and explanatory power to be relevant means of assessment. If an agent puts 
forward a life narrative that renders a whole host of actions and events inexplicable then we 
would be rightly suspicious of that narrative. If an agent puts forward a narrative that suggests a 
vast number of actions are to be considered ‘out of character’ whilst offering no further 
explanation of what caused such behaviour we might quite naturally conclude that the narrative 
in question is flawed, and is a dishonest account designed to obscure actions that are actually in
character. In doing so, we would disregard the fact that our judgement might well be unflattering, 
unattractive, or just plain boring.
When discussing why someone might reflect upon his or her whole life, MacIntyre says, 
When from time to time, the plain person retrospectively examines what her or his life amounts 
to as a whole, often enough with a view to a choice between alternative futures, 
characteristically what she or he is in effect asking is, ‘To what conception of my overall good 
have I so far committed myself? And, do I now have reason to put it into question?’ The unity 
of her or his life about which each human being thus enquires is the unity of a dramatic 
narrative, of a story whose outcome can be a success or a failure for each protagonist.
18
What this shows is that while lived lives are enacted narratives, the framing of a life story in a 
‘literary’ or conversational narrative, a life narrative as it is told, is designed to allow the agent to 
better understand his or her life and to be better able to proceed. Lippitt is correct to note that 
MacIntyre does not adequately distinguish between literary and enacted narratives, and though 
MacIntyre’s account would have been clearer had he drawn that distinction, something along the 
lines of this distinction is implicit in MacIntyre's account. Such a distinction would especially 
help MacIntyre to avoid the unwanted consequence that his theory seems to permit someone to 
fatalistically accept their life to be of a set genre
19
.
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One consideration that might have led to this omission is that MacIntyre regards as 
narratives a great multiplicity of things, as we will see later, and so does not want to create a 
dichotomy between just two types of narrative. Humans are metaphysically unified, and 
narrative-unity best allows us to understand ourselves. In this sense we can see more clearly why 
the unity must be understood in narrative rather than simply logical or metaphysical terms. An 
adequate narrative of my life will focus heavily on the role played by others, and in considering 
my own narrative I may well test the veracity of my narrative my offering narrative justifications 
of my actions and choices to my friends and interested members of the relevant community. 
Others therefore feature centrally in both our lives and in helping us to adequately understand our 
lives. “Only in fantasy do we live what story we please... Each of our dramas exerts constraints 
on each other’s”
20
. We are each the major player in our own particular narrative, but our 
narratives are bound up with the narratives of others and so a narcissistic focus on oneself can 
only lead to a mistaken interpretation of one’s life.
21
A life is not the same as a conversation or a confession in which that life is described, but 
for MacIntyre, “Narrative is not the work of poets, dramatists and novelists reflecting upon 
events which has no narrative order before one was imposed by the singer or writer; narrative 
form is neither disguise nor decoration.”
22
The narrative pre-exists the telling of the narrative 
which is done for the sake of better understanding, so the life is a narrative in terms of its 
ontological structure, but the telling of the narrative is an epistemological tool. While it is 
important to resist the “danger of conflating the quality of a life with the quality of the narrative
of that life”
23
(italics in original) because the central purpose of constructing a narrative of my 
life is vastly different from the central purpose of constructing a fictional narrative, the narrativist 
runs less risk of being seduced by aesthetic factors than Lippitt believes. This is not to say that 
the two must always be distinct. Someone may write fiction in order to clarify or analyse some 
aspect of lived life, and obviously some people’s life stories make for riveting biographies.  
Indeed, part of the appeal of fictional narratives is surely that they do have parallels with life as it 
is lived. MacIntyre says, “It is because we all live out narratives in our lives and because we 
understand our own lives in terms of narratives that we live out that the form of narrative is 
appropriate for understanding the actions of others”
24
. We have the fiction we do because of the 
lives we lead.
MacIntyre claims that narrative form is to be found in various aspects of life, such as, 
“battles, chess games, courtships, philosophy seminars, families at the dinner table, businessmen 
negotiating contracts”
25
as well as fictional narratives found in works of literature. So whilst he 
does not draw a clear line between literary narratives and enacted narratives, these examples 
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make it clear that a variety of items fall under the concept. Given that this is the case it makes 
sense for us to ask, ‘if we construct narratives to make better sense of the enacted narratives of 
our lives, what relationship must there be between these two types of narrative?’ This is a 
question we will turn our attention to in section 2.3, but there are some remarks that need to be 
made here. If it is right to regard the narratives we tell ourselves about our lives as 
epistemological tools, then some things that are true of our whole lives will not be relevant to 
what is nevertheless a whole account. The fact I was bitten by a dog aged eight plays no 
important role in my life provided it never caused me to fear dogs. In this case having been bitten 
neither hinders, helps, nor has any impact upon my life projects and my pursuit of the good. If I 
was afraid of dogs but managed to overcome that fear it might be a detail relevant to my 
narrative, it might for instance allow me to have faith in my ability to overcome irrational fears, 
and if I am still afraid of dogs there is a chance I will never be able to appreciate walking in the 
park, or to relax when I visit my friend who has a house full of spaniels, etc. Not everything that 
happens to me is relevant to my life story, and of course the fact that I cannot remember 
everything that has ever happened to me does not thereby render me incapable of providing a 
unified narrative account of my life. If the reason for attempting to make sense of my life as a 
narrative is motivated by the question of what I have committed myself to, then some of the 
choices I have made and some of my acts will be more relevant than others precisely because 
they will be more revealing about my overall commitments. So an agent capable of remembering 
every detail of his or her life and thus capable of writing an exhaustive autobiography would not 
necessarily be giving an adequate narrative of his or her own life.
It might also be instructive to consider why the ability to produce an adequate, unified 
narrative is not the same as the ability to produce a good autobiography. MacIntyre says that “To 
write a worthwhile autobiography you need either the wisdom of an Augustine or the 
shamelessness of a Rousseau or the confidence in one’s own self-knowledge of a 
Collingwood”
26
. Here we see can see that MacIntyre’s account of the narrative unity requirement 
does not require explicitly working out every detail, and does not require the laborious, 
intellectual demands required by an autobiography. We also see that a narrative unity is 
compatible with having less than complete certainty in one’s self-knowledge. Indeed, if my 
reading of MacIntyre is correct, engaging in an attempt to account for one’s commitments is one 
method of coming to acquire greater self-knowledge.
Lippitt is mistaken to demand that a narrative account of my whole life necessarily make 
sense of my commitments as a gardener and as a soccer fan. If these two commitments are in 
tension and are of enduring importance to me then that may well be the case, but such 
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commitments may be so partial, modest, or incidental that they have no bearing over the overall 
shape of the life. If I spend far more time gardening than I do watching soccer then it might be 
sensible to draw the conclusion that I value gardening more highly than I do soccer, or if I am 
bullied into tending the garden by my spouse, missing the game might show that I value a quiet 
life more than I value soccer. It is also possible that a correct narrative leaves this question 
undetermined, but more importantly the reason a narrative account of a whole life does not need 
to take account of every single element is the same reason a literary narrative can be convincing 
even if details are omitted. We never find out whether Anna Karenina likes her eggs poached or 
fried, or perhaps we do but it is a fact so unimportant that I have forgotten it. I can understand 
what is important about Anna without such knowledge, just as I can understand my life without 
being able to remember or account for every tiny detail. Lippitt might say that in admitting this I 
have capitulated and shown that the term ‘whole life’ delivers far less than it promises, but if 
what I have said above is correct then the focus on a whole life is more concerned with the 
avoidance of compartmentalisation than on accounting for every small detail. If I find out that the 
begonias will die unless I attend to them immediately and to do so I must miss the game, what I 
decide to do will reveal, perhaps to me as much as to others, which commitment of the two is 
dearest to me. The ability to recognise genuine conflicts as such and therefore to be able to set 
about resolving them is part of the purpose of asking myself about my whole life. Gardening and 
football are unlikely to ever come into conflict except in the sort of odd case I have described, 
but there are other roles that contingently might or necessarily must come into conflict. I cannot 
possibly become a champion body builder and a contender for the Tour de France at the same 
time, and as the example given in 2.1 about power company executives shows, it is not always 
possible to be a good power company executive and a good concerned citizen.
Another objection might be that we simply do not live and do not need to live unified 
lives, that compartmentalisation is not a problem. MacIntyre certainly thinks that ‘we’ do not 
necessarily live adequately unified lives, as we saw in 2.1. I hope that the arguments presented 
then about the nature of unity and the arguments presented in this section about the 
epistemological usefulness of telling unified narratives about our lives has given us some reason 
to doubt the force of this objection. In the following section we shall examine more closely just 
what kind of wholeness our lives can have, and we will return to the problematic nature of 
compartmentalisation in chapter 4.
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2.3 Temporality, Literature and Wholeness
Lippitt puts forward or endorses a series of further objections to MacIntyre’s narrative unity 
thesis based on Lamarque’s account of narrative: i) almost any sequence of events can count as a 
narrative, so as a concept applied to a human life it is uninformative, ii) MacIntyre’s insistence 
that lives can be assigned genres is, at best, misleading because the unpredictability of life as 
lived means that the genre could change at any minute, and iii) few people do or could tell 
narratives about their whole lives.
i) Lamarque claims that “at least two events must be depicted in a narrative and there 
must be some more or less loose, albeit non-logical, relation between the events”
27
. Even if we 
accept this minimal definition and its corollary that technically being a narrative tells us very 
little of substance, is it possible to infer anything against MacIntyre’s narrative thesis from this? I 
think not. This is because, as we saw in 2.2, the casting of a life in terms of a told narrative is 
done with the purpose of deciding what to do next, to discern the nature of one’s existing 
commitments and whether to put them into question, etc. The fact that something is a narrative is 
not in and of itself informative, but the narratives appropriate to such questioning must be. 
MacIntyre says that “The concept of a telos of human life is generally first comprehended in 
terms of outcomes of particular narratives about particular lives”
28
so we know in advance at 
least something about the type of narrative our telling of our own life story has to take: they are 
guided by what we take our ultimate ends to be. As MacIntyre says, "Ends provide the measure 
by which desires... are to be evaluated. Ends provide us with premises for sound practical 
reasoning"
29
. Those who accept this, even if tacitly, are in no danger of confusing a narrative that 
adequately accounts for a life with a narrative that links barely related events. Although this is 
not the place to elaborate here, MacIntyre seems to hold a cognitivist account of literary value. 
The works of literature MacIntyre most frequently praises, especially works by Austen and 
Dante, are praised for what they reveal about human life and about the virtues, and MacIntyre 
even claims that it is not always clear when one is reading philosophy and when one is reading 
literature in the cases of the writers mentioned
30
. We would not be interested in a fictional 
narrative that consisted solely of one event and then another, nor are we interested in trivialities 
when we consider the stories that make up our lives.
ii) According to Lippitt, MacIntyre's claim that we can allocate genres to lives obscures 
rather than clarifies matters. MacIntyre says that when a biographer contemplates the life of his 
or her subject it is appropriate to do so with a view to allocating a particular genre to that life. 
MacIntyre also says that, “We allocate conversations to genres, just as we do literary narratives. 
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Indeed a conversation is a dramatic work, even if a very short one, in which the participants are 
not only the actors, but also the joint authors, working out in agreement or disagreement the 
mode of their production.”
31
Lippitt’s objection to this is that allocating a genre to my own life 
can prevent me from seeing alternative futures and possibilities. Lippitt says "Judging my life as
a tragedy on the basis of critical aspects of it to date may well prevent me from seeing ways in 
which possibilities open to me right now prevent its continuing along such a trajectory"
32
. Also, 
given that life is unpredictable and an unexpected event can give me good grounds for 
interpreting my life in such a way that I must categorise it as belonging to a different genre, the 
notion of a genre provides no basis for a stable account of the self that the talk of unity and 
wholeness seems to require. About this Lippitt is surely right. However, it is important to note 
both that MacIntyre never claims that an agent must allocate an unchanging genre to his or her 
own life as it is being lived; his point about biographies is to show how close told narratives can
be to enacted narratives, and that the requirement that we allocate conversations to genres can 
help us to understand the non-vacuous flexibility of the concept of enacted narrative. 
If we allocate conversations to genres while at the same time being the authors of those 
conversations, it is possible to see how a change in genre whilst the conversation is ongoing does 
not mean that conversations lack a kind of unity or wholeness nor that they must stagnate under 
the pressure of such allocation. If, when engaged in a particular conversation, I come to recognise 
it as a friendly debate with the norms that this ‘genre’ requires it does not mean that it is 
impossible for that conversation to become a hostile row or idle chatter. This transition can both 
be made by a relatively slow process of readjustment or as a reaction to a more abrupt change of 
tone. Like the narrative as told of a life, the classification of conversations into genres can be 
seen as an epistemological tool, rather than a restrictive ontological requirement. These two 
categories cannot be kept entirely separate of course.  If MacIntyre is correct, conversations 
really are narratives that belong to particular genres, but our understanding of those conversations 
as they are happening is necessarily prone to change and so our decision to allocate them to any 
particular genre at the time is best understood as a way of coping with and understanding the 
demands of that particular situation. In the case of someone's life it may indeed be the case that 
the very best interpretations can be made only after death. In his discussion of social scientific 
knowledge in After Virtue, which we will consider in chapter 6, MacIntyre gives the example of a 
board game that replicates the Battle of Gettysburg which can be won by a moderately good 
player taking the Confederate side. Such a player is unlikely to be as adept at military command 
as General Lee, but such a player knows what Lee could not have. Our lives might be easier to 
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understand in retrospect but that does not diminish the value of doing what we can to understand 
our lives as we go.
iii) Very few people do and perhaps few people could tell their own life stories in any 
complete or unified fashion, so “if the unity of a life depends upon the unity of a narrative then 
most lives will turn out to have no such unity because there is no such narrative”
33
. Without 
wanting to quibble over the empirical claim that most people could not tell a unified narrative 
about their own lives (in any case MacIntyre’s thesis suggests that they could not and that this is 
part of what is wrong with modernity), this is not quite right for another reason. It is no part of 
MacIntyre’s thesis that it is essential for an agent to regularly tell the story of his or her entire life 
in order to live a unified life. Were this the case two absurdities would arise, firstly the telling of 
a life that omits no detail is likely to take longer than that life took to live and so the agent would 
be in a position, reminiscent of Tristram Shandy, of being likely to die before the narrative 
caught up with the date that the telling commenced, and secondly, if it were possible to find a 
more economical way of telling a whole life story, if a life requires being told as a narrative in 
order to be unified, an agent would have to retell, or at least call to consciousness in some way, 
that narrative each and every day in order to make sense, (i.e. subsume into the unity of life) of 
the events of that day. This is not of course MacIntyre’s view, nor does what he says commit him
to this view. 
As we saw earlier, MacIntyre says that an agent may periodically call his or her life into 
question in order to make sense of existing commitments and to make decisions about how to go 
on. The unity of a life does not depend on the telling of that life as a unified narrative, a unified 
life is narrative in form and can be best understood as a told narrative. It is because we can best 
understand our lives as narratives that fictional narratives can play such an important role in our 
moral development, and some lack of ‘wholeness’ is not damaging. We can easily distinguish 
between a biography that accounts for a whole life even though it omits the subject’s favourite 
breakfast cereal and one that is fragmentary or covers only a portion of the life of the subject. As 
MacIntyre says, “we characteristically draw upon resources provided by some stock of stories 
from which we had earlier learned to understand both our own lives and the lives of others in 
narrative terms, the oral and written literature of whatever particular culture it is that we happen 
to inhabit.”
34
Just as we can adjudicate between more and less didactically valuable works of 
fiction, we can adjudicate between better and worse types of narrative told about our own lives.
Mulhall rejects the notion that human lives can be unified or whole, in Lippitt’s words, 
“because of our being-ahead-of-ourselves. We relate ourselves to what is not yet, coming to an 
end only at death”
35
. Furthermore, against MacIntyre’s claim that death is the end of the narrative 
50
of our lives, Mulhall argues that death is something that occurs outside the story of my life and so 
cannot be part of my life story as told by me. As Lippitt says, “the one person whose unified ‘life 
narrative’ I can’t in principle have access to is my own”
36
. Let us consider these two related 
objections.
It seems that MacIntyre is able to deal with the notion that ‘each of us is most distant 
from himself’ and also with the problem posed by death. Despite never drawing an explicit 
distinction between a narrative drawn up as an epistemological tool and the narrative structure of 
life as lived, this distinction allows us to make better sense of a good deal of what MacIntyre 
does say. We saw earlier that a unified account of a whole life does not need to provide a detailed 
account of every single aspect of that life. Once we realise that the narratives we tell ourselves 
about our lives are perfectly compatible with a realisation of the openness of our future, and once 
we distinguish between wholeness-as-complete and wholeness-as-exhaustive, death does not 
seem to be much of a problem. One does not need to give an account of one's own death in order 
to give a unified account of life and to be able to take a rational, intelligible next step. In a sense 
the story of someone's life continues after their death. Consider the example of Oliver Cromwell. 
He never lost a battle and died one of the most powerful men in Europe, yet within a few years of 
his death his laws had been repealed, some of his closest comrades had been tortured and killed, 
and his own body had been exhumed and desecrated. But a generation later his example made 
possible the Glorious Revolution. In deciding whether Cromwell's life was successful it certainly 
makes sense to consider such developments. Clearly such events cannot be part of Cromwell's 
reasoning, but this does not mean that Cromwell was unable to think of his life in narrative terms. 
As with the example of the Battle of Gettysburg game given above, it is not crucial that 
Cromwell's own narrative understanding of himself is superior to those who judge with 
hindsight, it is crucial that his self-understanding is better when framed in narrative terms than it 
would otherwise be, and that this understanding allows him to avoid incoherence.
We do well to realise that our lives have a terminus, and this realisation has certain 
repercussions. Whilst death may come at any time, it is not entirely unpredictable (there is such a 
thing as the average life expectancy after all) and a person who is aged 70 and yet totally 
unprepared for death, as unprepared as a 15 year old might be, has made an irresponsible 
mistake. This picture of narrative unity is not incompatible with ancient Greek injunction to call 
no man happy until he is dead. While we are alive we can never be certain that some great 
misfortune is not about to befall us. A narrative unity is one way in which we attempt to avoid 
misfortunes that might arise from moral incoherence or confronting an irresolvable dilemma, but 
no amount of narrative unity can protect someone against a sudden and unexpected death. In a 
51
paper delivered at the Catholic University of America in 2009 entitled ‘Ends and Endings’
37
MacIntyre claims that moral philosophy requires historical and literary narratives as it is through 
these that we can come to appreciate that the concepts of final ends and subordinate ends have 
application. This is because the nature of a story depends on the kind of ending it has, and the 
kind of ending it has depends upon the relationship its central characters have to some end. 
Without ends we would not be able to understand our projects or our lives and there could be no 
finality except the accidental finality of death, claims MacIntyre. Does this not suggest that we 
need to get things exactly right, to complete our central projects, just before our death? No, but 
we do want to aim at a completed life that prepares us for death. If I die an unexpected death, my 
narrative still depends upon those ends I had set myself.
The claim that temporality limits unity is more challenging. There are times when one 
forgets oneself and one can only possibly account for that period in retrospect, and indeed the 
moment of narrative cannot itself be part of that narrative. This point is made by Lippitt and 
Mulhall. Lippitt says that, “one can only be conscious of oneself only as one was, not as one 
is,”
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and as far as it goes this is right. But it is not clear that this is incompatible with 
MacIntyre’s position, once the telling of a narrative is interpreted as a tool. What we have been 
tells us what we are committed to, and what we are committed to tells us what we are. Mulhall 
puts the same point this way, “the phenomenon of self-consciousness… condemns the self to 
non-self-identity, to a necessary inability to coincide with itself, to gather itself up as a whole into 
its own awareness”
39
. In one sense, this point is similar to a challenge made by Lamarque that we 
considered above. If unity requires exhaustive wholeness then the fact that an agent provided a 
narrative that did not include the present moment would be problematic. In order to achieve that 
sort of unity, not only would an agent have to provide an account of every detail in the past, not 
only would an agent have to retell the narrative after every day or significant event (or indeed 
every single event, if such a narrative is required to make a decision about what is to count as 
significant), but the agent would also enter an infinite regress at the end of the telling a narrative: 
‘now I am telling myself my narrative’, ‘now I am telling myself that I am telling myself my 
narrative’, and so on ad infinitum. But we have already seen that MacIntyre’s conception of a 
narrative unity is not so demanding and so does not suffer from this regress. He says, “An ability 
to put ourselves into question philosophically thus in key part depends upon the prior possession 
of some measure of narrative understanding”
40
. What this quotation shows is that narrative unity 
is not supposed to render perspicuous all of the complexities of human consciousness or 
phenomenology, but rather to enable us to effectively put our own lives into question. Even if 
human consciousness must be characterised by some sort of conflict, or absence, or non-identity, 
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narrative is a tool that can allow us to gain the distance required to avoid indecision or 
procrastination and to see that we are also complex wholes.
It follows from the points put forward by Lippitt and Mulhall that the future is a threat to 
unity. The future is an important part of my life, but it is not something I can account for as part 
of my narrative because it is unpredictable. This unpredictability however is precisely what a 
narrative can help us to deal with. MacIntyre’s remarks on integrity, as we saw earlier, show that 
it is a virtue concerned with setting ‘inflexible limits’ to the sorts of roles we will be willing or 
indeed able to play. MacIntyre points out that our enacted narratives are both unpredictable (and 
teleological). 
[We] live out our lives, both individually and in our relationships with each other, in light of 
certain conceptions of a possible shared future, a future in which certain possibilities beckon us 
forward and others repel us, some seem already foreclosed and others perhaps inevitable. There 
is no present which is not informed by some image of the future and an image of the future 
which already presents itself in the form of a telos – or of a variety of ends or goals – towards 
which we are either moving or failing to move in the present.
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It is our ability to understand our own enacted narratives, in part by telling narratives about them, 
that we can face the future with confidence that we stand some chance of achieving the good or 
goods we wish to achieve.
2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter I sought to defend and elucidate MacIntyre's conception of narrative unity. The 
notion of narrative unity is most useful if we distinguish between metaphysical and 
epistemological senses. Man is “essentially a story telling animal... [and] becomes through his 
history a teller of stories that aspire to truth”
42
. With this in mind it makes sense to suggest that 
what matters with narratives about our own lives is that they capture the truth even if they take 
the form of reconstructions that fail to get the history exactly right. In any case, the reason it is 
important that we conceive of our lives as having a narrative unity, something stronger than a 
simple logical unity, is that a human life gets logical unity for free. The self just is unified, a well 
lived life possesses an extra degree of unity through which commitments can be ordered in 
relation to some end, and at moments of epistemological crisis an explicit narrative will be an 
invaluable tool. Having considered two of the three stages of MacIntyre's definition of a virtue, 
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we will next turn our attention to the question of alienated labour and to contemporary working 
life. The account of MacIntyre's ethics developed in these first two chapters will underpin much 
of the argument in later chapters, and the notion of narrative unity defended here is pre-supposed 
in later discussions of compartmentalisation.
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Chapter 3: Alienation and Modern Work
In the previous chapter we saw that MacIntyre conceives of the good life as requiring a 
certain kind of narrative unity, the achievement of which both requires the possession of the 
virtues and is required in order to secure that possession, which is initially learned through 
engagement in practices. In this chapter we will consider some ways in which working life 
might, theoretically at this stage, frustrate our acquisition of the virtues. More specifically, we 
shall consider how working life may be a source of alienation. Firstly we will examine the 
early Marx’s account of alienated labour and then Braverman’s white collar alienation theory 
in order to frame an examination of contemporary work. We will then look again at the 
relationship between Sennett and MacIntyre in order to further elucidate MacIntyre's position 
and to explore how the MacIntyrean would respond to some of the features of modern work 
that Sennett identifies as being inimical to 'character'. Alienation is a useful concept for the 
study of working life, indeed for any theory which depends upon a commitment to the 
existence of a human nature, and this is especially true when that human nature itself depends 
upon an engagement with practices, or productive activity. 
Sennett's account of changes to contemporary work provides us with a useful account 
which will inform later chapters, but it stands in need of some modification. For instance, 
whilst Sennett, like MacIntyre, rejects Marxism and Communitarianism, the former’s reasons 
for doing so are questionable and prevent his account of good work from being as strong as it 
otherwise might be. From a MacIntyrean perspective, both Marxism and Sennett's position 
are both ethically impoverished. More broadly, the purpose of this chapter is to complete the 
theoretical groundwork for the more direct investigation of working life in the subsequent 
chapters by outlining how MacIntyrean enquiry differs from related critical sociologies of 
work.
3.1 Marx’s Account of Alienated Labour
From a MacIntyrean perspective practices are both the crucial determinant of flourishing at 
work and are marginalised within modernity. It would therefore be natural to suspect, given
MacIntyre broadly accepts Marx's account of capitalism, that a MacIntyrean account of 
contemporary work will be an account of alienation. In this section I will outline Marx’s 
theory of alienated labour, discuss Blauner’s theory of subjective alienation and briefly 
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consider Ollman’s systematic and expansive defence of Marx’s theory of alienation. My aim 
throughout will be to detail why Marx’s theory of alienation and Ollman’s statement of it 
does not adequately map onto modern forms of work and to outline a MacIntyrean 
alternative, but also to use Marx's framework to begin to outline the nature of modern work. 
It is important to note that MacIntyrean philosophy shares many concerns with Marxism. In 
particular, much of Marx’s critique of capitalism and his realisation that all theory must be 
understood as informed by practice greatly influenced MacIntyre’s mature thought. Indeed, 
MacIntyre was a Marxist in the 1950s and 1960s, and was at various times a member of the 
Communist Party of Great Britain, The Socialist Labour League, and the International 
Socialism group
1
before breaking with Marxism towards the end of the 60s, still 10 years 
away from his ‘mature’ period, on the grounds that Marxists had failed to adequately theorise 
revolutionary practice and more generally that Marxism had failed to provide a fully coherent 
moral alternative to liberalism. 
MacIntyre’s relationship to Marxism as a whole is too complex a topic to be 
adequately accounted for in a single chapter (and indeed the present thesis has no space to 
explore this wider issue). We are concerned here not to assess Marxism but to flesh out 
MacIntyre’s view that Marxism – in particular Marx’s account of alienation – does not 
adequately apply to the modern world
2
. In this sense our concern is primarily with the 
contemporary workplace rather than Marx scholarship. The early Marx's account of 
alienation is a useful starting point because it is the most explicitly ethical of Marx's writings 
and as such is where Marx's Aristotelian commitments are most evident
3
.
Broadly speaking Bertell Ollman considers alienation to be a phenomenon 
characteristic of capitalist work that operates even when unrecognised by agents rather than a 
merely subjective phenomenon experienced by particular workers. Ollman does believe that 
alienation is to some degree relative, but ultimately believes that alienation can only be 
overcome through the emergence of what he calls ‘unalienation’ which he believes is 
possible only in a communist society
4
. Ollman’s view is flawed in that it is unable to explain 
our motivation for being alarmed by the phenomenon of alienation, an explanation which 
MacIntyre’s practice based theory can provide: engagement in practices allows us to 
experience goods and develop virtues that then ground our ability to recognise and criticise 
alienating forms of activity, forms of social life, etc. Let us turn now to Marx's own account.
In his ‘Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844’, Karl Marx elaborated his 
theory of alienation. Here Marx claims that there are four basic components of alienation:
56
1) Alienation from the product of labour. The product of labour is an alien object exercising 
power over the worker.
2) Alienation from the process of labour. Working causes suffering in the form of mental and 
physical degradation.
3) Alienation from ‘species being’. Work in capitalist society is not compatible with human 
nature as inherently socially productive and thus co-operative.
4) Alienation from other people. The antagonisms of working life lead to social atomisation 
and tarnish personal relationships.
Let us consider each of these in more detail and try to make sense of them in a contemporary 
context, or rather contemporary contexts, as Marx seems to be speaking only of industrial or 
manufacturing work.
1)Alienation from the product. Given that manufacturing in Britain today accounts for 
less than one fifth of the workforce, in the majority of cases it is not clear exactly what a 
worker’s relationship to the product of his or her labour might be. Indeed if we consider the 
emergence of the various service sector jobs, it is not even entirely clear what the product is. 
The last generation or so has seen the advent of jobs like software engineers and management 
consultants, as well as a significant increase in hairdressers, sales assistants, care workers, 
and nursery nurses etc. Clearly a management consultant or a hairdresser cannot stand in the 
same relation to an altered firm or a new hairstyle as an artisan or factory worker might stand 
to their products, the physical and tangible objects they have made. The products of the 
consultant's and the hairdresser's labours are necessarily someone else's property so whilst 
Marx’s analysis may capture something of the nature of manufacturing jobs, it is not a useful 
tool when it comes to making sense of contemporary working life because we have no reason 
to think that only material production can be rewarding. 
Musical free improvisation is unrepeatable (if it is recorded the record is re-playable, 
but the improvisation itself is not) and yet we have no reason to suspect that improvisatory 
musicians are alienated. Assuming that 'come the revolution' people retain a desire to be well-
coiffed, hairdresser’s relation to their product is likely to remain similar to the way it is now. 
Insofar as this species of alienation concerns the ‘sorcerer’s apprentice’ element of 
capitalism, i.e. the sense in which capitalism takes on a life of its own and seems beyond our 
control, it will be considered below in our discussion of alienation from species-being. 
However, the craft-like nature of some forms of modern work, the forms of work which 
obviously have an identifiable product, suggests that antagonistic relationships between 
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producer and product are not as widespread as would be needed to support the claim that all 
or most workers are alienated from their products. Consider one contemporary example: a 
software designer – the software is not alien to the designer but may be an expression of his 
or her creative talents. The designer may have had to work to tight deadlines, may at stressful 
moments have cursed the prototype versions of the software, and in these senses the product 
exercises a power over the worker but it is not clear that this can be conceived of as 
alienating. The important thing to note is that the software designer has discretion over his or 
her work that Marx's imagined factory worker did not.
2) Alienation from the process. Marx, as we now know, was not able to foresee the 
future but he was capable of a fine rhetorical turn. When discussing alienation from the
labour process, Marx treats the reader to the following, 
[the worker] does not feel content but unhappy, does not develop freely his physical 
and mental energy but mortifies his body and ruins his mind. The worker therefore only feels 
himself outside his work, and in his work feels outside himself… its alien character emerges 
clearly in the fact that as soon as no physical or other compulsion exists, labour is shunned like 
the plague.
5
Clearly Marx's remarks apply to manual labour. Despite some fairly damning 
evidence about contemporary Britons’ happiness at work this is clearly not true of most 
contemporary work. While a 2007 survey of 1200 Britons found that 2/3 reported themselves 
to be ‘unfulfilled’, ‘miserable’, or ‘drifting’ in their jobs and over ½ said they’d happily leave 
to earn less money in a job that made them feel good about themselves
6
, and whilst the 
Joseph Rowntree Foundation study the ‘Job Insecurity and Work Intensification Report’
7
found that 64% of employees reported an increase in the speed of work and 61% reported an 
increase in the effort they put into their work over the period 1992-1997, figures up from 
56% and 38% respectively in 1987, Marx’s characterisation again applies to industrial labour 
in the 19
th
and early 20th centuries more readily than it does to contemporary work. Today 
people frequently work even without financial compulsion. In fact, a significant percentage of 
people when questioned claim they would stay in their job even if they won the lottery (18% 
of Americans according to one study
8
) and relatively few jobs can be considered genuinely 
exhausting or dangerous to the extent that the work is liable to ruin the bodies of workers. 
Indeed, while working hours have not (yet) reached the 4-5 hour a day levels characteristic of 
some hunter-gatherer societies, they have fallen from an average of 14 hours per day in the 
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period just before Marx was writing to the contemporary levels of a little over 8. If alienation 
from the process of labour were an unavoidable reality, an objective state, of life in capitalist 
society and Marx’s claim about work being ‘shunned like the plague’ was true, then it would 
be mystifying that anyone claims to enjoy work.
However, there is some evidence to suggest that there is some cultural pressure on 
Americans to report themselves as being happy even when they are not
9
and because the 
attainment of a job one enjoys is a significant status symbol such data may not be reliable. 
Moreover, the example of a lottery win is misleading. There is a tendency to believe that a 
life of luxury is better than a life of paid employment (and there is no doubt something to 
this). A more interesting question would be whether people would quit work in the 
expectation of greater happiness if they were guaranteed their current salaries for life, but I 
have been unable to find such data. In any case, it would require a prohibitively expensive 
study to test the veracity of those expectations! In the absence of such empirical evidence to 
the contrary it seems fair to say that Marx's claim would be a gross exaggeration if applied to 
the present day.
While we must also note that where compartmentalisation is commonplace,
alienating elements may pass unnoticed, although it is clear that work is no longer as brutal 
today as it was for the 19
th
century proletarian. This does not however refute Marx’s 
contention that workers are often alienated from the process of work. One reason the 
MacIntyrean should still take Marx’s thoughts about alienation seriously, even if they 
principally apply to forms of work that are increasingly uncommon, is that Marx (like 
MacIntyre) draws a distinction between humanity as it currently happens to be, and humanity 
as it might be if it realised its telos (though putting it this way privileges MacIntyre’s 
formulation over Marx’s). It is this premise that means subjective satisfaction is not the 
ultimate arbiter of how we should judge work.
Marx’s focus is on the nature of the work rather than the material rewards, but these 
statistics serve to remind us that alongside the emergence of MacJobs (professions, IT) has 
been the emergence of McJobs (fast food and shop retail)
10
. We should not overstate the 
extent to which working conditions have improved, and should not misunderstand the story 
of work as the story of continual improvement. At this stage the central element of the theory 
of alienation is still unproven, for there is as yet no reason to think that the large number of 
people in jobs they enjoy, jobs that are mentally challenging and without any punishing 
physical demands, can be considered as suffering from alienation from the process.
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3) Alienation from ‘species being’. The notion that work alienates us from our 
‘species being’ is rather more serious and alarming than the idea that the process might 
sometimes, or even frequently, be tiresome. Indeed, sometimes the most fulfilling and 
worthwhile tasks can be tiresome. Raising children, training for an athletic event, practicing 
piano scales, and sometimes even keeping up to date with scholarship in a particular 
academic field can be less than riveting.
It would be an error to overstate the extent to which Marx’s notion of species being
mirrors MacIntyre’s conception of humankind’s telos but the two notions are similar enough 
for this prospective form of alienation to be a unifying concern. For Marx, what is distinctive 
of humanity is our ability to cooperatively transform nature. Indeed so intimate is man’s 
relationship to nature that Marx says nature is man’s “inorganic body”
11
, but alienation alters 
the relation between man and his labour such that labour becomes a means to a person’s 
individual existence rather than a way of fulfilling his nature. Man thereby loses the free 
control over what he produces that Marx takes to be mankind’s advantage over the non-
human animals and loses his ability to fully understand and control his labour. 
Marx’s claim should not be interpreted as meaning that in the absence of alienation 
individual people consciously realise they are fulfilling some species orientated task; it is 
rather that under capitalism, man loses control of his productive ability and becomes unable 
to produce from ‘inner necessity’ – a creative desire that Marx holds to be one of the
unchanging elements of human nature. It is this thought that leads Marx to remark in The 
German Ideology that under communism man could hunt, fish, farm, and criticise without 
ever adopting any of those roles completely. Marx believed that human production should be 
engaged in freely and as a source of creative pleasure. Without stating it with the same 
explicitness as MacIntyre
12
, Marx also clearly believes that humans should be concerned with 
internal goods, as is evident when he says, “the dealer in minerals sees only the commercial 
value, and not the beauty and peculiar nature of the minerals; he lacks a mineralogical 
sense”
13
. While this may seem harsh on the dealer who adores minerals for their beauty yet is 
not sufficiently wealthy to become a mineral collector, Marx’s broader point is clear enough: 
where the profit motive exists unopposed, the intrinsically valuable becomes invisible and 
what MacIntyre calls the goods internal to practices may become obscured. Indeed, market 
competition might even force the dealer with mineralogical sense to adopt the methods and 
policies of the pure profit-seeking dealer, so his mineralogical sense falls into subjective 
irrelevance.
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MacIntyre says that “the good life for man is the life spent in seeking the good life for 
man, and the virtues necessary for the seeking are those which will enable us to understand 
what more and what else the good life for man is”
14
. This might strike us as disappointingly 
hollow, but we must remember that internal goods can never be fully specified or 
paraphrased in such a way as to be fully comprehensible to the uninitiated, as we saw in 
chapter 1, and more broadly that the goods of a specific kind of life lived by those whose 
lives are shaped by particular practices and a particular community will differ from those 
whose lives are shaped by other practices and communities. Thus MacIntyre's conception of 
'the' good life is inherently pluralistic. Such goods can of course be partially described, and 
indeed MacIntyre gives some clues as to what he takes the good life for man, i.e. the life in 
which man most fully realises his nature, to be. MacIntyre, like Marx, has a radically 
historicised conception of human nature, and practices themselves are relatively open-ended. 
When MacIntyre says that the good life is not a collection of arbitrarily chosen practices and 
then explains that the virtues require that our lives be unified, he implies that the good life 
involves the harmonisation and ordering of goods. 
The narrative nature of human life means that rarely will two different lives be beset 
by identical problems and obstacles (because the exact nature of the obstacles depends upon 
the perspective of those facing them, including their historical context and place within a 
particular tradition), and so the question ‘what sort of person do I need to become in order to 
achieve my good?’ cannot be provided with a single, universal and substantive answer. If the 
good life is partially constituted by the process through which it is sought it would be self-
defeating to attempt a genuinely substantive answer outside of any particular context, and in 
any case the sort of paraphrase which might be at all accurate would sound hopelessly 
platitudinous or, like Marx’s ‘free creative production’, be in danger of sounding excessively 
sentimental or romantic. MacIntyre follows Aristotle in taking the virtues themselves to be 
partly constitutive of Eudaimonia as opposed to being a mere means to happiness, so even in 
the absence of a comprehensive discussion of MacIntyre’s conception of the human good it is 
clear that this conception possesses some normative content.
What we have not considered thus far is how accurate a description ‘alienating from 
our species being’ might be of contemporary working life. The answer to this question cannot 
be as simple as our discussion of alienation from product or process and this is in part 
because if it is true that people are alienated from their true nature, their ‘species being’, in 
modern society, this alienation has possible causes outside working life. For MacIntyre at 
least, there is more to the human good than free, creative production: there is more to life 
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than work! Even if we attribute to Marx, and accept as being largely true, the claim that work 
is a uniquely important feature of human life, the fact that working hours are lower than 
during the 19
th
century
15
, flex-time is more common, and a greater number of people have the 
wealth and time to pursue leisure activities, mean that any plausible or satisfactory account of 
alienation from our species being or human nature would have to be far broader than an 
account that focused solely on our relation to our work.
It might seem suspect that Marxists start by claiming that people are alienated at 
work, and then when this appears to be disproved by counter-examples, change their claim to 
one that postulates alienation resulting from capitalist society as a whole. But this is not as 
illegitimate a move as it may seem. A decline in ‘community’ (a notion we shall discuss more 
fully in chapter 5) means that alienation is likely to be a phenomenon that exists on a wider 
scale, that some of the bureaucratic structures that characterise modern life are themselves a 
threat to human flourishing. Marx, naturally enough for such a systematic philosopher, 
situates work within a wider context. When he discusses alienation from species being his 
basic concern appears to be the loss of control over our work. This loss of control necessarily 
inhibits our ability to organise production rationally, i.e. in ways that are directed towards the 
satisfaction of human need. More concretely, this loss of control perverts the development of 
certain virtues precisely because the acquisitive nature of institutions cannot be resisted and 
made to serve practices. At this level of generality however, this is no longer a claim about 
alienated labour.
4) Alienation from other people. Marx says “An immediate consequence of the fact 
that man is estranged from the product of his labour, from his life activity, from his species 
being is the estrangement of man from man”
16
Alienation from other people follows from the 
other types of alienation according to Marx because those other types of alienation cause man 
to misunderstand himself and to project this inaccurate self-conception onto others. This kind 
of alienation is a kind of social atomisation because alienation from species being prevents 
fully human co-operation. So Marx and MacIntyre in their different ways hold self-
knowledge and healthy social relations to be characteristic of human flourishing. Consider 
MacIntyre’s emphasis on the importance of friendship, which we considered briefly in the 
previous chapter. He says that only through friendships can we understand ourselves
17
, and so 
alienation from others would render such self-understanding impossible. Where competition 
becomes too important a feature of social life, agents are liable to find themselves in 
prisoner’s dilemma-type situations (‘business is poker’) in which reason is regarded as formal 
and calculative and thus cooperation is rationally unjustifiable, despite the best efforts of 
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innumerable moral theorists, and unconditional commitments such as those required by true 
friendship become threatened.
The extent to which the early Marx considers alienation to be an objective feature of 
all workers under capitalism, as opposed to a subjective state that affects some but not others 
(though of course there need not be so clear a dichotomy between these two poles) is not 
entirely clear. The concept of ‘inversion’ to be found in Capital, which seems to have 
evolved out of the concept of alienation
18
, is that of an objective state - but the aim of this 
chapter is not that of Marx scholarship. Marxist orthodoxy has held that alienation is an 
objective state that can only be overcome through the emergence of an un-alienated 
Communist society, and the purpose of this section is to argue that this Marxist orthodoxy, 
rather than Marx’s own view, is false and impedes our understanding – and so also our ability 
to remedy – the alienating tendencies present in modern work. Davidson and Blackledge, in 
their introduction to the recent collection of MacIntyre's early Marxist work, lament that 
during his Marxist phase MacIntyre failed to develop an account of revolutionary practice
19
, 
but the MacIntyrean laments the failure of Marxism to adequately theorise the goods 
available to agents within capitalism, goods that justify the moral critique of capitalism in the 
first place. 
3.2 Recent Accounts of Alienation
One corrective to the orthodox view of alienation has been proposed by Robert 
Blauner. Blauner says that “alienation is a general syndrome made up of a number of 
objective conditions and subjective feeling-states which emerge from certain relationships 
between workers and socio-technical settings of employment”
20
. Blauner himself thought that 
alienation could be completely overcome by technological advances which would free 
workers from assembly-line drudgery. We need not address this extremely optimistic view 
here, but what is important is that any adequate conception of alienation must be alive to both 
aspects - objective conditions and subjective states. Any view of alienation informed by 
MacIntyre’s thought will hold that it cannot be a uniform objective state because through 
engaging in practices humans can acquire the virtues essential to and partially constitutive of 
the fulfilment of their nature, and given that practices are "a universal feature of human 
cultures"
21
, widespread and comprehensive alienation is all but impossible. Consequently 
alienation does involve subjective states, though these subjective states need not involve 
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unhappiness nor conscious recognition of alienation (‘alienated’ is not a synonym for 
‘unhappy’). While practices can be marginalised or obscured, these predicaments do not 
follow automatically from existing within market economies in the way that alienation seems 
to for Marxist orthodoxy. Indeed, the importance of alienation for MacIntyrean thought is 
closely related to the importance of institutionally sustaining practices (and of course 
recognising institutions that embody and sustain practices), and defending ourselves against 
these processes by which practices are marginalised or made obscure. This must be a goal of 
politics as it is required by agents to be fully able to rationally pursue the good.
Three possible orthodox Marxist responses spring to mind: A) I have ignored the 
importance of capital being an impersonal force and thus tacitly accepted the legitimacy of 
one crucial part of alienation, B) in allowing the possibility of subjective states playing a 
central role, I have ignored the extent to which alienation itself causes the worker to be 
complicit in his own exploitation by conditioning him to think he ‘enjoys’ his work, and C) 
that I have been too quick to dismiss the claim that modern forms of work are alienating in 
the way Marx identified 19
th
century industrial work to be.
My response to objection A) is necessarily brief: a MacIntyrean view most certainly 
does not ignore the impersonal nature of institutions, indeed it recognises it so clearly that 
correctly institutionalising practices so that the dominance of impersonal forces is minimised 
is seen as a crucial task. The difference between the two views lies in their accounts of what 
it is to correctly institutionalise a practice. Loss of control of work is a problem for MacIntyre 
as well as Marx, but for MacIntyre ownership is not always crucial. On this issue it seems 
that Marxism is in danger of fetishising ownership and of exaggerating the scope of the force 
of impersonal capital. I can still engage with chess as a practice even if I do not own the 
board. Ownership is not required for use or even effective control. We will return to this topic 
in chapter 7. The example of contemporary financial institutions is instructive here. The 
owners are kept at a distance and have little control over the institutions, leaving the decisions 
instead to the managerial ‘experts’, a topic we will address in chapter 6. Marx's broader
critique of the iniquities inherent in capitalism may be correct but this does not imply that 
flourishing is rendered impossible by private ownership. Problems arise when profit 
maximisation is the overriding purpose of an organisation, but not when profit is sought for 
the sake of a practice and the ultimate focus is on goods internal to that practice.
Objection B) is no stronger an objection, but it requires a slightly longer response. 
Bertell Ollman, author of a notable study of Marx’s theory of alienation claims, quoting The 
Communist Manifesto, that “We do not know each other as individuals, but as extensions of 
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capitalism: ‘In bourgeois society capital is independent and has individuality, while the living 
person is dependent and has no individuality’”
22
. In one sense this is a consequence of 
alienation from other people, but to put it so strongly is surely incorrect.
For the MacIntyrean it is precisely our knowledge of internal goods, a knowledge 
which requires healthy relations with others and a genuine engagement in practices to come 
into being in the first place, that motivates a rejection of dehumanising working conditions. If 
we were completely unable to experience goods, then we would be unable to criticise the 
alienating tendencies of capitalism in the first place, and both those who are and those who 
are not members of the industrial proletariat would have no reason to support anti-capitalist 
political movements. MacIntyre says of Marcuse’s One Dimensional Man, a work which 
more or less claims that every aspect of life is tainted by capitalism, that “if its thesis were 
true, then we should have to ask how the book came to have been written and we would 
certainly have to inquire whether it would find any readers.”
23
This query would also have to 
be directed at Marx if Ollman’s conception of alienation were adequate. 
We must take the gradations between alienation and unalienation seriously if we are 
to avoid positing a dichotomy between the alienated, who cannot possibly see the need for 
revolution, and the unalienated, who also cannot see the need for revolution. It is possible to 
imagine an elite class of the unalienated attempting to make a revolution on behalf of the 
alienated, though it seems we have good reason to think such an attempt doomed to failure 
and the existence of the unalienated would be mysterious. One suspects that Ollman has 
taken a rhetorical flourish from a populist pamphlet too seriously. This mistake is made 
possible by Marx’s failure to provide a more detailed account of the ethical dimension of his 
theory to be, that is, what exactly constitutes ‘free creative production’.
According to MacIntyre’s essay ‘Theses on Feuerbach: a road not taken’, it is 
precisely Marx’s failure to give an account of the ethical content of his position, that is of his 
conception of ‘free creative production’, that prevents Marx’s theory of alienation from 
succeeding in the way that MacIntyre’s conception of practices does. We might prefer 
Blauner’s fourfold theory of alienation to Marx’s, but it remains unable to explain how and 
why particular practices are important i.e. why and how they play a central role in the pursuit 
of the good life. As MacIntyre notes, a great failure of Marxist thought generally is that it 
takes it “for granted that the only goals that workers could have reason to make their own are 
the goals of socialism and communism”
24
, thus Marxism is unable to account for the 
heterogeneity of goods actually pursued by communities, and the continuing existence of 
local traditions and rationalities
25
. If conceptions of the human good and indeed the human 
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good itself are rooted in specific engagements with particular practices, themselves rooted in 
particular social and institutional settings, then what it is rational for members of these 
communities to pursue politically will not always be identical. Any theory that assumes local 
customs and traditions to be always irrational or uncivilised is itself likely to have alienating 
consequences. We will consider the importance of personal relationships in the following two 
chapters.
Whereas for Marx this ‘alienation of man from man’ followed from the three prior 
types of alienation, for the MacIntyrean the existence of the first two types of alienation is 
questionable (it is certainly not universal: practices exist within capitalism), and the third type 
of alienation, i.e. from species being, is of a very different kind. Indeed, because MacIntyre’s 
view of the human telos reserves a very important place for friendship and concrete social 
relations, the last two types of alienation are not separable and nor are they a direct result of 
working conditions. The dis-unified self and the breakdown in social bonds are grave ills for 
MacIntyre, but they do not follow from our alienation from the product and process of labour, 
at least not in the predominant working environments of 21st century capitalist society. 
Instead alienation can result from the character of particular types of work and particular 
institutional settings in which work takes place. Work and the institutions in which it took 
place may have been close to uniformly alienating for the 19
th
and early 20
th
century 
industrial worker, but that is not the case today.
Objection C) requires us to consider Braverman's account of white-collar alienation. 
Braverman’s thesis implicitly takes the view that alienation is a relative and variable 
subjective state, though of course one largely determined by objective features of work. This 
is demonstrated by the very notion of work being degraded by a process of deskilling. If 
alienation were not relative then the level of skill required by a job would have no bearing on 
whether or not is it alienating. It is likely that this was Marx’s view given that in his 1844 
manuscripts he often talks as if artists and artisans do not suffer from alienation. Braverman 
does not claim that deskilling is entirely universal. Rather he thinks that it is a general 
tendency to be resisted and avoided where possible. 
Simply stated, Braverman’s thesis is that Taylorist scientific management techniques, 
which originally found application in the measurement, surveillance and control of manual 
labour, and which often required that tasks be broken down into constituent parts in the name 
of efficiency, have now become prevalent in white-collar office work. Braverman claims that 
management under capitalism is principally concerned to control the way work is organised 
so that the pace and duration of work can also be controlled, and because the discretion of
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workers can be an obstacle to this goal, management aims to limit the control employees have 
over their own work. One crucial way in which discretion can be reduced is through a 
reduction in the skill required by any particular job, and so Braverman claims that 
management has a general tendency to implement measures which deskill workers. Thus 
Braverman's account is essentially a restatement of Marx's alienation from the process: work 
does not develop our physical and mental capacities.
Deskilling takes two primary forms for Braverman: organisational and technical. 
Organisational deskilling is the separation of the conception and the execution of work where 
creative planning is the preserve of management and the execution of such plans alone is left 
to the worker. Braverman claims: 
[A] necessary consequence of the separation of conception and execution is that the 
labour process is now divided between separate sites and separate bodies of worker… The 
production units operate like a hand, watched, corrected, and controlled by a distant brain.
26
Technological deskilling is the process whereby machinery is used to reduce shop 
floor discretion. Instead of machinery offering the possibility of new skills of control over the 
machinery, Braverman thinks there is a tendency for those who use the machinery to be 
unable to alter or repair the workings of the machine and thus be dependent on external 
technicians and external automated control of the machinery. What is important is not a 
Luddite reaction against technological advancement, but the particular forms of the 
advancements and the uses to which they are put. Where workers are subordinated to the 
technological processes of work, and this can be the case in either blue or white-collar work, 
what is active is not the full human being but a mere element or handful of elements and it is 
this subdivision that is alienating. Braverman says, 
While the social division of labour subdivides society, the detailed division of labour 
subdivides humans, and while the subdivision of society may enhance the individual and the 
species, the subdivision of the individual, when carried on without regard to human capabilities 
and needs, is a crime against the person and against humanity.
27
However, because Braverman does not think this deskilling process to be an 
ineluctable universal process, he is committed to maintaining the possibility that there are 
cases in which technology has allowed work to be ‘up skilled’. Even if, as Bennett Harrison 
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has argued, the computerisation of work has actually shown a drop in economic 
productivity
28
, it has certainly allowed for the emergence of a whole new set of skills and 
competences which from a MacIntyrean point of view is preferable, unless the drop is severe 
enough to threaten a community’s other goods. Satisfaction of material needs is a pre-
condition for the virtues, and this fact itself calls for some balance between efficiency and 
pursuit of internal goods. Electronic tills might mean that cashiers have less opportunity to 
develop their arithmetical skills, but their accuracy and reliability is an undeniable advantage. 
If a drop in productivity has indeed occurred, it clearly has not been so dramatic that the 
satisfaction of human needs has been imperilled. On the other hand there are many white-
collar jobs that are similar to monotonous factory work, with call-centres being the most 
notable example.
It might be argued against Braverman’s deskilling thesis that a service economy is 
more innovative, diverse, and subject to change than a productive manufacturing economy 
could possibly be, and that this calls for a kind of ‘flexible specialisation’ which itself 
requires a greater level of skill on the whole than the old industrial economy. Prima facie this 
view is at least as hopelessly optimistic as Braverman’s claim that there is a general tendency 
towards deskilling appears to be hopelessly pessimistic. However we need not seek to resolve 
this debate for it treats ‘skill’ as a basic, simple, unified concept and as such does not develop 
our capacities as do practices. Almost any activity admits of some level of skill. Up skilling 
may be a good thing, indeed it is one of the most significant boosters of subjective 
satisfaction at work
29
, but it is not necessarily conducive to flourishing. As we noted in 
chapter 1, practices, which are crucial to the development of virtues, cannot be identified with 
a “set of technical skills”
30
. In the same way that flourishing in the relevant sense cannot 
simply be about reported happiness or job satisfaction, nor can it simply be about the 
technical complexity of the job. The relevant skills must be coherent and complex forms of 
socially established co-operative human activities, and so on, in order to encourage virtuous 
flourishing.
A MacIntyrean account of work therefore resists reduction to a Marxist account of 
alienation. Modern, industrialised capitalism might have lead to the "destruction of 
craftsmanship"
31
, but MacIntyre's conception of engagement in practices in accordance with 
narrative unity is ethically richer than the notion of craftsmanship. However, much of what 
Braverman says rings true. Braverman was writing in the 1970s, and so to better evaluate 
whether contemporary work is alienating we now turn to more recent developments. In 
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particular we will examine Richard Sennett's account of changes to work in contemporary 
capitalism.
3.3 Alienation, Fragmentation, and Organisational Change
Sennett argues that the emphasis placed on flexibility by the ‘new capitalism’ is  
characterised by a winner takes all mentality that leads to a tendency to focus on the short 
term pursuit of external goods in such a way that encourages ‘downsizing’ (read 
‘redundancies’), thereby undermining job security, and in turn traditional communities. 
According to MacIntyre this process began when production left the household, and entered a 
new phase which has increased social atomisation. This atomisation is incompatible with the 
development of character. While Sennett’s use of the word ‘character’ suggests that its 
requirements are not identical to the requirements of MacIntyre’s conception of a virtue, there 
are again important similarities. Sennett says “Character is expressed by loyalty and mutual 
commitment, or through the pursuit of long term goals, or by the practice of delayed 
gratification for the sake of a future end”
32
. This does not commit Sennett to the stronger 
elements of MacIntyre’s ethics, but it certainly captures something of the spirit of 
MacIntyre’s practice-based conception of the virtues, and Sennett’s view that the 
disappearance of long term careers, “pathways along which people can travel; durable and 
sustained paths of actions”
33
again suggests some affinity with MacIntyre’s narrative unity of 
life requirement that we discussed in chapter 2. Although these parallels between Sennett and 
MacIntyre mean that the former's sociology can inform the latter's philosophy, let us first 
consider an important difference.
Sennett and MacIntyre are both at pains to distance themselves from 
communitarianism, but in very different ways. In an interview with Giovanna Borradori 
MacIntyre is quite explicit about the matter, he says, “I am not a communitarian. I do not 
believe in ideals or forms of community as a nostrum for contemporary social ills”
34
. 
Elsewhere MacIntyre explicitly states that some forms of market economies can, in his view,
be conducive to the virtues.
35
Nevertheless MacIntyre does place a firm emphasis on the 
importance of local community. Indeed in the same interview quoted above MacIntyre says 
that despite the barrenness of large scale political movements, “what is not thus barren is the 
politics involved in constructing and sustaining small scale local communities, at the level of 
the family, the neighbourhood, the workplace, the parish, the school” etc.
36
So while he is not 
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a card-carrying communitarian, he may well be a communitarian in Sennett’s sense. 
Furthermore, because MacIntyre has indeed been claimed/categorised as (or perhaps accused
of being) a communitarian elsewhere
37
and because much of what Sennett says when 
rejecting communitarianism can be aimed at MacIntyre it is worth turning our attention to 
Sennett’s arguments.
Sennett recognises that a strong sense of community is valuable, but he denies that 
communitarianism is as conducive to this good as its proponents think. Sennett says:
[Communitarianism] falsely emphasises unity as a source of strength in a community and 
mistakenly fears that when conflicts arise in a community social bonds are threatened... 
[instead] people are bound together more by verbal conflict than by verbal agreement… [as 
they] have to work harder at communicating... the scene of conflict becomes a community in 
the sense that people learn how to listen and respond to one another even as they more keenly 
feel their differences.
38
The MacIntyrean response to this is to say that of course conflict threatens social 
bonds, but this threat does not entail that conflict is always and necessarily damaging to 
social bonds. The threatened social ill in question, that of bond severance and perhaps 
irreconcilable conflict, does not ever need to be realised in the same way that a 
misunderstanding might threaten to turn into a row without ever actually doing so. Indeed, in 
both cases it may be down to the virtues of those involved to avoid the breakdown in social 
bonds. Social bonds can be caused to fade gradually over time, but it is hard to imagine 
conflict not constituting at least a potential threat. There is a sense in which the joint 
overcoming of adversity can strengthen bonds, but this requires a good deal more unity than 
Sennett seems to realise. Such conflict resolution presupposes agreement on aims and 
legitimate methods of resolution. This does not mean that MacIntyre is forced to disagree 
with Sennett’s subsequent points, quite the contrary. Indeed if we see conflict as a threat to 
social bonds then we can better explain just why it is that people work harder at 
communication in times of conflict. According to this view it is not the scene of conflict that 
becomes community but the scene of resolution. The hard work is justified precisely because 
the conflict is a threat and the alleviation of that conflict is a good. It is crucial on the 
MacIntyrean view that there is a substantial agreement about values if the development of the 
virtues, or of ‘character’ is to be possible, for without shared standards of excellence and 
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shared notions of human goods and ends, people will be prevented from properly engaging in 
practices.
So, because the extent of Sennett’s rejection of the goods of community goes beyond 
what is warranted, in examining the details of Sennett’s account of the changes which have 
degraded work, or as he puts it, corroded character, we may well have to modify his account 
so that it fits our MacIntyrean concerns more closely. The three changes which Sennett 
claims characterise work in the new flexible economies are, i) the discontinuous re-invention 
of institutions, ii) flexible specialisation, and iii) the concentration without centralisation of 
power. Let us consider these in turn.
1) Discontinuous re-invention. Sennett draws a distinction between change which is 
the result of an organic process which is intelligible and coherent, even if unwelcome, and 
change which takes the form of a discontinuous rupture. Sennett says that a 
cornerstone of modern management practice is the belief that loose networks are more open to 
decisive re-invention than are pyramidal hierarchies which ruled the Fordist era. The join 
between nodes in the network is looser; you can take away a part, at least in theory, without 
destroying other parts. The system is fragmented; therein lies the opportunity for intervening. 
Its very incoherence invites your revisions.
39
Such radical reorganisation is a threat to practices and practice-based communities 
which require relative permanence. The corporate re-engineering that discontinuous re-
invention involves, often means a wave of redundancies. Unemployment is an ill not only 
becomes it means poverty, but also because it leads to a deep sense of social exclusion. This 
is especially so if it takes the form of being arbitrarily excluded from a practice because of 
corporate down-sizing initiatives. In addition to relative poverty leading to the inability to 
lead what is socially regarded as a normal life, unemployment can be alienating in that it 
leads to a feeling of powerlessness. Hegel, whose account of alienation partly inspired 
Marx's, is instructive here. Hegel's myth of the master and the slave suggests that the slave 
receives the benefits of work (even though he does not own the means of production) because 
he is able to make a mark on the world, and thus regard himself as an active agent
40
. 
Although evidence from empirical psychology supports the view that employment is better 
for people's mental health than unemployment
41
, Hegel himself is aware that the worst work 
is hardly better than the exclusion experienced by the workless
42
. About this, Sennett and 
MacIntyre would agree.
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However, what is especially damaging, as is noted by both Sennett and MacIntyre, is 
that in an age of discontinuous re-invention rising unemployment is often treated as a good 
thing on the stock market and companies are pressured into sacking staff solely in order to 
demonstrate their ‘flexibility’. This lack of security is a threat to the virtues in another way. 
Where competition for survival is intense it is inevitable that social bonds are weakened 
because one person’s gain will be another’s loss. In this way insecure workers may be 
alienated from their fellows; each views the other as a competitor first and a colleague with 
whom co-operation is a good, second
43
. In this way too, genuine engagement in practices can 
be imperilled because in such situations external goods may become the priority.
Another notable aspect of discontinuous re-invention is that companies have become 
de-layered which has had the consequence that a smaller number of managers have a greater 
number of subordinates to manage (made possible by various technological advances), and so 
workers have less chance of having a personal relationship with their bosses which in turn 
makes it harder for trust to flourish in the work place. We will examine the importance of 
personal relationships and trust in the following chapter.
2) Flexible specialisation. This makes use of the technological changes described by 
Braverman. It is now possible for an organisation to change the nature of its production in a 
relatively short space of time. Machines and operating systems can be reprogrammed 
relatively quickly and so the nature of the work within an organisation can too change. 
Implicit in Sennett’s discussion of flexible specialisation is the idea that the flexibility makes 
undemocratic demands and gives workers little discretion over their work. A completely 
flexible specialisation is inimical to a genuine engagement in a practice because there is no 
chance of achieving genuine excellence. This is because there is not sufficient time to 
understand the nature of the activity or putative practice that would allow its internal goods to 
be enjoyed.
Work may increasingly involve many diverse tasks, but this is not the same as up-
skilling and it is certainly not to be confused with genuine engagement in a practice. Practices 
can of course involve many diverse tasks: a medical doctor may deal with vastly diverse 
cases in quick succession, and a farmer may even find time to plant turnips between putting 
up a new scare crow and tending to his prize pigs, but each of these practices has a degree of 
unity that means they amount to more than their description as a series of unrelated 
specialisations would suggest. We can see that MacIntyre is able to highlight the pitfalls of 
flexible specialisation in a way that Sennett simply cannot. Sennett bemoans the fact that
flexible specialisation has led to growing economic inequality (though he is also obliquely 
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aware that this growing inequality has depended on the demise of union power). This is 
indeed a matter of serious concern. Inequality is a threat to wellbeing and significant 
inequality threatens possession of the virtues but it does not explain why this particular 
feature of changes in the way work is carried out is damaging. MacIntyre’s conception of 
practices is so able. Flexible specialisation hinders flourishing in its own right because it 
means that tasks become piecemeal, temporary, and so ultimately they are not character 
forming even when they enable workers to develop skills. Practices require a long term 
commitment, a period of discipleship that cannot be achieved where specialisation is subject 
to radical change.
3) Concentration without centralisation of power. This is the most important of the 
three elements identified by Sennett. In organisations which no longer have “the clarity of a 
pyramid… domination from the top is both strong and shapeless.”
44
The top down power of 
an organisation remains strong, indeed new modes of measurement and surveillance may 
well have made them stronger, but actual production is fragmented by subcontracting and 
subdivision. This means that whilst the overall scale of organisation has increased, those who 
actually make the most important decisions have less accountability to the workforce and in 
fact the possibility of consultation with the workers becomes diminished as it is difficult to 
achieve even when it is a goal, which is rare. Workers are thus treated like raw materials: 
human resources. When the possibility of workers having the power to shape the institution 
in which they work is thus diminished, the workers are unable to exercise their practical 
reason to institutionally safeguard their practice. In this way they are alienated from their 
nature as rational agents and denied access the goods internal to their putative practices 
insofar as practices presuppose a community of practitioners. 
In addition to the drawbacks of immense, large scale power (a problem MacIntyre is 
more able to explain than Marx), there is a problem with shapeless power in that it is 
inherently unaccountable. Largeness of scale makes it difficult for members of an 
organisation to receive a hearing, and so they become excluded from decisions that affect 
them. Although the agent may still coherently make decisions, the future comes to appear 
arbitrary. An agent’s pursuit of his or her goals always involves a confrontation with the 
unpredictability of the future (which is why we can agree with Aristotle that Eudaimonia
requires luck), and this is a source of anxiety.
In a sense the concentration without centralisation of power can be interpreted as 
leading to alienation from our species being. For Marx it is man’s nature to rationally 
transform the natural world to meet our needs. Where power is entirely diffuse, need-claims 
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go unheeded because there is nowhere for them to be directed. The Marxist would argue that 
this claim, and therefore this form of alienation, applies to capitalism as a whole. Perhaps 
there is some truth in this. However, making the claim separately for smaller units, such as 
particular organisations or local forms of capitalism (Anglo-American as opposed to Rhinish, 
for instance) allows us to explain the possibility of practice-based communities operating 
within capitalism. If there is a substantive and universal element to human rationality, it 
might be correct to argue that any substantial division implies an alienation from species-
being
45
. Our purposes depend on the more modest claim that people need to form 
communities in order to achieve their ends, and that doing so is at least an important part of 
our ‘species-being’. When such communities become characterised by a concentration 
without centralisation of power they become unable to meet the requirements which justifies 
their existence.
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to lay the foundations for the following chapters. While a 
MacIntyrean account of work is not fully Marxist due the ethical core provided by 
MacIntyre's conception of practices, elements of Braverman's Marxist account of work 
accurately applies to much modern work. Marx's own description of alienated labour applies 
principally to factory-based work, but Sennett's account of contemporary work suggests such 
work can be alienating. Indeed, Sennett's account shows that most contemporary work is not 
only not an engagement in practices, it is also carried out in contexts that threaten any sense 
of community. This characterisation of much modern work will inform the chapters that 
follow. From the account developed so far, it is clear that the best work will be that which is 
practice-based, but it should also be clear that practice-based and practice-like work is 
threatened by how work happens to be institutionalised within the present order. In the 
following chapter we will consider how workplaces might avoid being so alienating.
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Chapter 4: Commitment and Emotion At Work
Call centre operators have joined, with flight attendants, shop assistants, fast food and waiting 
staff, the swelling ranks of service workers whose performance at work is shaped by the 
object of customer satisfaction. All these employees, in various ways, are required to conform 
to pre-determined phrases, scripts, and modes of behaviour and delivery. If anything 
distinguishes the call centre worker it is both the extent to which they are subject to 
monitoring and the unrelenting pressure to conform to acceptable forms of speech, whether 
scripted or not. It is difficult to conceive of another occupation where the entire working shift 
requires the articulation of the same vocal patterns in such a repetitive and uninterrupted 
sequence.
1
Here we have a characterisation of one of the most typical kinds of emotional labour, the 
disingenuous expression of positive emotion, which is the defining characteristic of call 
centre work. In this chapter, I will explore some ways in which emotional labour and emotion 
work can escape this bleak, alienating picture. I will do this through a discussion of the 
worthwhile elements of emotion work, the problem of role identification and its threat to 
unity and integrity, and lastly the conditions of trust under which it becomes rational or 
desirable to engage in the difficult task of transforming oneself, particularly in the context of 
employment. 
In section 4.1, I will distinguish between emotional labour and emotion work, and 
between identification with brands, identification with roles, and ordinary soft skills. For 
MacIntyre, one of the central tasks of ethics is the transformation of our desires so that we 
aim at the good. For healthy emotion work to be possible, working contexts must be 
relatively small scale and personal as it is these contexts that best allow us to understand 
ourselves and others well enough to transform our desires in this way. The problem of role 
identification and its threat to unity and integrity will be the focus of 4.2. The strong 
identification with a role and adoption of standards of excellence appropriate to that role 
brings with it the possibility of a conflict between being good qua human being and being 
good in a role. From a MacIntyrean point of view the demands of being a good human being, 
living a good whole life, always trump the demands of being good in a role whenever the two 
are in conflict. Furthermore, according to MacIntyre, people ought to avoid putting 
themselves in situations in which such conflict is endemic. As we saw in chapter 2, 
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conceiving of one’s life as a narrative unity is an invaluable tool when it comes to clearly 
understanding oneself as a whole human being over and above any particular role that one 
happens to occupy. We would do well to notice however that this transcendence of any 
particular set of roles is not a transcendence of particularity per se, nor does it imply that 
roles are ethically unimportant. MacIntyre’s unity requirement does not entail the rejection of 
the adoption of working roles, but it does entail the rejection of Swanton’s role ethics. Lastly, 
in 4.3, I will examine the conditions of trust in which it becomes rational or desirable to 
engage in the difficult task of transforming oneself, particularly in the context of 
employment. I follow Kohn in distinguishing between thick and thin trust. Thin trust might 
be more useful in some social situations as it lubricates basic interactions (in contexts which 
are already large and largely impersonal), but thick trust is indispensable when it comes to the 
pursuit of virtuous flourishing. Thick trust also lubricates more complex social interactions, 
and safeguards thin trust against enfeeblement. It is for this reason, and because the changes 
to contemporary work described by Sennett and discussed in chapter 3 reduce the likelihood 
of thick trust emerging, that companies attempt to foster relations that at least approach 
genuine friendship, through team building exercises and so forth.  However, where these lose 
sight of the goals of long term collaboration, thick trust and security they can become 
misguided or even coercive attempts to guarantee superficial lip-service to the goals of 
teamwork.
4.1 Emotion Work and Emotional Labour
‘Emotion work’ differs from ‘emotional labour’ in that the former refers to “the act of trying 
to change in degree or quality an emotion or feeling”
2
i.e. ‘deep acting’, whereas the latter 
often refers to the presentation of emotional states that are likely to be feigned, or at least 
ostensibly superficial and obviously role-related attitudes of the kind associated with jobs in 
customer service, retail, hospitality etc. In this chapter, I will be primarily concerned with 
emotion work in a work context, and emotional labour as it relates to emotion work, rather 
than emotional labour per se. The emotional labour in the kinds of employment mentioned 
above may involve the exertion of a kind of self-control required in order to acquire the 
virtues, but it is not itself conducive to virtuous flourishing and indeed can be incompatible 
with such flourishing. The damaging effects of emotional labour can be quite serious. That 
numerous studies show prolonged and acute expression of unfelt emotion to be detrimental to 
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employees’ ‘subjective wellbeing’
3
and self-validation
4
is unsurprising. Emotional 
dissonance resulting from prolonged emotional labour has been described as creating a “sense 
of being false, mechanical, no longer a whole integrated self”
5
, and other research has shown 
that emotional labour is more damaging the less authentic the expressions of emotion
6
. Also, 
and again unsurprisingly, the damage of emotional labour is diminished by employees having 
greater autonomy and control over their work
7
.
Of course, surface acting may be harmless. When it is brief, such as a smile and a nod 
at a colleague when one is in a bad mood; flexible, for example when friendliness is required 
but expressed with a significant degree of personal discretion (the significance caveat is 
required to rule out unscripted but carefully monitored and encouraged false perkiness 
alluded to in the quotation from Taylor and Bain with which this chapter began); or perhaps 
when it is entirely voluntarily chosen; the alienating tendencies of prolonged emotional 
labour are absent. 
However, the enforced suppression of genuine emotion and expression of unfelt 
emotion even when outside the context of call centre work and its kin may be not only 
emotionally exhausting and unpleasant, but a threat to personal relations (and thus 
alienating). This threat is a result of the decline in levels of trust likely to exist between 
people in contexts in which emotional expressions are constantly and obviously fake. The 
threat also results from the likely absence of the energy required to continue being friendly 
once the shift has ended in places of work that make very great emotional demands on 
employees. The demands of repetitive and unrelenting customer focused 'perkiness' is liable 
to diminish people's inclination to engage in the voluntary emotion work required to forge 
friendly collegial relations, thus diminishing the chances of genuine relations of friendship 
that may follow. As Hochschild, who has done more than anyone to put the concept of 
emotional labour on the academic map, says, emotional expressions 
are symbolic with reference to certain taken for granted agreements as to which gesture goes with 
which meaning in which context. Like money, expressions work on a basis of trust that this 
expression (e.g. a clenched fist) corresponds to that range of inner experience (e.g. anger, 
exuberant bravado). So our trust in a gesture rests on a public trust in the general validity of such 
expressions, their general link to inner experience.
8
Of course, the more counterfeit money there is in circulation the less people can trust the 
currency, and where mistrust becomes the norm authentic personal relations are threatened. 
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Indeed, where mistrust becomes the norm, even basic co-operation is threatened. We will 
return to the topic of trust later, but for now our topic is emotion work and, more specifically, 
the place emotion work might play in a MacIntyrean account of working life.
Central to MacIntyrean ethical theory is the notion that not only is it possible to alter 
emotional responses but that the “hard work of morality consists in the transformation of our 
desires, so that we aim at the good”
9
. So it is important to note that emotion work can go 
beyond even deep acting, but we will retain the term emotion work for cases in which people 
have to modify their behaviour due to the demands of a role or when the social context 
demands that they display affect in ways in which they otherwise might not. In this way, even 
when acting has become redundant the exercise of control over affective display can still 
count as emotion work, so we are dealing with a broad concept. An account of emotion work 
in its most elementary sense, from an Aristotelian (and MacIntyrean) perspective, will note 
that a genuine transformation of an emotion characteristically requires deep acting, which 
itself characteristically presupposes an ability to surface act e.g. a child feigning gratitude for 
an unwanted present. This feigning of gratitude itself probably requires encouragement at an 
earlier stage e.g. a younger child being encouraged to express gratitude: ‘what do you say?’.
This may be similar to MacIntyre’s example of a budding chess player being encouraged to 
play with the reward of candy
10
. It is only through playing chess or expressing gratitude that 
it is possible for someone to appreciate the goods of chess or of gratitude. That gratitude is of 
value is clearly explicable from a MacIntyrean perspective. Indeed, there has even been a 
substantially MacIntyrean account of manners which notes that they, the ‘little virtues’, are 
required to sustain a community
11
. We will consider below how small, civil, social interaction 
can sustain trust and how it is, therefore, of great importance.
There is a line of thought according to which emotion work as emotional labour 
constitutes a betrayal of the self. According to C. Wright Mills, 
In a society of employees dominated by the marketing mentality it is inevitable that a personality 
market should arise. For in the great shift from manual skills to the art of ‘handling’, selling and 
servicing people, personal or even intimate traits of employees are drawn into the sphere of 
exchange and become commodities in the labour market,
12
and further that 
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Men are estranged from one another as each secretly tries to make an instrument of the other, and 
in time a full circle is made: one makes an instrument of himself and is estranged from it also.
13
We discussed the concept of alienation from other people in the previous chapter. However, 
the call for ‘soft skills’ need not be so sinister. As Hochschild puts it, it is not “that the 
modern middle-class man ‘sells’ his personality but that many jobs call for an appreciation of 
display rules, feeling rules, and a capacity for deep acting.”
14
So what is 'commodified' is a 
capacity not a character, a skill not a personality. Let us not overstate the extent of this 
commodification. The capacity is not sold as a product might be; possession of the personal 
quality is not relinquished. An accountant sells his or her ability with figures but still 
possesses this ability when not at work. We can imagine a gruelling schedule leaving the 
accountant unwilling to exercise that ability at home, but where the job is well-
institutionalised and such burn out is avoided, the sale of accountancy skills need have no 
unpleasant consequences. 
The notion that emotion work as emotional labour can only take one form, the 
unpleasant and alienating sale of personality, betrays a conceptual confusion. Indeed the 
notion that a personality not already consumed by a desire for external goods might be 
sacrificed for the sake of external goods is puzzling! Such a commodification would require a 
person to be seriously corrupt, or a character to be seriously corroded, to use Sennett's terms,
in advance of the imaginary exchange, while also having an exceptional aptitude for emotion 
work. In such a case, it would be inaccurate to call such a transformation emotion work, 
though it is doubtful whether an agent genuinely capable of such voluntarism has ever 
existed. As MacIntyre notes when discussing how plain persons make moral decisions, even 
a skeletal explanation of a moral transformation requires a large body of contextualising 
information. MacIntyre has been consistently critical of accounts of moral choice that 
emphasise freedom at the expense of context-dependent deliberation. This is a key feature of 
both MacIntyre's conception of narrative unity, and of his account of moral traditions
15
.
It is not that emotion work as emotional labour never takes a form similar to that 
suggested by Mills, it is that such a fate is not universal or inevitable. Indeed, if we leave to 
one side the metaphor of the sale of personality, Mills' account may well be an accurate, 
though partial, description of what happens when a compartmentalised conception of life 
becomes standard, as MacIntyre suggests has happened in contemporary Western culture. 
Both in the previous chapter and in the above allusions to jobs that require repetitive 
emotional labour, we saw reasons why something like a Marxist account of alienation is not 
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to be abandoned altogether (and we will do so again in the brief discussion of brand 
identification below). However, for MacIntyre, it is extremely rare and difficult for anyone to 
fall into a comprehensive state of alienation, a state that affects the whole of someone's 
character. What is more likely is that someone can come to understand him or herself in a 
compartmentalised way. Comprehensive alienation is rare because engagement in practices 
of various kinds is required in order to become minimally autonomous, rational, moral 
agents, and an engagement in practices requires at least relatively healthy relations with 
others. Such practices may be as simple as childhood games and being part of a family, and 
even if Larkin is right about parents, the damage done to children who do not play and have 
no genuine, healthy nurturing relationships is well documented. Because alienation, where it 
exists, is a partial phenomenon, we would do better to ask how varieties of emotion-work-as-
emotional-labour might be alienating and how we can best immunise ourselves against this 
alienation.
Now, someone’s character might be corrupted by external pressure to identify as 
completely as possible with a work organisation, or even as a result of a spontaneous desire 
to do so, and in such a case the metaphor of selling one’s personality may be a helpful one. 
But there are at least four distinct ways in which emotion work characteristically occurs in 
the context of the contemporary workplace in addition to the kind of alienating emotional 
labour undertaken by call centre workers repeating the same cheery words throughout the 
day: 1) identification with a brand, 2) identification with a role, 3) a more nebulous 
commodification of affect such as an enthusiastic adoption of a role, and 4) 'soft skills', or
non-obligatory surface acting. It would doubtless be possible to identify innumerable distinct 
categories between and beyond those listed, but these four are sufficient for our purpose of 
outlining where healthy relationships to one’s work end and where relationships inimical to 
flourishing begin. Let us consider these in turn.
1) Identification with ‘brand’. Here ‘brand’ has a broader reference than commonly 
associated with the word. ‘Brand’ identification involves a significant level of loyalty to the 
values of an organisation or its product. When any organisation is oriented towards 
cultivating identification with its ‘brand’ something like Mills’ account of the white collar 
worker will be plausible. In such cases, the strong emphasis on aligning with an 
organisational culture demands significant emotional work, and its benefits may include 
greater productivity and morale. However, the attempt to implement such measures can lead 
to what Irving Janis called ‘Groupthink’ – “A mode of thinking that people engage in when 
they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members' strivings for unanimity 
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override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action.”
16
This is 
clearly inimical to virtuous flourishing, but even where groupthink does not obtain, the 
demands of such thorough-going emotional labour are quite worrying in themselves as we 
can see by considering the account Barbara Ehrenreich gives of the high demand, high 
energy, high burn-out rate, corporate culture at Microsoft
17
. The demand for, and realisation 
of, a strong emotional attachment to a brand can only be good when that brand is itself good 
and even then may be excessive: moderate goodness does not warrant utter devotion. 
Identification with a brand in this strong sense is therefore another very real candidate 
for a contemporary version of alienation. Even though brand identification is in some ways 
the opposite of alienation from process and product, it is clearly a threat to our ability to order 
our lives as narrative unities and to our ability to adequately appraise our engagements in 
practices. For, unless we define the good life as a practice, it would be a mistake to 
completely identify oneself with any one activity
18
. There is of course much that needs to be 
said about this topic, but now is not the time - the subtleties of the remaining kinds of 
emotion work are more immediately relevant to our investigation.
2) Identification with a role. It is no part of MacIntyre’s ‘narrative unity of self’ 
requirement that role-playing be eschewed, but identification with a role, in the sense 
intended, does have a tendency to breach this requirement. For MacIntyre, the role player 
must always be able to ask him or herself “How is it best for me to play this role? ... By what 
standards am I to judge what is best?”
19
such that whenever the demands of a role conflict 
with the demands of being a good person over and above that particular role, the latter must 
always be given priority. Nevertheless, the latter will of course take role demands into 
consideration as the self is partially shaped by roles and cannot be conceived of as being 
entirely free from role demands. We will consider this point in more depth in the next section.
3) Enthusiastic adoption of a role. The adoption of a role in this sense is distinct from 
the identification of a role in that when a role is adopted enthusiastically that enthusiasm is of 
a person considered over and above the role. Almost all work, and indeed very many kinds 
personal relationship, involves the adoption of a role, but to be a sullen waiter involves no 
emotion work even if the suppression of outright hostility may have to be accounted some 
form of emotional labour, but insofar as the job is done at all some role is adopted. To adopt a
role enthusiastically means therefore that the enthusiasm is judged as being the best way to 
play the role for the person as autonomous, independent rational agent
20
. This, like all of the 
four forms of emotion work as emotional labour described here, admits of degrees and can be 
more or less commodified. Hochschild says, 
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Conventionalised feeling may come to assume the properties of a commodity. When deep 
gestures of exchange enter the market sector and are bought and sold as an aspect of labour 
power, feelings are commodified. When the manager gives the company his enthusiastic faith, 
when the airline stewardess gives her passengers her psyched up but quasi-genuine reassuring 
warmth, what is sold as an aspect of labour power is deep acting.
21
In this sense a person can be a competent waiter without being genuinely friendly, a 
knowledgeable teacher capable of helping students to achieve high grades (which is not to 
say a good teacher) without genuinely caring, but the affective enthusiasm is required to be
fully good at either role.
4) Ordinary ‘soft skills’. Were it not for the sake of preserving readability this might 
be termed ‘Non-obligatory surface acting’. This is simply politeness, civility, agreeableness 
etc. exercisable in a variety of ways. Such politeness and civility is required by good 
manners. Such friendly signals importantly safeguard the small level of trust required by 
ordinary social interaction. It is worth highlighting it as a feature of working life because the 
maintenance of professional relationships differs from the maintenance of even trivial 
personal relations, even relations with strangers. It is permissible to ignore obnoxious 
strangers (by, for instance, withholding friendly nods of recognition from the mobile phone 
ring-tone fixated fellow train passenger), or to passively allow a feud with a former friend to 
continue where one sees no hope of genuine reconciliation; it is impermissible or at least 
substantially less permissible to treat a colleague in either of those ways. This is because 
there is always some sense in which work colleagues are engaged in a collaborative 
enterprise and always a chance that one’s role will require contact with those colleagues one 
may find obnoxious. Even in highly competitive and/or unfriendly working environments in 
which collaboration is severely reduced, the level of enforced contact and the desirability of 
maintaining the subjective well-being of others means that collegial civility is always 
important. Indeed, such civility is essential if the work is to be compatible with the good life.
It is common for friendships to begin at work; indeed, it is not uncommon for people 
to meet their future spouses at work. The opportunity for social interaction provided by work, 
along with the self-esteem provided by contributing to society in some way rather than being 
idle, and of course remuneration, is one of the most commonly cited benefits of work
22
. That 
social interaction is so praised might tell us more about contemporary society in general than 
it does about work, but one important feature of the sociability afforded by work is that one is 
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often thrust together with people one would not have otherwise met or socialised with. This 
initial diversity, that is, diversity before relationships have been forged and common goals 
adopted, means that 'soft skills' are especially important in the workplace for many people.
2) Identification with role will be our focus in the next section of this chapter, and 4) 
ordinary soft-skills, or non-obligatory surface acting, will be our focus in the third section. 
Our focus here is on 3) enthusiastic adoption of a role.
There is much in Hochschild’s account of emotion work that is compatible with a 
MacIntyrean case for the importance of small work communities, and a life lived as a 
narrative unity. Hochschild says
…feelings take on their meaning and full character only in relation to a specific time and place 
in the world. And each context has a normative, an expressive, and a political dimension...both 
feelings and feeling rules are socially induced, as is the potential conflict between the two. The 
expressive dimension of any context has to do with the relation between a person’s feelings and 
other people’s understanding of and response to those feelings, that is, with the issue of 
communication.
23
This focus on context and on a kind of understanding that goes beyond the simple 
communication that is required for basic interaction suggests that the management and 
negotiation of such feeling rules will operate best when long term relationships are allowed to 
develop. These relationships need not only be relatively long term, they must involve 
frequent face-to-face interaction so that regular and relatively detailed communication is 
possible. Hochschild continues,  “The many small decisions that lead us to discount or take 
seriously an expression rest on a variety of factors: our style of interpreting, our knowledge of 
another’s smiling habits, our knowledge of events prior to the encounter, and so on.”
24
This 
resonates with  MacIntyre's emphasis on both the continuity of personal relations and the 
importance of small-scale communities. In order to be able to accurately interpret the subtle 
meanings that might be communicated by a particular person’s smile or gesture one would 
have to know that person well, which takes some time. To know the (quite possibly) 
ostensibly trivial prior events itself requires that the milieu be relatively small. It is possible 
to cultivate virtues such that one can respond well to people's behaviour generally, but the 
ability to respond in the best way requires that one know an individual reasonably well.
It is said that doctors and bank managers tend to assess people quickly, but this is 
because there are likely to be time restrictions on both – there is no point in indulging a
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talkative patient or customer if their requirements can be met quickly – and because both 
positions involve looking out for a limited number of things. The ability to spot patients who 
under or over-state the severity of their symptoms is invaluable for a doctor, and will in all 
likelihood require doctors to pay attention to a handful of warning signs. Insofar as bank 
managers are still entrusted with decision making in this era of computerised credit checks, 
there are likely to be signs that differentiate reliable and unreliable customers. Excessive 
speed of judgement may also result from a cynical complacency too. The difference is that 
there is no comparable collaborative element to one’s relation with one’s doctor. One wants 
one’s doctor to perform well, and one will probably comply with requests/volunteer accurate 
information, but one is not part of a working team. A brisk bedside manner might be a little 
rude, but does not alter one’s relation with the doctor in any relevant sense. At work however, 
being insensitive can chip away at the good feeling that sustains informal relationships, and 
ultimately threatens the free-flow of informal information that is crucial in almost any 
workplace.
The upshot of Hochschild’s MacIntyrean elaboration of conditions under which 
healthy emotion work takes place is that the enthusiastic adoption of a role cannot be a 
merely ‘professional’ process. This is to say, these conditions are not impersonal or 
bureaucratic; “The more bureaucratized our society, the more standardised, commodified, 
and depersonalised are public displays of feeling, and the more discounting we do.”
25
Standardisation (and of course commodification) tends to be ruled out where relationships of 
or approaching genuine friendship exist. Friendship plays a crucial role in MacIntyre’s ethics 
for without it we may fail to understand both others and ourselves, as we saw in chapter 2. If 
we are to genuinely transform our desires in order to facilitate a collaborative enterprise, this 
understanding will be crucial. People tend to be influenced far more by their relationship with 
their profession and with their immediate work group than their organisation or broader 
department
26
. In a profession, there is, and in a work group there is likely to be, some degree 
of homogeneity in terms of conceptions of goals, and so professions are often prima facie 
candidates for the status of MacIntyrean practices
27
. As MacIntyre says, “reasoning together 
with others about my and their good requires some significant measure of agreement on our 
goals – where there is no common ground concerning ends, there can be no common 
deliberation”
28
. A flight attendant might be obliged to offer warm and friendly service, but 
this is likely to require less emotional labour when working relationships are long term and 
safeguarded, and generally the more people are afforded the opportunity to meaningfully 
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deliberate about their working goals the more possible a genuinely enthusiastic adoption of 
the working role becomes.
In this section, we focused on the enthusiasm more than the role, but now we turn to 
consider the nature and extent to which it is legitimate to adopt role-demands as one's own. 
Emotion work may be furthest from emotional labour under conditions of semi-permanence 
and close acquaintance but roles themselves do not necessarily change on account of such 
features.
4.2 Roles and Role Ethics
The strong identification with a role and adoption of the standards of excellence appropriate 
to that role brings with it the possibility of a conflict between both various particular roles 
and between being good qua human being and being good in a role. Clearly, from a 
MacIntyrean point of view the demands of being a good human being, living a good whole 
life, always trump the demands of being good in a role whenever the two are in conflict. 
Furthermore, according to MacIntyre, people ought to avoid putting themselves in situation in 
which such conflict is endemic such as working for companies involved in the arms trade or 
responsible for polluting the environment and so on
29
. As we saw in chapter 2, conceiving of 
one’s life as a narrative unity is an invaluable tool when it comes to clearly understanding 
oneself as a coherent whole, a human being, over and above any particular role that one 
happens to inhabit. We would do well to notice however that this transcendence of any 
particular set of roles is not a transcendence of particularity per se nor does it imply that roles 
are ethically unimportant. Obviously, MacIntyre’s unity requirement does not entail the 
rejection of the adoption of working roles
30
, but it does entail the rejection of the role-ethics 
developed by Christine Swanton.
Swanton is one of the leading non-Eudaimonist virtue ethicists, and is perfectly clear 
about some of the ways in which her view differs from that of an Aristotelian like MacIntyre. 
She says:
In Aristotelian virtue ethics, the answer to this question lies in a hierarchical approach to 
goodness, with the hierarchy terminating in goodness qua human being. The goodness of a role 
is determined by reference to its place in the life of a good human being, and there is no conflict 
between role virtues and ‘ordinary’ (role undifferentiated) virtues: namely those making one 
good qua human being.
31
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For MacIntyre, ordinary virtues are not completely role undifferentiated. It is important to 
spell this out in some detail here as the plausibility of Swanton’s account will turn on her 
contrast between role-differentiated and role-undifferentiated virtues. According to 
MacIntyre’s practice-based account, virtues must always be understood contextually, that is 
to say, they are always to some degree role-differentiated. Virtues receive their primary, 
though partial, definition in terms of practices. As Christopher Lutz points out in his study of 
MacIntyre’s account of tradition-based rationality, it is not disembodied or autonomous 
ethical standards that guide our acquisition of the virtues for such standards do not exist 
independently of the practices through which virtues are acquired. Lutz says, 
Practices are the sources of standards. There are no standards prior to practices, because 
standards arise organically from practices themselves... Pursuing the goods internal to practices 
entails the development of certain moral qualities, and it is a consequence of this that practices 
are bearers of moral standards.
32
One must be the master, or pupil, or collaborator and one’s motivation to engage in a putative 
practice is always going to be informed by the roles one plays in relation to those from and to 
whom one seeks and gives advice, respect, obedience, and so on.
Swanton continues to explain the nature of her position. She says, “There is another, 
non-Aristotelian, possibility for a virtue ethical role ethics. Role virtues make one good qua 
role occupier, and those roles must themselves be worthwhile or valuable.”
33
Swanton claims 
that there is characteristically no conflict between roles. Thus on her view it is not the case, 
for instance, that the role virtue of artistic passion can lead to a mistreatment of friends and 
family when the artistic stakes are very high. For Swanton the artist’s passion is tempered by 
other demands. We will consider this move in more detail below. However, let us note that 
Swanton does not think it is the case that where “there is some conflict between being good 
qua human being and being good in a role, goodness in-a-role is always to be subordinated to 
being good qua human being”
34
. This should strike us as being a bizarre claim and Swanton 
offers little in the way of elucidation other than the allusion noted above that ‘other demands’ 
can prevent us from vice in such cases of conflict. Given that those other demands are not the 
demands of being a good person it is worth looking more closely at what Swanton envisages 
roles to involve and why roles might be thought to be good (to the extent that they are not to 
be subordinated to being a good person).
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Swanton’s pluralistic ethics precludes the possibility of there being one answer to the 
question of what makes a role good. Discussing business roles specifically, she says that they 
might be said to be “good because the institution or practice of business as a whole increases 
prosperity, and is therefore worthwhile”. Though, Swanton explains,
It does not follow from this that the target or aim of a business role virtue is to promote the 
overall prosperity of society as a whole, or the prosperity of the worse off. For the nature of a 
role virtue in an individual agent is determined by the purpose or function of individual 
business organisations, and it is not necessarily the case that the purpose or function of 
individual business organisations is to increase the overall prosperity of society, or the 
prosperity of the worse off.
35
And further,
business organisations have a distinctive purpose such as promoting or maximising (within 
limited constraints) owner value over the long term by selling goods and services…[and] that, 
nonetheless, there is characteristically no conflict between pursuing this aim in a business role 
and being a good human being.
36
Even if we accept this set of claims, such an observation is useless when it comes to deciding 
what to do in cases where there is a conflict. Swanton has given us some indication of why
she thinks such roles might be valuable, but not a sufficient criterion (or, more plausibly 
given her pluralism, a set of criteria) of value such that conflicts between commitments can 
be resolved. A role can be worthwhile because it broadly tends to increase prosperity without 
the increasing of prosperity being the purpose of the role, but what of cases in which role-
demands contingently and unfortunately count against prosperity or some other good? 
Swanton says, “it is both the case that A) being good as a human being is itself shaped by role 
demands, and that B) role demands are constrained by the requirements of being good as a 
human being”
37
. MacIntyre would agree with claim A), although his conception of those 
roles is different to Swanton’s, but not claim B). Claim B) means that for Swanton role 
demands are constrained by, but not necessarily subordinate to, the demands of being a good 
person. Is such a view plausible? There is no contradiction here – constraint does not imply 
subordination - but the MacIntyrean will be extremely sceptical about this because while 
being a good person involves roles it is not 'constrained' by them. If role demands and the 
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demands of being a good person were equally and mutually constricting any conflict between 
the two would, ipso facto, be irresolvable. In order to answer this question properly however 
we need to be clear about what Swanton takes the demands of being a good person to be. 
Swanton’s account of the demands of being a good person involves the concept of a 
‘prototype virtue’. For Swanton these demands are role-undifferentiated and so general that 
they can make no reference to social circumstance, cultural conventions, or the narrative 
particulars of a life
38
. Swanton says,
Not only do they (prototype virtues) not provide universal principles, they do not even provide 
rules that are specific enough to provide guidance of the form: ‘characteristically you should do 
thus and so.’ For example, the prototype virtue loyalty does not prescribe that, 
characteristically, you should stick with your employer for several years. The prototype virtue 
honesty does not prescribe that, characteristically, you should state the bad features of your 
product or not overhype or exaggerate its good features when advertising or selling it.
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That loyalty does not prescribe staying with an employer for several years tells us nothing 
about the nature of loyalty. It is obviously the case that some people are often motivated 
primarily by external goods and so will sell their skills to the highest bidder, which may 
involve changing jobs regularly, just as some employers will sack employees if doing so is 
thought to be profitable or likely to lead to a rise in share price
40
. Loyalty in this sense is 
completely inappropriate in such contexts; just as patience cannot mean waiting endlessly for 
just anything, loyalty cannot mean remaining faithful to just anything. The increasing 
likelihood of employers announcing redundancies at times when their companies are doing 
well
41
, and the growth of short/fixed term contracts and ensuing “atmosphere of pervasive 
insecurity”
42
means that loyalty to most work organisations in any real sense is increasingly 
irrational. Brand identification is at times almost pathological. Consider an anecdote: I once 
met someone who worked on an advertising campaign for a brand of beer. Having been 
partly responsible for the 'brand message' of the beer, he came to identify with that message 
to such an extent that he never drank other brands. When questioned about this he would, 
quite without irony, almost quote the slogans he had played a part in coining, describe how he 
fitted the specified target market, and yet never mentioned the taste of the product as a reason 
for his preferring it.
For Swanton the ‘business virtue’ of loyalty does not make the same demands as 
loyalty in friendship. But it seems that nothing is gained by postulating the existence of a set 
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of ‘business virtues’. We can easily and economically say that loyalty, and indeed every
virtue, varies in terms of correct application depending on the context. Friends can make 
greater legitimate demands on our loyalty, ceteris paribus, than do business organisations, 
family members more than strangers. We can acknowledge that loyalty is more important in 
some especially trying situations and certain cultural contexts than others, and so on. 
Swanton says that in order to combat high staff turnover “management may refuse to re-
employ good staff begging for their jobs back, in order to help create a climate where loyalty 
is seen as an important virtue.”
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Such a measure might increase managerial control, but can 
hardly be said to foster genuine loyalty. The institutional measures suggested by Swanton 
may increase staff retention because they instil in the workforce a fear of losing the external 
goods provided by the organisation or indeed the goods internal to the job, and as a result 
may increase productivity as the combined result of retaining good staff and reducing the cost 
of recruiting and training new staff, and ultimately may lead to an increase in lip-service paid 
to loyalty, but it would not increase genuine loyalty. This lip-service would be akin to the 
superficial emotional labour of a call centre worker and rather unlike the emotion work that is 
required for the development of genuine loyalty. Loyalty can of course be fostered in the 
workplace by the preservation of long term working relationships that become friendships 
even if they are largely restricted to the workplace, and through the creation of environments 
in which workers feel both valued (and relatively secure) and autonomous
44
. In these cases, 
what we are talking about is not ‘business loyalty’ but loyalty.
Swanton's categorisation is mistaken because, although we might draw a distinction 
between colleagues and 'work friends' and draw a further distinction between the latter 
category and friends outside of work, we might also draw a distinction between university 
friends, five-a-side team friends, home-town friends, and so on without ever thinking that 
there is a serious difference in the nature of friendship in these different cases. These 
categories are more like descriptions, and we do not think there is a distinct relationship that 
has the name 'home-town-friendship' any more than we should think there is a distinct virtue 
called 'business loyalty'.
The case of honesty is more straightforward. Any account which is compatible with 
deliberately misleading someone about the nature or quality of a service or product is not, 
ipso facto, an account of honesty at all. It would seem that Swanton’s account of business 
role ethics, in trying to be sufficiently broad to include the great variety of business roles that
exist has become so permissive that it has unwittingly excluded the ethics. One need not 
accept MacIntyre’s own very pronounced scepticism about ‘business ethics’ – he is said to 
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have once replied, when asked why he refused an invitation to address a business ethics 
conference, that it was ‘for the same reason he would not attend a conference on astrology’
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– to remain critical about behaviours common in certain industries or aware of the unethical 
ways in which otherwise legitimate business is practised. Many people sceptical about the 
praise lavished on the banking sector by the incumbent Labour government were shocked by 
the revelations that accompanied the 2008 crash, so it is clear that we can distinguish between 
the demands of roles in themselves and roles as they happen to be particularly 
institutionalised. There is an enormous difference between raising public awareness of a 
product and using underhand methods to manufacture desire. Misleading and manipulative 
statements in advertising, marketing, public relations, journalism and any other industry for 
that matter are ruled out by honesty if anything is.
Swanton’s problem is that her definition of ‘good person’ is too vague and inclusive, 
and her definition of ‘prototype virtue’ is too minimal, to be considered virtues at all. 
Moreover, these aspects of her account are certainly far more minimal than is needed to 
sustain even a pluralistic conception of what it is to be a good human being.
One feature of Aristotelian Virtue Ethics is that the virtues are acquired by acting in a 
way that is virtuous before the relevant virtues are genuinely possessed. To reintroduce an 
example given above, a child may learn gratitude by being taught to act gratefully at 
appropriate times. In this sense, there is an acceptance of role-apt exaggeration within 
Aristotelianism. Is Swanton’s tacit acceptance of exaggerating about a product similar to the 
child feigning or exaggerating gratitude for a present? No: the child’s laboured response is 
partially dependent on his or her status as child (and therefore not to be accounted a fully 
morally responsible agent) but is ultimately justified by the significance it has for his or her 
life as a whole, and perhaps by the benefits expressions of gratitude has for community as a 
whole. School children are taught Newtonian physics because this is the only way they could 
learn the concepts needed to understand more advanced physics (And because Newtonian 
physics adequately describes almost all of the physical phenomena they will ever meet). For 
the exaggerating and over-hyping advertiser this is not the case. Whereas for MacIntyre we 
attempt to alter our desires so that they aim at the good, deception in advertising is designed 
to transform desires so that they aim at what is profitable for some group of people.
It is the context that stops an actor from being a liar every time he performs; the 
game-show ‘Call My Bluff’ was many things, but grossly immoral it was not. The 'bluffs' 
told in the game-show occur in a context in which ordinary rules of trust and belief are 
suspended because the audience knows 2/3s of the claims are false, and although most people 
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are wary of the claims made by advertising, the misrepresentations (“only 400 calories per 
200g serving!”) and half-truths (“more of the pain relieving agent doctors recommend 
most!”) may still be believed and are ostensibly designed to convince. Moreover because the 
Advertising Standards Agency is committed to the belief that you cannot derive an ‘ought’ 
from an ‘is’, highly dubious value judgements are allowed to pass, even if these take the form 
of exaggeration or implication. Where the purpose of the deception is profit-maximisation, 
there exist no effective separate standards by which the advertisements can be judged. Where 
victory in football is to be pursued at all costs, the ethical distinction between an expertly 
executed feint and an expertly executed dive becomes blurred. 
Swanton continues to elaborate her version of context-dependency. “Creativity is part 
of vice in business if it constitutes inefficiency, self-indulgence, or grandiosity, but in a very 
talented artist what may be called grandiosity in the business world may be virtuous 
creativity.”
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This analogy does not work. Of course a focus on efficiency that is excessive 
from the point of view of a human being may make one a successful business person, and the 
prudence required of someone qua friend, or father, or brother may prevent that person from 
fulfilling his potential qua artist. The possibility of conflict is very real even if it is not 
‘characteristic’. Whatever is to be accounted genuine creativity in the context of business 
cannot be mere grandiosity. It is for this reason that Aristotle claimed that bravery does not 
mean being entirely without fear, and to place oneself in danger for something that is not 
good makes one rash
47
. The context determines whether a mode of thought or behaviour is to 
be considered a virtue and which virtue it is. Wearing a suit and carrying a briefcase would 
not necessarily make an artist ‘business-like’ but might rather constitute one more form of 
eccentricity.
Swanton seems to be happy to allow the demands of the institution and/or role to 
govern the virtues rather than vice versa. Indeed, if Swanton's pluralistic role ethics is correct
it is hard to imagine how anyone could devise criteria by which they could assess and then 
alter an institution or a role, whereas for MacIntyre this institutional safeguarding of practices 
is a key task. When Swanton attempts to explain why her view does not amount to the belief 
that business is about maximising shareholder profits, instead it is about serving shareholder 
interests ‘excellently’, she says “a woman may practice private business, but eschew 
maximising on the grounds that caring, demanded by her role as parent and spouse, precludes 
maximising in her business role”
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Despite the fact that on her view prototype honesty is 
compatible with regularly lying, Swanton also claims that a number of prototype virtues may 
rule out maximising – this is presumably what is meant by ‘serving excellently’. However, 
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unless there can be a place made for narrative unity, or at least some other form of hierarchy, 
in her theory it is not clear that such a move is available to Swanton. This is because it is not 
clear what grounds there could be for allowing the demands of being a parent or a spouse to 
outweigh the demands of a business role. Furthermore, whilst Swanton has indicated (albeit 
inadequately) why the woman in the example may not maximise even if a role demanded it, 
she has not demonstrated that business roles do not involve such maximising. For the 
MacIntyrean, some roles do and some roles do not involve maximising shareholder profits, 
and where these roles are in conflict with roles such as those of a parent or a spouse, the 
demands of the latter roles win out because they are more important in terms of being a good 
human being. 
It is possible to imagine an example in which a role demands profit maximisation 
such that caring for a child is precluded, and if 'parent' and 'businessperson' are merely two 
separate roles that are not hierarchically ordered, it seems that if we accept Swanton’s view 
there is no satisfactory way to resolve this conflict. One role might happen to be more 
important to an individual than another but unless the demands of being a good person are 
allowed to trump role demands, which of the competing role demands are obeyed is merely a 
matter of subjective preference. On MacIntyre's Aristotelian view, it is easy to see how and 
why someone might attempt to change an institution or a role such that its demands were 
more in line with what is required of us in order to be good qua human beings but on 
Swanton's view this remains mysterious.
Swanton identifies what she sees as the problem of supposing the demands of 
prototype virtues to be so stringent that the demands of the business purpose may be seriously 
compromised. I hope I have said enough about the concept of prototype virtues to show that 
this accusation is unlikely to have much force. Swanton goes on to say that this mistake 
follows from drawing a false dichotomy between the moral and the ‘merely’ practical, and 
regarding business purposes as being merely practical. She says that this “spurious” 
separation has the effect that,
the ‘merely practical’ is downgraded in significance relative to the moral. However, doing 
one’s (worthwhile) job properly is a moral requirement, and if problems such as a printer not 
getting course books ready in time for the first class are seen as ‘merely practical problems’, 
then they may not be attributed to the moral failings of individuals, as opposed to, for example, 
‘systems’ failure where no one takes responsibility for contributing to the failure. The mistake 
of reducing many morally important features to the merely practical is not always made, but it 
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is still common nonetheless to think of many institutional goals such as business goals as 
amoral. It is harder to make this mistake with respect to other worthwhile institutions such as 
medicine. It would be very odd indeed to regard the saving of life and the reduction of health 
related suffering to be an amoral (or ‘merely practical’) goal.
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Obviously, the MacIntyrean recognises the moral as being importantly practical and agrees 
that a disregard for medicine would indeed be odd. The problem with Swanton’s surprisingly 
brief dismissal of this objection is that there seems to be no way of giving a satisfactory 
account of what is worthwhile. Moreover, the problem is that there is nothing about 
something being a ‘business goal’ that guarantees its being worthwhile, indeed some are 
amoral and some are immoral. One of things we legitimately expect from a moral theory is 
that it be able to help us adjudicate between good and bad actions, roles, business practices 
and particular jobs
50
. Aristotelian Eudaimonism in general and MacIntyre’s formulation in 
particular can easily account for the difference between medicine, good business, and certain 
amoral business goals without drawing an unsustainable distinction between the moral and 
practical. It can also explain why it is commonly and correctly held that medicine is more 
intrinsically good than, say, advertising.
All activities require the adoption of roles to some extent, and all of these roles have 
at least some standards of success (or ‘excellence’ in Swanton’s sense), but if this is enough 
for a role to be ‘worthwhile’ then all we are left with is the glorification of whatever happens 
to be done. This is an unacceptably broad set of limits. A more robust conception of virtues 
and of being a good person allows us to avoid the problems we encountered with Swanton’s 
account. MacIntyre provides just such a robust conception. MacIntyre's practice-based ethics 
is sometimes criticised for being unable to rule out 'evil practices'. Aside from the fact that 
such accusations rest on a misinterpretation of MacIntyre's definition of a practice, they can 
be ignored because on his account nothing is to be accounted a virtue in terms of practices 
alone
51
. Swanton's account invites similar accusations, but it seems she has no way open to 
her to adequately distinguish between morally good and bad roles. Whereas MacIntyre
subordinates roles and practices to the demands of being a good person, Swanton lacks a 
plausible conception of a 'good person'. If roles are allowed the dominant position which 
Swanton grants them then there can be no resolution of conflict.
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4.3 Trust and Authority
We saw above some ways in which, in certain contexts, a focus on ‘soft skills’ and emotion 
work helps to make contemporary work more conducive to virtuous flourishing, for instance 
by protecting personal relationships. However there are at least two ways in which this 
promise can be undermined: 1) by being instantiated in an environment in which trust is 
absent or severely threatened, and 2) by requiring subordination to the standards of a 
particular activity without the presence of legitimate authority specifically or rational grounds 
more generally. There is an enormous difference between someone engaging in emotion 
work in order to become a better worker because they recognise and accept the goals of doing 
so as internal goods and doing so for the sake of external goods or to avoid punishments of 
whatever kind. These two threats to flourishing have been gestured at in previous chapters in 
our discussion of the epistemological difficulties facing would be practitioners and in our 
discussion of alienation.
As we saw in the first chapter, MacIntyre’s practice-based ethics requires an account 
of rational authority. This is because if we are to subordinate ourselves to expert practitioners 
and dedicate ourselves to the practice (or indeed putative practice) so that we can become 
better able to engage in and thus appreciate the goods internal to the practice in question and 
if we cannot have a sufficient understanding of that practice in advance, we, as potential 
practitioners and as theorists of practices need some way of deciding whether a putative 
authority who recommends such subordination and dedication is genuine. We both need an 
account of the nature of the authority and an account of the conditions under which it is 
rational to yield to an authority. Traditional expert authorities are becoming less respected, as 
Christeen George puts it, 
Patients may, for example, question a medical decision and demand explanation taken by the 
medical professional. Students may question a grade given for a piece of work and may request 
additional feedback to provide justification of the grade. Whilst the knowledge and expertise is 
acknowledged, their judgements and actions are increasingly scrutinised. Social changes, 
particularly within the UK, have led to a decrease in deference and a more customer –rather 
than client- focused relationship.
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Excessive or undue deference can be a hindrance to anyone’s pursuit of the good. However, 
this change to customer-focused relations is not unproblematic. No one believes the customer 
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is always right. The need for an account of authority may be especially acute when deciding 
whether to engage in a new practice, or persevering with one through difficulty, but it is also 
present when it comes to the practice of sustaining a community, a practice in which we are 
all, to some extent, engaged. Even being a well mannered customer contributes to this in a 
minimal sense. However, community is not a good absolutely and so we must, if we are to 
form and sustain communities conducive to flourishing, be able to both question the worth of 
goals set by a community and the authority of any person or social or organisational structure 
that calls for emotion work that serves that particular community. More accurately, it is not 
the ability to question authority that is important here, but the conceivability of those in 
authority answering that question. Being able and permitted to question authority is of little 
value if one lacks the resources to understand when that authority is illegitimate and the 
ability to remedy the situation.
Clearly, in work contexts certain people have authority in the sense of power, but 
what we are interested in here is trust in authority (based as it may be on faith in someone’s 
moral or technical competence or knowledge). In this sense, we place trust in someone both 
because we do not suspect that they will deceive us and because they deserve trust on the 
grounds that they know what they are talking about. Here we might follow Kohn in 
distinguishing between three broad kinds of trust: 1) trust without goodwill of the sort that 
allows us to store money in banks
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or trust in expert systems more generally
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or indeed trust 
strangers to fulfil contractual and legal obligations, 2) the freer but still thin trust that exists 
between a shop-keeper and his or her customers, and 3) the thick trust that exists between 
friends. In the context of contemporary work (and contemporary society more generally) thin 
trust is still relatively common and freely available, but has in many respects become thinner 
still with the increase of bureaucratisation. To use an example given by Kohn, where a 
newspaper editor might be inclined to informally commission an opinion piece from a 
journalist he or she knew, the paper’s corporate policy might dictate that a formal contract is 
required, thereby increasing the time and effort required. This resort to legal obligation 
betrays a lack of trust and reduces our dealing with people to dealings with roles. We can 
trust a person qua person on the basis of an informal promise, but we cannot trust a person 
qua role-occupier if that role dictates that there would be some benefit from breaking such a 
promise. Indeed the thinning of trust must partially account for increasing efforts to manage 
the psychological contract, a concept that was once unheard of, which then became a 
metaphor, and has become increasingly literal and is perhaps a genuine phenomenon now that 
employers take it into consideration. Indeed, the more employers focus on it the more real 
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will its effects become, and the more contractual will become what were once ordinary 
relationships. Transactions that do not require contracts run more smoothly, as Kohn notes
56
, 
but this makes them harder to manage.
Kohn thinks thin trust is more useful than thick trust because it extends beyond 
firsthand experience, but it seems that we need to be able to have relatively thick trust beyond 
firsthand experience on the basis of rationally grounded authority. For instance, we might 
have firsthand experience of a friend’s ability to be a good judge of character and then go 
beyond firsthand experience and trust a new friend of this friend, and this relatively thick 
trust derives from the faith we have in the friend. Certain types of church group or humanist 
organisation might welcome a new member with fellowship because of shared moral 
commitments upon which trust can be founded. Robert Putnam notes that as “the social fabric 
of a community becomes more threadbare, however, its effectiveness in transmitting and 
sustaining reputations declines, and its power to undergird norms of honesty, generalised 
reciprocity and thin trust is enfeebled”
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. This indicates that there are severe limitations to the 
usefulness of thin trust. Thin trust is most reliable in contexts in which thick trust is a 
possibility because in such circumstances it can resist being so enfeebled. Actual thin trust 
operates best against a background of potentially actualisable thick trust. The task of creating 
such circumstances is up to us, and depends on our possession of the virtues. The creation of 
small scale communities in contexts such as the workplace or neighbourhood cannot solve 
wider social problems, but it can allow thin trust relationships to come closer to thick trust.
There is a venerable liberal tradition of arguing that the common good supervenes on 
enlightened self-interest. Consider the following classic statement from Adam Smith’s (Book 
IV, chapter II, paragraph IX) The Wealth of Nations
By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends only his own 
security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest 
value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible 
hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the 
society that it was not part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the 
society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it. I have never known much 
good done by those who affected to trade for the public good. It is an affectation, indeed, not 
very common among merchants, and very few words need be employed in dissuading them 
from it.
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Smith's position is plausible when applied to individual merchants but does not apply in a era 
in which corporate entities are vast and vastly powerful. Mr. Butcher does not want to 
overcharge Mr. Baker because he does not want to be overcharged himself, but Mr. Tesco 
cannot be harmed by Mr. Independent-Farmer so the former can do as he pleases. Moreover 
it is already a mistake to regard society as being composed of free and equal persons even 
where, for the sake of argument, there are no power disparities of the sort that divide global 
corporations from local producers because, as MacIntyre is at pains to argue in Dependent 
Rational Animals, we are all born into relationships of dependency in which uncalculated co-
operation is required. For the MacIntyrean, flourishing requires more substantial goods, a 
thicker conception of the common good, and a recognition that our relationships with others 
go deeper than Smith Liberalism allows. Given that our unconditional commitments to others 
are grounded by the virtues, and so ultimately derivative from our pursuit of the good life, the 
common good is still a matter of enlightened self-interest for MacIntyre. The difference lies 
in what each party counts as enlightenment.
According to MacIntyre we must be aware that we can learn from everyone
58
, that is 
to say, we can regard every human being as potentially worthy of thick trust, i.e. friendship. 
Thin trust would then operate against a background of possible thick trust, and non-obligatory 
surface acting, 'soft skills', may approximate genuine emotion work. However, the larger the 
scale of the social group the less feasible it becomes to invest in these relationships 
characterised by thin trust, and the more likely it is that they will be reduced to merely 
contractual relations or the most minimal 'trust-without-goodwill'. The standard numbers 
bandied around in management books for the optimal group size for decision-making is 
between 5 and 12. More broadly, estimates for optimal size of a social group are still 
relatively small. For instance Dunbar’s ‘number’, a cognitive upper limit on how many 
people it is possible to maintain stable social relationships with, is 150 (based on the volume 
of the human neo-cortex compared to other primates) and Bernard, Killworth et al estimate 
that the number is closer to 230 based on field studies of actual human populations
59
.
Thin trust might be more useful in some social situations as it lubricates basic 
interactions (in contexts which are already large and largely impersonal). Thick trust is more 
‘useful’, indeed, it is indispensable, when it comes to the pursuit of virtuous flourishing. 
Thick trust also lubricates more complex social interactions, and it safeguards thin trust 
against enfeeblement. It is for this reason, and because the changes to contemporary work 
described by Sennett reduce the likelihood of thick trust, that companies attempt to foster 
relations that at least approach genuine friendship, through team building exercises and so 
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forth but where these lose sight of the goals of long term collaboration, thick trust and 
security they can become misguided or even coercive attempts to guarantee superficial lip-
service to the goals of teamwork. That ordinary workers find this harder to lose sight of is 
suggested by the surveys which show people prefer ordinary work nights out, meals, and the 
like to the wackier end of team building exercises. This is perhaps part of the explanation of 
why people often resist the reorganisation of working groups
60
, and perhaps why people are 
sometimes disinclined to accept promotions that they think will damage their relationships 
with their peers
61
.
4.4 Conclusion
We can draw some conclusions about the conditions of flourishing at work at this stage. 
These are that working in an environment that involves a say over how one’s workplace is 
organised, and possessing working autonomy, and long term relationships with valuable 
commitments to fellow workers are all required if one is to flourish at work, though as we 
will see in chapter 7, they cannot be guarantors of such flourishing. These factors are simply 
a partial description of MacIntyre’s practice of sustaining and organising and institutions. It is 
also a reasonable partial description of the mandate of trade unions, in addition to the task of 
securing external goods such as higher wages, and traditionally more leisure time (one of the 
union movement’s great successes). When a form of employment is not a practice and cannot 
be made to be rewarding in terms of internal goods, it is crucial that it be organised such that 
those engaged in it have some control over it. It is an ideal, though one that is probably 
unrealisable, that all employment be an engagement in a practice. As MacIntyre says, 
Much work of course is necessarily tedious and fatiguing. But, if in addition it is carried out 
under oppressive and exploitative conditions, if it is organized so that the maximization of 
surplus value to be appropriated by others is the overriding consideration in organizing it, then 
work becomes something inflicted on the worker… This is why strong and independent trade 
unions, controlled as far as possible from their grass roots, are necessary for the good life under 
any form of capitalism. This is why strike action, provided that the striking workers have some 
chance of success, is almost always to be supported.
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This support for trade unions flows partly from MacIntyre's recognition of the iniquities of 
capitalism and partly from his emphasis on the importance of community (although the two 
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are not entirely unrelated concerns). MacIntyre’s tradition-based account of rationality and 
his account of practices mean that judgements from those outside particular trade unions will 
always be more liable to error than judgements from within. While a thorough account of 
MacIntyre's politics is beyond the scope of the present thesis, the following chapter will 
examine one key facet of that politics, the nature of community and how communities might 
be fostered and protected in even inhospitable workplaces, and we will return to the question 
of how they might be fostered more generally in the final chapter
                                                
1
Taylor and Bain, 1999, p.109.
2
Hochschild, 2003, p.94.
3
Zapf 2002, Zapf and Holz 2006, Lewig and Dollard 2003.
4
Brotheridge and Lee 2002, Warr 2007.
5
Mumby and Putnam, 1992, p.472.
6
Schaubroeck and Jones, 2000, p.179.
7
Wharton, 1993.
8
Hochschild, 2003, p.83.
9
MacIntyre, 2009a, p.117.
10
MacIntyre, 2007, p.188.
11
Johnson, 1999, p.20.
12
C. Wright Mills, 1951, p.190.
13
ibid, p.193.
14
Hochschild, 2003, p.102.
15
See After Virtue chapter 15. MacIntyre devotes most of Whose Justice? Which Rationality? to outlining the details of his 
account of tradition-based rationality.
16
I. Janis, 1972, p.9.
17
Ehrenreich, 2005.
18
I take it that this is consistent with Aristotelian ethics even on the dominant interpretation of Eudaimonia, which 
MacIntyre holds, because we do not 'identify' with contemplation in the sense I intend.
19
MacIntyre, 2006p, p.201.
20
It is important to note that whenever I talk of autonomy or independence I in no way mean to deny the more fundamental 
dependence we all have on others. For MacIntyre self-sufficiency, even as Aristotle conceived of it in his great-souled man, 
is an illusion. See, for instance, MacIntyre, 2009a.
21
Hochschild, 2003, p.102.
22
See Terry and Hogg, 2005, amongst others (including, as we saw in the previous chapter, Hegel).
23
Hochschild, 2003, p.81.
24
ibid, p.83.
25
ibid, p.83.
26
Ashforth and Johnson, 2001.
27
Although the institutional contexts of most of the recognised professions suggests they are liable to become corrupted.
28
MacIntyre, 2009a, pp.120-121.
29
See MacIntyre, 2006p.
30
ibid, p.201.
31
Swanton, 2007, p.208.
32
Lutz, 2004, pp.41-42.
33
Swanton, 2007, p.208.
34
ibid, p.210.
35
ibid, p.208.
36
ibid, p.210.
37
ibid, p.211.
38
ibid, p.211.
39
ibid, p.214.
40
See, for instance, Worrell et al (1991) which found that share prices rose by on average 4% in the days after redundancies 
are announced. Sennett also notes this in his Corrosion of Character.
41
This was discussed earlier with reference to Sennett, but see also P. Cappelli  1995.
42
Allen and Henry, 1996, p.66.
43
Swanton, 2007, p.217.
44
Stichler, 2005, p.405.
45
A story told by Kelvin Knight in ‘The MacIntyre Reader’, p.284.
46
Swanton, 2007, p.216
47
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1115a20-1116b.
100
                                                                                                                                                       
48
Swanton, 2007, p.221.
49
ibid, p.222.
50
I ignore for now the claim that virtue ethics is a flawed enterprise because it cannot help guide action. Insofar as this 
objection means that virtue ethics reserves an essential place for practical wisdom and has a deep sensitivity to context, it is 
no objection at all and insofar as it is warranted I take it that it does not apply to MacIntyre.
51
MacIntyre, 2007, p200.
52
I suspect also that Swanton would be unable to maintain the distinction between emotion work and emotional labour I set 
up in the first section because she allows roles to be self-sufficient.
53
George, 2009, p.74.
54
Kohn, 2008, p.12.
55
ibid, p.69.
56
ibid, pp.89-90.
57
Putnam, 2000, p.136.
58
MacIntyre, 2009a, pp.129-130.
59
McCarty, C., Killworth, P.D., Bernard, H.R., Johnsen, E. and Shelley, G., 2000.
60
Kotter, 2007, found that 70% of all corporate change efforts fail and attributes this to workforce resistance.
61
A phenomenon noted by Elton Mayo, 1949. Recent research suggests that promotions tend to be damaging to health. See 
Boyce and Oswald, 2011, who found that there is little evidence that greater job status leads to greater mental well-being and 
considerably more evidence that it leads to a decline in such well-being.
62
MacIntyre, 2008b, p.275.
101
Chapter 5: Institutions and Communities
MacIntyre frequently lists workplaces as sites in which practice-based communities can exist. 
This claim is implicitly qualified by MacIntyre’s repeated and unequivocal criticisms of the 
dominant institutions of modernity and by his claim that in order to flourish, people must be 
part of relatively small-scale, local communities. In this chapter I will argue that workplaces 
can house communities and that we need not read this claim as pertaining only to workplaces 
that house separately identifiable practices, or workplaces that are explicitly subversive of the 
dominant order. My argument does not, however, involve a paradoxical repositioning of 
MacIntyre as pro-business
1
. Instead, I argue that MacIntyre has not fully accounted for the 
widespread disengagement from contemporary work
2
and the informal communities that 
resist the compartmentalising tendency of much modern work. Even where Breen's claim that 
the "workplace has no connection with their wider aspirations or goals, with who they are or 
who they wish to become, but is instead a realm of existence that is to be contrasted 
negatively with the realms of familial life and of leisure"
3
holds true, alienation can be 
avoided through communities, or quasi-communities, of tacit resistance. Workplaces that 
house practices or strong, active trade unions get community for free. I am concerned to show 
that they can survive in even the most hostile environments. In chapter 3 I argued that 
comprehensive alienation was likely to be rare, and the present chapter serves to underline 
that point.
I will begin in section 5.1 by outlining MacIntyre’s definition of a practice-based 
community. What distinguishes such communities is the shared commitment to certain ends. 
Without a shared set of premises that can be no genuine community. I will then consider John 
Dobson’s objections to MacIntyre’s criticisms of the contemporary workplace. Dobson 
argues, in his ‘Utopia Reconsidered’, that large-scale institutions such as the modern firm 
might fulfil the role of practice-based communities. In section 5.2, I will explore three key 
areas of MacIntyre's account of communities: compartmentalisation, inequality and myopia, 
and I will argue that Dobson’s own arguments about these three topics are mistaken.  
However, in answering Dobson's challenge I will outline some reasons to adopt a less hostile 
attitude towards the institutions of modernity than MacIntyre himself apparently holds. In 
support of this claim, I will outline some ways in which workers might be resistant to 
modernity without being ostensibly subversive, for instance by disengaging from their non-
practice-based work and by carrying out such work for the sake of other, practice-based, 
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ends. Finally, in 5.3, I will head off the possible counter attack by outlining the argument,
developed most convincingly by Ron Beadle, that business itself cannot be regarded as a 
practice.
5.1 MacIntyre’s ‘Communities’ and the Workplace
For MacIntyre sustaining communities is the practice of politics, and he specifies certain 
necessary conditions for a political or social institution to be conducive to the achievement of 
individual and common goods. He says:
[T]hey must afford expression to the political decision-making of independent reasoners 
on all those matters on which it is important that the members of a particular community 
be able to come through shared rational deliberation to a common mind.
4
It is only under such conditions that a substantive conception of the common good is 
possible: only in small scale communities can there be a politics that is not dominated by 
competing interests. Where fundamentally different interests do compete, rational persuasion 
is secondary to leverage in negotiations and the ability to manipulate others becomes crucial.
MacIntyre says, “The practice of the virtues…is something difficult to reconcile with 
functioning well in the present economic order.”
5
This is because of the systematic exclusion 
of practices and the overwhelming emphasis on pursuit of external goods that is characteristic 
of the dominant institutions of modernity, in particular the market economy and individual 
corporations. I shall argue below that for many people, functioning well in the present 
economic order is not among their over-riding goals.
Perhaps the best known element of MacIntyre’s objection to contemporary work is his 
argument against managerial expertise in After Virtue. This will be the topic of the following 
chapter. However, in an earlier essay MacIntyre says:
The dominant way of understanding [industrial work and its rewards] under 
capitalism…is that whereby workers, management and investors all share in the 
distribution of what is jointly earned, in order that each gets as much as possible, and 
what matters is that as much as possible be produced...On this view men are primarily 
consumers and they work in order to consume…
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MacIntyre goes on to outline a rival view:
We ought to eat in order to work, not vice versa. The classical expression of this view is 
Aristotle’s, but all artists, most professors and some socialists believe it too. Only 
sentimentalists believe that work ought or can be always interesting, but in an order 
where work serves consumption it is bound to be always uninteresting. On the first view 
my fundamental interest as a member of one group is in how large a share of the product 
of work I consume; on the second view I can have no fundamental interest in the 
continuance of an order that represents work, interest and rewards in the way that the 
first view does. It is clear that if the first view is universally or even just widely held, the 
concept of interest employed will be such that conflicts over interests will be local, 
manageable, and, if the managers are sufficiently adroit, marginal; but if the second view 
were ever to be held by even a minority of workers, then conflict between them and the 
managing and investing classes would be endemic, central and possibly interminable.
6
MacIntyre might be right in his claim that most work exists to serve consumption, but work 
that is practice-based does exist. In chapter 1, we saw that the notion of a practice is more 
malleable than it first seems, and in chapter 3 we explored some reasons to reject any 
sweeping claims about the alienating tendencies of modern work. Such practice-based work 
can be threatened by the acquisitive tendencies of institutions, but it can also survive such 
threats. People whose work answers to the title of ‘practice’ may well have no fundamental 
interest in the continuance of the present order, nor indeed may people who willingly comply 
with their non-practice-based work, but to have no interest in that order’s continuance is not 
the same as having a compelling reason to work towards the overthrow of that order. People 
engaged in practice-based work certainly have an interest in resisting threats to the focus on 
internal goods, and people whose work is not practice-based have an interest in opposing 
intrusive managerial measures such as excessive control or monitoring, and in avoiding work 
that is uninteresting.
In a series of works MacIntyre claims that people often begin to ask questions about 
their good in a fundamentally Aristotelian way
7
, but that this starting point is perverted by, 
for instance, the way in which lives are compartmentalised in the modern order. I am 
suggesting that this perversion is easier to avoid than MacIntyre suggests because 
communities, even in MacIntyre’s restricted sense, are all but ineliminable and so that this 
compartmentalisation is not as pervasive a feature of modern life as MacIntyre suggests.
Note that between the former work-to-consume view and the latter Aristotelian view, 
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there remains space for a third view. People can regard work as a necessity to be done in 
order to pursue other ‘work’, i.e. engagement in practices outside their paid employment, and 
so the fundamental concern need not be with how much of the product of work they 
consume. In After Virtue, MacIntyre claims that insofar as productive work is carried out 
within the household it contributes towards the practice of sustaining communities, but
As, and to the extent that, work moves outside the household and is put to the service of 
impersonal capital, the realm of work tends to become separated from everything but the 
service of biological survival and the reproduction of the labour force, on the one hand, 
and that of institutionalised acquisitiveness, on the other… Where the notion of 
engagement in a practice was once socially central, the notion of aesthetic consumption 
now is, at least for the majority.
8
The aim of the argument that follows is to show that working groups can be communities and 
that this means that even forms of employment in which the workers own neither the means 
of production, nor their product (where these terms still have application), they may still be 
engaged in the practice of sustaining their community. This is so even though that community 
is likely to be less unified and less conducive to the virtues and to flourishing than household 
communities that existed before the ‘great transformation’, to use Karl Polanyi's term. Notice 
that in the above quotation MacIntyre does not require that the activity of work itself be a 
practice, for many of the individual tasks involved in sustaining a household and other kinds 
of practice-based communities do not themselves answer to the title of practices. Not 
everything hangs on whether particular forms of modern work can be shown to be practices 
and I shall argue below that the conditions under which non-practice based work can be 
carried out and the relationships that exist between workers determine whether a particular 
workplace can be accounted a MacIntyrean community.
MacIntyre is surely right to note that what he calls ‘aesthetic’ consumption rather than 
engagement in practices is now socially central. As individual consumers, people have no 
reason to attempt to tutor their desires. Someone may have reason to attempt to transform a 
lower-order desire for junk food so that it accords with a higher-order desire to be healthy, 
but where individualism is the dominant mode of thought, there is no reason for someone to 
call into question their fundamental preferences
9
. Being a member of a working community 
in which the virtues have a purpose provides an agent with a defence against this
individualism, for as part of a group with some common ends an agent is answerable to 
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others, in this case to co-workers, in a way that they are not as private consumer. Such 
membership affords people some opportunity to think about their good rationally and 
critically
10
. As Keat notes, people very seldom leave one job for another as soon as 
marginally more money is on offer
11
. People do not blindly accept the criteria of success 
characteristic of modernity.
In order to explore MacIntyre's account of community more fully we will now 
consider a number of criticisms put forward by John Dobson. In the remainder of this section, 
we will consider Dobson's central claim that modern firms are new forms of community and 
that in attempting to exclude them MacIntyre has incorrectly drawn the boundaries of his own 
concept.  In the following section, we will consider some of Dobson's more particular claims 
about MacIntyrean communities.
Dobson claims that MacIntyre is mistaken in his assertion that modern market 
relationships undermine communal ties, and instead suggests that the modern firm is itself a 
new form of community. Dobson says “the modern firm is simply creating different types of 
community: more fluid, more all-embracing, more virtual, and no less virtuous”
12
. On the 
topic of virtual communities, Dobson suggests that social networking internet sites are “all 
about building communities”
13
. There is good reason to be sceptical about this claim for one 
notable difference between communities as MacIntyre defines them, i.e. as requiring face to 
face interaction and mutual accountability, and virtual communities is that it is very easy to 
construct a false identity, to lie, to remain anonymous on the latter in ways that preclude 
accountability and genuinely deliberative conversations about goods. Such goods are most 
available when the contact tends to be long-term
14
and, as we saw in chapter 4, sufficiently 
regular to sustain thick trust.
Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to rule out the possibility of 'virtual' communities 
altogether. However, MacIntyre is at pains to point out that community is not intrinsically
valuable. It is valuable because it allows for the collaborative pursuit of various common 
goods. Such community is unavailable at the level of entire firms. Large firms are usually 
dispersed across many individual workplaces. Someone might be able to identify a common 
good with the members of their department, that is people with whom they have daily face-
to-face contact, but it is harder to imagine this relationship obtaining between people whose 
only contact is via email. The goals of a large company are likely to be too vague or diverse 
to ground a sense of common enterprise, and in an era of flexible specialisation are liable to 
change. Indeed the sheer size of such companies is an obstacle, but this is not so at the level 
of team or department, and it is not necessarily so of small companies which plausibly 
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possess the requisite homogeneity of purpose.
Dobson’s main claim, that modern large-scale corporations are new forms of utopian 
community is therefore unpersuasive. Innovative methods adopted by companies such as 
Microsoft, Google, eBay, and Apple might have some long term benefits in terms of morale 
and productivity.
15
   However, it is probably too soon to be certain about this and also about 
whether such methods are applicable to other kinds of company, such as firms which are 
untouched by the remnants of the 1970s fusion of IT and ‘hippy’ ideals (insurance, financial, 
or professional services companies for example). Moreover, as MacIntyre points out, we 
should not readily accept as definitive research into the subjective states of employees to 
provide evidence about genuine flourishing
16
, given the additional ethical import of the latter 
term. 
Dobson praises modern firms for, amongst other things, their geographical diversity. 
However, it is this very lack of rootedness that makes them susceptible to MacIntyrean 
criticism. At the level of the neighbourhood or the workplace team, genuine friendships may 
flourish and so ground commitments that outweigh pursuit of merely external goods, which 
can also be grounded by enjoyable work. Geographical diversity rules out the daily face-to-
face interaction that can foster friendships. Moreover, Dobson’s account is vulnerable on the 
grounds that the lack of a substantive common good seriously hinders shared deliberation. 
Although Dobson has set out to engage directly with communities in MacIntyre’s 
sense, it seems that he tends to use the word in its ordinary sense or perhaps even its rather 
degraded contemporary sense i.e. ‘any group with something in common, however otherwise 
dispersed and heterogeneous’, and therefore misses much of the point of MacIntyre’s 
emphasis on communities. We can concede that the companies he lists are new forms of 
community in a broad sense without allowing them to be practice-based communities, 
communities in which shared deliberation and pursuit of internal goods is possible. But if 
community per se is not intrinsically valuable, this is no real concession at all.
Dobson questions whether the demise of ‘traditional’ community is such a bad thing. 
MacIntyre himself recognizes that communities are “always open to corruption by 
narrowness, by complacency, by prejudices against outsiders, and by a whole range of other 
deformities, including those that arise from a cult of local community”
17
. The demise of these 
kinds of communities is a good, but that does not alter the central MacIntyrean contention 
that membership of a community is a precondition for acquiring the virtues and thus for 
flourishing. There is no sense in which MacIntyre values community for its own sake, but 
there is no doubt that he regards the demise of household-based economies as a loss, and this 
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is because he regards this demise as marking the severance of the virtues from “their 
traditional context in thought and practice”
18
. Contemporary contexts in which the virtues are
so contextualised escape MacIntyre’s censure. We saw that such communities are crucial to 
MacIntyre's ethics in our discussion of the decision and testimony problems in chapter 1, and 
in our discussion of the self-deception problem in chapter 2.
While denying that the dominant institutions of modernity can be practice-based 
communities, MacIntyre lists schools, hospitals, chess clubs, farming co-operatives, fishing 
crews, small towns and neighbourhoods as being the kinds of formations that can exemplify 
the traits definitive of practice-based communities to ‘a significant degree’
19
. What is striking
about this list is that some of these formations are not entirely separate, or indeed separable, 
from the dominant institutions of modernity. Fishing crews and farming co-ops are relatively 
clear examples of practice-based communities that are substantially independent of 
modernity
20
, but small towns – for instance -  have visitors, people move away, people vote 
in general elections (without necessarily consulting the village council), and some might also 
commute to nearby large towns to work for large-scale modern firms.
MacIntyre’s inclusion of neighbourhoods is noteworthy. Neighbourhoods are of 
course parts of larger towns and cities and the possibility of a neighbourhood of a large city 
significantly exemplifying the characteristics of a practice-based community raises the 
question of whether there can be any grounds for excluding those often distinctly 
individuated parts of modern corporations such as teams and departments. Such putative 
communities are sometimes prey to disruption and dissolution, and can be victims of 
damaging inequality (a topic we will come to below). They can also, when the relationships 
within them are allowed to develop over time, and when the relationships possess a degree of 
security, become sites of genuine deliberation and pursuit of common goods.
Unlike the more rigidly bounded practice-based communities such as chess clubs and 
string quartets, looser associations like clinics and small towns do not possess powers of 
censure through which threats to harmony and cohesion can be excluded - and at times 
workplaces can be characterised by a great degree of conflict. This is not to say that a 
MacIntyrean community requires unwavering conformity, far from it: the point of some 
practice-based communities and a feature essential to all is an ongoing debate about the 
goods of that community in which dissent is to be encouraged. 
However, certain forms of dissent may be excessively disruptive and corrupting. A 
member of a string quartet who goes rogue and insists on putting some rock’n’roll into 
Mozart, the irremediably lazy fisherman, the cheating chess player, the data-fabricating 
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scientist, the holocaust denying ‘historian’
21
, can be excluded from their respective 
communities in ways that the noisy neighbour cannot be excluded from a small town, or 
sometimes quite seriously unruly pupils and patients cannot be excluded from schools and 
clinics. These communities are not entirely without resources. Problematic neighbours cannot 
be removed from a neighbourhood, but they can find themselves excluded by being generally 
ostracised if their behaviour is deemed intolerable.
Such communities lack full institutional control and so might always be more exposed 
to threats than more bounded and more comprehensively internally-governed communities. 
MacIntyre does list workplaces as possible communities and workplaces like neighbourhoods 
face external threats to their status as communities. In exceptional circumstances such as war 
or natural disaster, or indeed in less catastrophic circumstances such as the building of an 
Olympic village or a surge in house prices that prevents locals from finding housing, 
neighbourhoods can be fragmented or eradicated from the outside. Neighbourhoods, 
necessarily fuzzy at the boundaries, can exercise some measures of control: they can petition 
local government over a variety of issues (when prudence dictates that the members go 
beyond the local), and can reach informal agreements, make exceptions to laws, exchange 
goods in order to satisfy needs. For all that, they can be powerless to prevent certain kinds of 
anti-social behaviour, unemployment etc. affecting the community from the outside. 
The contemporary workplace is similar in this respect to the neighbourhood. The fact 
that work is not generally practice-based means that it is not an education in the virtues when 
considered as a particular activity. But as a collaborative challenge and as a challenge to 
maintain community and solidarity in the face of institutional pressures it can provide such an 
education. Even in a highly acquisitive institution in which the work carried out lacks internal 
goods, there remains the possibility of a community and of an informal quasi-institutionalised 
pursuit of external goods that prevent the corporation-institution from threatening that 
community. The informal quasi-institution is simply the group of workers who can safe-
guard the community by seeking to covertly achieve goods of effectiveness when there is a 
threat of ‘down-sizing’ or other forms of restructuring that fragment or otherwise damage the 
working community. Examples might include closing ranks in the face of a complaint, 
making sure everything is in good order when the inspectors arrive, covering for a colleague 
who is having a hard time at home so that the personnel dept is kept at arm’s length, or subtle 
forms of obstinacy and obstruction when faced with an intrusive managerial edict.
MacIntyre underestimates the extent to which conflict within the contemporary 
workplace is endemic. This conflict is, however, often covert. Even people in dull, repetitive, 
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low-skilled jobs that lack a significant union presence can still exercise a solidarity that is 
indicative of a community. People in jobs they find rewarding or exciting, even where these 
jobs fall short of full ‘practice’ status, can resist bottom-line thinking, being excessively 
‘managed’, and other such intrusions. Even where people are treated institutionally as mere 
means, they can still exercise moral agency because of the informal institution of the group 
which might be characterised by tacit rules and elliptical deliberation about the good (people 
need not be moral philosophers
22
). 
It is central to my argument that such communities can exist by degree. The 
admission of partial MacIntyrean communities can give us cause for hope; it does not alter 
the need to prioritise practices and more thoroughly practice-based communities that enable 
us to live distinctive kinds of life. In particular we must attempt to ensure that such working 
communities can avoid compartmentalisation and the ill effects of inequality.
5.2 Compartmentalisation, Inequality and Myopia
In this section we will consider three charges MacIntyre makes against the modern firm and 
defend them against Dobson's criticisms.
1) Compartmentalisation. MacIntyre argues that characteristically, the demands of 
roles people occupy within most modern institutions are incompatible with the demands of 
other roles they might occupy, and that the ends of these roles are usually pre-given and 
unavailable for criticism. As we saw in chapter 2, MacIntyre argues that a person whose life 
is compartmentalised will have no effective way of deciding between commitments when 
they come into conflict. Indeed the person whose life consists in a variety of role-structured 
activities may well be unable to recognise such conflicts between role demands, and will 
almost certainly be unable to resolve it for he or she will have no access to a point of view 
from which commitments can be considered as more important within the context of a whole 
life. Dobson asks,
Is MacIntyre correct? Does the modern firm induce moral compartmentalisation? Do the 
managers of modern firms frame every decision in terms of a narrowly defined cost-benefit 
analysis? Do they leave their humanity and morality at the door when they enter the 
boardroom?
23
The answer to these questions is 'no', but to frame them in this way betrays a 
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misinterpretation of MacIntyre.
The firm can induce compartmentalisation without every decision reducing to cost-
benefit analysis. Pressure to identify with a role can be far more subtle. MacIntyre’s criticism 
of management is not that people employed as managers become narrowly calculative as 
soon as they enter the workplace. MacIntyre’s point is that people working in modern firms 
are often under institutionalised pressure to be narrowly calculative, and to always act in 
accordance with the pre-given character of the manager. Moreover, success in one role might 
require the exclusion of considerations that are fundamental to other roles and that through 
adopting and coming to identify with a role people can become blind to morally conflicting 
demands, as I argued in chapter 4. Cost-benefit analysis is part of the structure of some roles 
and to fail to excel at such analysis is to fail as occupier of that role.
Dobson’s conclusion that “moral agency lies at the heart of managerial decision-
making in the modern firm”
24
is misleading. Managerial decision-making may involve moral 
agency, but insofar as it is distinctly managerial decision-making rather than decision-
making simpliciter, it is a compartmentalised appearance of moral agency. I argued in 
chapter 4 that there is no such virtue as 'business-loyalty'. Similarly, managerial decision-
making is simply decision-making. 
Dobson advances as evidence for his claim the ever expanding business-ethics 
literature and the fact that even hardcore finance textbooks acknowledge non-financial 
considerations. MacIntyre would find this evidence unpersuasive. He regards the business-
ethics literature as one more symptom of compartmentalisation because it tends to be 
“focused upon the dilemmas or other predicaments confronting individuals within 
institutionalised and professionalised situations, rather than on the structures which determine 
the character of those situations”
25
and because the business ethicist, like the medical ethicist 
and other kinds of specialist applied philosophers, becomes another narrow expert and 
debates about what justifies this expertise are limited to each particular field. The lip-service 
that financial textbooks pay to ethics is even less persuasive. Following fashion and claiming 
that ethics is important does not make it so any more than a Victorian schoolmaster telling the 
pupil he is about to cane that "this will hurt me more than you" makes it so. The assertion that 
value judgements are central to management is not a refutation of compartmentalisation. 
Compartmentalisation tends to render moral agency incoherent, it does not rule out value 
judgements.
A further point to note is that the compartmentalisation of life is not a merely 
accidental effect of modernity, but something its bureaucratic institutions are geared towards 
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producing. People are expected to act in a way that is job-capacity specific. The means by 
which life becomes compartmentalised are, however, often ineffective and generally 
inefficient. People learn to pay lip-service to the latest management fad, learn what to write in 
application statements and pass interviews without genuinely identifying with the roles they 
occupy. All involved in a job interview know that candidates could not possibly have 
commitments to roles they have yet to adopt, and yet proceed as if answers which appear to 
demonstrate just that commitment are legitimate.
Work in a modern firm is still for the most part actually a matter of working in small 
teams or departments that are often characterised by a collaborative resistance to rules 
imposed from without that threaten the group-life (although some unfair rules might seem 
fair or unthreatening because of the ideology of bureaucratic authority, the presentation of 
managerial edicts is crucially important) and even by active disengagement. Unneeded sick 
days, lack of ambition or desire to gain promotion, constant internet browsing, saving up just 
enough money to be able to downshift and so on suggest that not all people are concerned 
either to succeed at work regardless of what they do (as we might expect of fully 
compartmentalised agents
26
), or to succeed in all areas in a way that we would expect of  
people ideologically conditioned by modernity. Indeed, in many instances in which people 
work diligently without identifying with their job role, they do so to spare colleagues an 
additional burden, and so the work is done out of a spirit of fairness or for the sake of 
friendship or camaraderie rather than pursuit of external goods. The mere payment of lip-
service to the goals of bureaucratic institutions is a key feature of modernity that MacIntyre 
has failed to adequately note.
There is a tension involved in claiming that work is both a mere means to an end and
a serious threat to integrity, except where the work done as a mere means is so alienating that 
the very activity threatens integrity (e.g. telesales, assassinations) – which is not the case for 
most people employed as white-collar workers. If work is a mere means, it is done for some 
other end. This might be an abstract acquisitiveness or a desire to support ‘aesthetic’ 
consumption, but it might also be to serve engagement in practices outside paid employment 
(even if it is the practice of simply supporting a family).
Someone might say: “I wait tables but I’m really an actor.” This might seem to be an 
unhelpful example on the grounds that such a claim might be delusional, but even a 
waiter/actor who does more waiting than acting is still able to avoid the role-identification 
symptomatic of compartmentalisation. The waiter/actor’s life can remain shaped by a focus 
on the goods internal to acting. If a situation arose in which the best thing to do qua waiter 
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hindered the agent's acting then that course of action would be eschewed.
In ‘Three perspectives on Marxism’, MacIntyre says that the modern economic order 
“provides systematic incentives to develop a type of character that has a propensity to 
injustice”
27
. But the modern economic order cannot fully destroy the systematic incentives to 
develop a just character that are present in almost all human social formations. Even where 
work teams exist for the purpose of capital, as communities, as practice-based sub-
institutions, they cannot easily be made into mere means. The agency of the members as 
members of a group with shared interests prevents such instrumentality.
MacIntyre makes the point that success in delimited roles sometimes requires a 
fragmented self which lacks the resources to ask what is good and best for a whole life, but it 
is notable that there are at least three ways in which people avoid ‘success’ as it is commonly 
defined in the modern economic order. Firstly, active disengagement from their work as was 
mentioned above. Secondly, people can display their rejection of the ideological norms of 
capitalist modernity through seeking practice-based work. This is problematic as the
consumerist, individualistic tendencies of job applicants might preclude subordination to the 
practice or respect for the authority of master-practitioners, but as MacIntyre’s oft-repeated 
fishermen example shows, people do not need to seek out the practice in advance in order to 
be able to come to appreciate its internal goods. If this is so then it is surely the case that 
people seeking work that satisfies their pre-existing, untutored, but excellence-focused 
desires will be at least as able to appreciate internal goods, and make the sacrifices that the 
practice demands of them. People who vaguely and apart from any particular practice want to 
do something ‘good’ may well initially think in terms of subjective preferences, but they are 
undeniably resistant to any conception of success that focuses primarily on external goods. 
And thirdly, people can avoid this ‘success’ by partially disengaging from the typical norms 
of the modern order through the prioritisation of community or camaraderie. Here we have 
resistance without revolt, but it is not merely passive. It does not merely consist in 
withdrawal from modernity; if my argument is correct then modernity can be ‘outlived’ from 
within more easily that it might appear.
This is not to suggest that we should adopt a propitious attitude towards the modern 
firm. What I claim is that the modern firm cannot ensure that employees fully identify with 
their work roles. I am not denying managerial effectiveness; I am asserting the ability of 
groups to form communities that can survive this managerial effectiveness because obedience 
to bureaucratic power is often merely an act. However, the power of bureaucratic authority is 
very real and usually far greater than that possessed by workers. Let us consider the effects of 
113
this imbalance of power.
ii) Inequality. Dobson’s argument against MacIntyre’s charge of inequality is that it is 
not clear that equality is conducive to communities or to flourishing. What is clear is that 
there is a very pronounced degree of financial inequality between the owners of large-scale 
modern firms and the average employee of such firms. Consequently, the owners possess a 
great deal more power than the workers. Such an imbalance is always liable to threaten the 
autonomy of a group and thus threatens its status as a practice-based community. Deprived of 
any institutional power, the virtues of members of such communities can go unrewarded. 
MacIntyre goes onto say “What is necessarily absent in such markets is any justice of 
desert”
28
. Given that this is so, the seductive power of external goods becomes more 
pronounced. The chess-playing child in After Virtue may never have come to engage with the 
goods internal to chess if he were rewarded with varying amounts of candy regardless of how 
he played the game. To have a great access to external goods is to have the power to 
influence or manipulate people, and so injustice and inequality of wealth is directly related to 
inequalities of power.
Clearly total equality is not required for a community to function well, but excessive 
inequalities of power are liable to produce undue deference that can hinder or even prevent 
rational deliberation. Managerial decisions can seem fair as a result of the power of the 
ideology of bureaucratic authority. In modern corporations, edicts from the boardroom can 
dismantle a team or department immediately, and to come across a pedantic or incompetent 
middle manager who disrupts the team or department is, over the course of a working life, 
very likely. 
Members of neighbourhoods and members of workplace groups might function as 
communities, but based on the considerations discussed here, it seems that this is likely to be 
threatened precisely by inequalities of power. No one in a town can prevent a house being 
bought as a holiday home by someone who contributes nothing to the community for ten 
months of the year. In most companies, the rank and file have no say over who manages 
them. Because this is so, a greater degree of ingenuity and commitment is required to sustain 
these communities than is required to sustain, say, a chess club. Workplaces in which 
inequalities of power are minimised are more likely to house genuine MacIntyrean 
communities precisely because leverage in competitive negotiations becomes less important. 
However, even a significant lack of leverage cannot prevent workers from forming 
communities of tacit resistance which (without being able to transform their working life 
directly) can furnish them with a deliberative community. 
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iii) Myopia. MacIntyre says that the “failure to be responsible for the future is not just 
a product of the negligence of individuals, but is rooted in the forms and tendencies of 
organisational and corporate life”
29
. The Weberian bureaucrat, who might consider himself 
capable of devising the most efficient means to achieve a pre-given end, cannot effectively 
decide whether delayed gratification is rational because it is impossible to adequately 
quantify: Is it rational to make sacrifices now for greater profits in ten years? One hundred 
years? Company performance is usually measured quarterly so executives are under role-
specific pressure to think in terms of short-term profits even when they know it is unwise in 
the long run. Short term underperformance will lead to investors taking their money 
elsewhere. The avoidance of temporal myopia is not simply to be achieved by individuals 
exercising virtues such as prudence, for myopia is often the fault of structures. Where 
someone occupies a role that has the pre-given end of maximising short-term profits, their 
personal prudence is likely to be irrelevant. But Dobson is not merely concerned to show that 
the modern firm can avoid ‘bottom-line thinking’, he also want to claim that myopia is more 
likely to be a characteristic of small-scale societies.
Dobson gives the example of Easter Islanders damaging the ecology of their 
homeland through deforestation. This example proves nothing, however, because MacIntyre 
is not committed to the plainly foolish claim that any community that pre-existed industrial 
capitalism or any community in which there is some notion of the common good is 
automatically wise or maximally virtuous. Nevertheless, despite Dobson’s unfair statement of 
the case, there remains something to the charge that the small scale of local communities can 
be a hindrance. The size of small scale communities does impose limits on the possibility of 
effectively responding to demands that require large-scale action, but again, this is precisely 
because of the lack of power most small-scale communities will have in comparison with the 
large-scale institutions characteristic of modernity. Small scale communities are therefore 
less likely to have the resources necessary to deal with large, long term problems single 
handed. This is not temporal myopia, but the threat of chronic impotence and where such 
impotence exists it is always a threat to practice-based communities, so Dobson’s criticism is 
ineffective and reinforces MacIntyre’s assertion that practices require institutions. It is 
through institutions that communities acquire the external goods needed to safeguard a 
practice. Tacit workplace communities of resistance are especially vulnerable because they 
are unable to rely on formal institutions.
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5.3 Business as a ‘Practice’?
Having seen that Dobson has not established that the modern firm is a new MacIntyrean 
community, we now turn to another way of arguing for this thesis. If business itself were a 
practice, then modern firms would all house practices and so the challenge of fostering 
practice-based communities through which goods can be achieved and virtues fostered would 
be easily met. The modern firm would not be a new form of MacIntyrean community, just a 
contemporary example of one. If business were a practice, then the organisations Dobson 
cites as examples of new practice-based communities would indeed be candidates for such 
status. However, this section will argue following Ron Beadle that business is not in fact a 
practice. 
Beadle's target is Geoff Moore, who claims that MacIntyre is his own worst enemy
when it comes to his rejection of business. Moore's argument, put forward in a variety of 
papers
30
, is that because MacIntyre thinks practices are productive crafts, and because 
business is a productive craft, business itself is a practice. As Beadle points out, Moore is not 
especially forthcoming with examples of the internal goods distinctive of business. Indeed, 
his only example is customer service. There is an obvious danger here of conflating two 
senses of 'productive craft', but more significant is the problem of identifying the relevant 
internal goods. From this, it follows that if institutionalised correctly business can provide an 
education into the virtues like any other practice. We will explore Moore's account of how 
good governance policies might 'crowd in' virtues in chapter 7. For now, let us consider 
Beadle’s case against Moore.
According to Beadle, Moore misses some of the crucial elements in MacIntyre's 
discussion of practices and institutions. Beadle further argues that Moore's account is also 
flawed in that he fails to define 'business' adequately and his examples of businesses are those 
which are productive crafts, such as fishing, already identifiable as practices whether they are 
businesses or not. This does not support the claim that business is a practice, "it simply 
reinforces the case that MacIntyre himself makes as to why the productive crafts that he cites 
(such as fishing) are requisitely coherent and complex to constitute a practice"
31
Unlike goods internal to practices, customer service, even excellent customer service, 
"is available only to those who can pay"
32
. In this sense, the goods of business are motivated 
by the pursuit of external goods in a way that is incompatible with MacIntyre's definition of a 
practice. Business, like management (which will be the subject of the following chapter), is 
not a practice because it does not consist in a distinctive activity and thus does not have a 
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distinctive internal good. A particular business can serve to institutionally safeguard 
practices, but business is not itself a practice. Beadle points out that in this sense business is 
like teaching: subjects taught are practices, but teaching considered in isolation of any 
particular subject is a mere means
33
. There are no doubt certain skills or techniques that can 
allow teachers and managers to be more effective, but effectiveness is not an internal good. 
Another analogy might be that of physical fitness, which is useful in a variety of sporting 
practices – a basic level is a prerequisite just as basic abilities to think and communicate are 
prerequisite for teaching or management. Good business cannot focus solely on profit just as 
good teaching cannot focus solely on exam results. However, where performances are 
measured along these lines it is inevitable that the goods of practice-based institutions (we 
will address the possibility of managing well outside of practices in ch.7) and the goods of 
particular subjects become secondary.
Beadle also claims that Moore's account is flawed because it relies on the possibility 
of someone engaging in two practices simultaneously, which Beadle claims is impossible and 
threatens the coherence of MacIntyre's account of practices. He says:
If Moore is correct and each and every business is a practice then the crew that abandons fishing 
simultaneously maintains and abjures its commitment to practice by remaining in business (a 
practice) and abjures fishing (another practice). That this is incoherent and that it follows from 
Moore's position is evident. The coherence of MacIntyre's definition of a practice would be 
undermined if the same set of practitioners can coherently simultaneously engage in two 
practices. They cannot.
34
This final element of Beadle's account seems questionable. He claims that it is impossible for 
someone to be engaged in two practices simultaneously. However, my account of quasi-
communities requires that this is indeed possible, because we cannot always clearly 
demarcate when someone is doing their practice-based job and when they are engaged in the 
practice of politics by resisting threats to their working community. Furthermore my account 
of practices in chapter 1 requires that the concept of a practice be more fluid than Beadle 
allows. Though I disagree with Beadle about this one element of the concept of a practice, I 
believe we can still avoid Moore's conclusion. An example might be a keen chess player from 
an unhappy family playing chess with a sibling at Christmas. The chess player certainly loves 
chess and appreciates its internal goods, but is not in the mood to play and forces himself to 
do so with the sibling in order to sustain familial life, to ease tensions, prevent arguments and 
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make some effort toward making common deliberation possible. Here chess and 'politics', the 
practice of sustaining a community, are engaged in simultaneously. Similarly, philosophy and 
history have distinct goods and related but distinct ends, but these subjects might easily be 
fused without thereby creating a new practice, and without the coherence of either practice 
being undermined. 
The real problem for Moore is that he cannot specify what the distinctive goods of 
business might be, and the incoherence of his position comes from the fact that those who 
give up fishing for (any other) business can remain engaged in the same practice regardless of 
what it is they actually do. Practices can be transformed over time, but they do not admit of 
this kind of rupture. To regard engagement in practices as being more fluid than Beadle 
allows enables us to solve some the difficulties discussed in chapter 1 and to account for the 
behaviour of those in communities of solidarity discussed in the present chapter without 
having to accept Moore's conclusions and by extension without having to accept that every 
firm is a MacIntyrean community.
5.4 Conclusion
We have seen that MacIntyre’s criticisms of the modern firm are largely defensible but also 
that practice-based communities can exist not just alongside but within bureaucratic 
institutions, and where this occurs it does so because of an informal quasi-institution. The 
widespread disengagement from tedious capitalist work, and the widespread prioritisation of 
fellow workers and external practices over success as it is ideologically defined under the 
current economic order reflects an absence of moral compartmentalisation. However, the 
need for communities to cope with inequalities of power and their possible inability to deal 
with long-term problems because of a lack of institutional power means that the distinctively 
modern communities such as workplaces and neighbourhoods face challenges similar to 
those faced by more quintessential MacIntyrean communities, such as farming co-ops and 
fishing crews. We have also seen that not every workplace houses a practice, and so the 
modern firm cannot be accounted a practice-based community on that ground. Business is not 
itself a practice because it lacks a distinctive internal good.
I have not sought to deny the general claim that “the institutions of contemporary 
market economies frustrate the achievement of goods central to human flourishing”
35
, I have 
sought to show how partial and partially avoidable this frustrating tendency is, and that the 
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virtues can be sustained in the most unlikely of places. Although the typical contemporary 
(i.e. non-practice-based) workplace does not satisfy MacIntyre’s requirement that 
communities make space for open deliberative debate, the lesser but still important level of 
elliptical debate, and resultant partial common good mean that compartmentalisation and 
identification with norms geared solely towards pursuit of external goods are avoidable even 
from within the modern firm. Knight is wrong to claim that, “it is only insofar as people are 
treated institutionally as practical reasoners and not as managed resources that they can 
exercise moral agency”
36
. Moral agency is more robust than that. Having seen that 
MacIntyre's criticism of the modern workplace is overstated, we next turn to the most 
notorious of his reflections on corporate modernity: his attack on the manager.
                                                
1
As Horvath, 1995, attempts to do.
2
See Bolchover (2005) for the following examples: 20% of US office based employees send 20 personal emails a day 
(survey for Vault.com). Only 1 in 10 Britons feel guilty about bunking off work (BBC news website). According to the 
Daily Telegraph, 1/3 of UK young professionals are hung-over at least twice a week on work days. According to a 2004 
Reuters survey, ¼ Europeans had fallen asleep at work. According to The Times, the dept. of work and pensions conducted 
an investigation into staff internet use and found that 2.3 million pages of pornographic material had been accessed in an 8 
month period in 2004.
3
Breen, 2008, p.19.
4
MacIntyre, 1999a, p.129.
5
MacIntyre, 2008a, p.6.
6
MacIntyre, 1998b, pp.55-56.
7
E.g. MacIntyre, 1998d, 1999a, 2006g.
8
MacIntyre, 2007, pp.227-8.
9
See Brecher, 1998, for a statement of this view.
10
MacIntyre, 2006b, p.156.
11
Keat, 2000, chapter 6.
12
Dobson, 2008, p.73.
13
ibid, p.73.
14
On this matter see in particular the discussion of the importance of friendship in MacIntyre, 2009a.
15
Of the examples given by Dobson Google in particular does well in ‘best companies to work for’ lists, placing in the top 5 
of the Fortune 100 list for the past 4 years.
16
MacIntyre distinguishes sharply between questions of flourishing and questions of subjective wellbeing in 2008a, p.3.
17
MacIntyre, 1999a, p.142.
18
MacIntyre, 2007, p.228.
19
MacIntyre, 2006b, p.39.
20
By which I mean that could exist largely as they are after capitalist modernity or in isolation from it.
21
About this particular example see MacIntyre 2006p. MacIntyre argues that the holocaust denier should be excluded by the 
community of historians, but the denial should not be illegal.
22
MacIntyre, 2006i, p.37.
23
Dobson, 2008, p.70.
24
ibid, p.71.
25
MacIntyre, 2006f, p.118.
26
See Hello Laziness (2004) by Corinne Maier for a manifesto of disengagement. It must be noted that Maier did manage to 
succeed, becoming a senior economist at EdF.
27
MacIntyre, 2006n, p.149.
28
ibid, p.149.
29
MacIntyre, 1982, p.357.
30
Moore 2002, 2005a, 2005b.
31
Beadle, 2008, p.235.
32
ibid, p.235.
33
I leave open the question of whether teaching very young children differs relevantly. J Dunne asked MacIntyre about this 
in an interview in Education and Practice (Dunne and Hogan, 2004), but the answer focused on other parts of the question.
34
Beadle, 2008, p.238.
35
MacIntyre, 2008b, p.268.
36
Knight, 2008, p.120.
119
Chapter 6: MacIntyre's Attack on the 'Character' of the Manager
In the last chapter we saw that even within workplaces that are hostile to practices and 
MacIntyrean communities, quasi-communities of resistance can continue to exist. This should 
give us some reason to be optimistic because it implies that organizations which aim to be 
conducive to practices, to rewarding work, and to a sense of community will have a real 
chance of success even within corporate modernity. Given that MacIntyre says "The making 
and sustaining of forms of human community – and therefore of institutions – itself has all 
the characteristics of a practice, and moreover of a practice which stands in a peculiarly close 
relationship to the exercise of the virtues"
1
we might assume that managers are well placed to 
be guardians of MacIntyrean communities
2
. However, MacIntyre's attack on the manager, or 
to be precise, the character of the manager, plays a key part in his critique of modernity.
According to MacIntyre,
The manager represents in his character the obliteration of the distinction between 
manipulative and non-manipulative social relations... The manager treats ends as given, as 
outside his scope; his concern is only with technique, with effectiveness in transforming raw 
materials into final products, unskilled labour into skilled labour, investment into profits.
3
I will argue that MacIntyre's two central prongs of criticism, that managerial authority is 
unjustified and that management is an embodiment of emotivism - in MacIntyre's sense of 
being manipulative rather than persuasive - are correct. However, in so doing I will disagree 
with some of MacIntyre's own argumentative strategies. This is primarily because MacIntyre 
writes as if technocratic, Weberian management is all there is. This view may have been 
plausible in the period up until 1981 when After Virtue was first published, but since the 
'leadership' boom of the 1980s it is no longer tenable. 
Given that, as the above quotation suggests, MacIntyre's critique applies to the 
character of the manager I devote section 6.1 to outlining this concept. My aim is not to 
defend MacIntyre's notion of a character, but to elucidate it so as to better understand 
MacIntyre's critique of the Manager. In 6.2 I will explore management in order to assess the 
veracity of MacIntyre's critique. I will support the central tenets of MacIntyre's attack, 
including his claim that managerial expertise is impossible, but argue that it is incomplete 
because it is possible for managers to pay lip-service to the values characteristic of 
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management without fully identifying with them, and because of the changes in managerial 
work alluded to above. In section 6.3 I will explore leadership as a form of management that 
does not explicitly depend upon expertise. I will argue that despite the fact that some of 
MacIntyre's arguments do not apply to the manager-as-leader, leadership as it is embodied 
within modernity is deeply Emotivistic and that the power and authority afforded to leaders is 
unjustified, in part because the illusion of expertise lingers on.
6.1 'Characters'
MacIntyre's examples of what he calls characters are the manager, the therapist, and the rich
aesthete. There has been a lack of scholarly attention paid to MacIntyre's notion of 
characters, and where the topic is addressed it is usually only done so briefly. Knight is 
wrong to claim that when MacIntyre uses words like 'character' and 'characteristic' in the 
early 1980s he means 'essential' because large parts of After Virtue make far more sense if the 
dramatic metaphor is taken seriously, which MacIntyre himself urges us to do
4
. McMylor 
does not broach the topic of characters in his discussion of MacIntyre's account of 
management. David Solomon says in footnote to his paper 'MacIntyre and Contemporary 
Moral Philosophy' that "The notion of a 'character' is one of the most difficult in MacIntyre's 
repertoire"
5
. Sandra Borden seems to use the concept too freely and identifies several 
different characters within journalism.
6
D'Andrea's only discussion of characters is a brief 
note that although faithful to MacIntyre's text sheds no further light on the concept
7
, and 
away from MacIntyre scholarship those who discuss MacIntyre's conception of characters 
tend to do so haphazardly
8
. Ron Beadle pays more attention to the details of MacIntyre's 
account. Beadle says characters "are social roles of a particular type because not only do they 
involve definitions of obligation and relationship (as do all social roles) but they also bear 
particular moral ideals and become representative of their social order through so doing"
9
. 
This is quite right, but we will need to explore the concept in more depth if we are to be able 
to assess the force of MacIntyre's criticism of the Manager. 
MacIntyre claims that characters are "masks worn by moral philosophies" and thinks 
that Characters are moral representatives of their culture. What follows is a discussion of the 
various attributes of characters according to MacIntyre: A) the dramatic metaphor is serious, 
B) characters are culturally central, C) characters partially define the possibility of plot and 
action, D) demands made of characters exceed those of ordinary social roles, E) those who 
121
play the roles of characters understand themselves as such, and F) character roles are non-
exclusive. 
A) The dramatic metaphor is serious. MacIntyre explicitly states "I intend this 
dramatic metaphor with some seriousness... I choose the word 'character' for them precisely 
because of the way it links dramatic and moral associations"
10
. Characters are crucial to our 
understanding the "social drama of the present age"
11
, according to MacIntyre. I argued in 
chapter 2 that we must understand MacIntyre's conception of narrative unity in part as an 
epistemological tool. Here again, in a related although distinct sense, we see that narrative is 
used as a method of enhancing our understanding. Given this requirement it is unsurprising 
that MacIntyre also holds:
B) Characters are culturally central. Characters "are those social roles which provide 
a culture with its moral definitions"
12
. This is one thing that sets them apart from ordinary 
social roles. The essence of this requirement will become clearer as we explore the others. 
MacIntyre also claims that characters are instantly recognisable. Intuitively this seems true of 
the figures MacIntyre lists. But it also true of countless other roles and figures, so nothing of 
importance can rest on this. We might immediately discern what MacIntyre has in mind when 
he discusses the Manager, i.e. the bureaucratic expert, but the comically inept, David Brent-
style manager is easily recognisable too. However, the incompetent and unintelligent David 
Brent is not a moral ideal for any section of our culture so there will never be pressure to 
behave as Brent does on any real manager. Mere stereotypes and negative caricatures might 
be widely recognised but they cannot be culturally central in this sense of providing a culture 
with its moral definitions, or justifying power or institutions.
C) Characters partially define the possibility of plot and action. This is an extension 
of A and B. Characters possess sufficient cultural power that any adequate story of our age
must make essential reference to them and their effects. What it also shows is that there is no 
need for cultural unanimity. There is, that is, no need for characters to be universally regarded
as legitimate nor for there to be universal assent to their key contentions
13
. Even those who 
are critical of particular characters still define their positions relative to such characters and 
continue to understand the wider culture with reference to those characters. That characters
partially define the possibility of plot and action shows that positions of cultural power, and 
the extent to which this cultural power creates norms, matter more than the extent to which 
characters and their positions of power are actually accepted as legitimate. I take points A - C 
to be merely definitional. It might be the case that there are no characters in reality, but at 
122
this stage there is no reason to object to what are essentially coherent stipulations. D - F will 
require closer critical attention.
D) Demands made of characters exceed those of ordinary social roles. Characters, 
claims MacIntyre, "are a very special type of social role which places a certain kind of moral 
constraint on the personality of those who inhabit them in a way in which many other social 
roles do not"
14
. MacIntyre's own argument for the claim that characters necessarily make 
greater demands proceeds as follows: 
 Social roles and individuals can and do embody moral beliefs and theories, but they 
do so in a very different way from characters. 
 Characters are the object of regard for some significant section of a culture and as 
such provide them with a moral ideal, so the demands are imposed from the outside in 
that people who inhabit the relevant roles use the ideal of the character to understand 
and evaluate themselves.
 Therefore there is a requirement that personality and role be fused in some way.
As it stands this argument is unconvincing because there can be external demands at a much 
more local level than that of a whole culture and because external demands can easily fail to 
be met. There is no doubt that external demands can be converted into internal compulsion, 
and our culture regards work, and doing one's job well, as being important. As Weber puts it, 
"what is most characteristic of the social ethic of capitalistic culture...is the obligation which 
the individual is supposed to feel and does feel towards the content of his professional 
activity, no matter in what it consists"
15
. The identification with a role will be more likely if 
there is considerable external pressure. Such pressure is, however, neither necessary nor 
sufficient for the occurrence of such identification. Therefore it is imperative for MacIntyre to 
provide us with a fuller account of how characters differ from ordinary social roles, and thus 
how they create more powerful norms for those who occupy such roles.
Before we consider MacIntyre's further arguments we should, however, note that 
MacIntyre would do well to take his own claims about cultural fragmentation more seriously 
at this point. The Priest, a figure MacIntyre does not include on his list of contemporary 
characters, is a moral ideal for some part of our culture, clearly embodies certain beliefs, and 
requires a certain type of personality. If MacIntyre is right about our culture being morally 
fragmented, then either what is shared is likely to be very insubstantial or 'some part of our 
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culture' refers to some small part, and thus there is a danger of the role failing to meet the 
'cultural centrality' criterion.
Furthermore, assuming that our culture lacks a shared and substantive conception of 
the good, even the appearance of shared commitment to the ends of a particular role would 
not be decisive. My account of disengagement from work and quasi-communities at work in 
chapter 5 suggests people can play along without accepting the criteria of success dominant 
within modernity. Characters are special kinds of social role, and their centrality, prestige 
and power might make them more likely to make strong demands of those who play them, 
i.e. by encouraging role-identification, and they might also define the possibility of plot and 
action without this particular element of MacIntyre's account being entirely accurate. At the 
very least this part of MacIntyre's account of characters requires further support. 
E) Those who play the parts of characters understand themselves as such. MacIntyre 
claims that those who inhabit the roles of characters use their understanding of those 
characters to guide their behaviour. This is an important extension of D) and one of the ways 
in which MacIntyre takes character roles to be more demanding than ordinary social roles. 
This surely depends not only on the degree to which a particular character is socially central 
— the shift from Victorian culture in which the Public School Headmaster, the Explorer, and 
the Engineer were dominant, according to MacIntyre, to modernity in which the Manager, the 
Therapist, and the Aesthete are dominant did not occur in an instant and so inevitably the 
dominance of Public School Headmaster would not have entirely waned before the dawn of 
the Manager et al  — but also on the other commitments of the agent who plays that 
particular role.
As MacIntyre acknowledges, any social role is liable to make some demands. Priests 
and Soldiers are clearly defined roles and can require particular kinds of personality. 
MacIntyre's examples of the Priest who has lost faith and the Trade Unionist who questions 
the existing goals of organised labour
16
show that someone can become jaded and therefore 
no longer committed to the role they play. This is also true of those who play the role of 
characters, again even if it is less common. One example of this is the existence of dissenting 
books by former managers, such as The Management Myth by Stewart and Bonjour Paresse 
by Maier. This is not to deny that culturally central roles that enable us to understand the 
drama of a particular age, because they partially determine the moral and cultural possibilities 
of the age - call them 'characters' - do tend to be demanding, and that their demands do tend 
to be met with a degree of personal commitment. Nevertheless, the requirement that only 
those committed to certain precepts of a particular role can possibly occupy that role is 
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clearly an over-statement. We do however need to pay attention to the likely ramifications of 
our living in a fragmented culture and in MacIntyre's account of characters he seems to pay 
insufficient attention to this insight which informs much of the rest of his account. 
We might reasonably assume that a Spartan soldier identifies with his role to a greater 
degree that the contemporary young Finn doing national service. It is not that we cannot 
imagine a young Spartan who wishes he were Athenian and the would-be warrior Finn.  
Rather, the cultural centrality of the role of a soldier in Sparta, the fact that the Spartan 
soldier provided a large section of that culture with a moral ideal, means that there is a greater 
weight of expectation on the Spartan than the Finn. The fragmented nature of contemporary 
culture means these latter imaginary figures strike us as being less conceivable. At the very 
least they appear to be less compatible with how we understand ancient Sparta and 
contemporary Finland. Indeed, such figures begin to approach the ridiculousness of Don 
Quixote. Sparta was a smaller and more tightly-bound community than any contemporary 
European nation. Characters are less available when there is less agreement within a culture
because there is less scope for a uniform cultural pressure. Therefore, the claim that any 
social role can be so socially central for us today that certain personalities are genuinely 
required, is an exaggeration. This point is made yet more clear when we consider the final 
aspect of characters:
F) Character-roles are non-exclusive. MacIntyre says that it is possible for someone 
to partition his or her life between two or more characters
17
. It follows that such a person may 
also be able to further partition his or her life such that there are elements of his personality 
that do not bear the traces of any particular character. A person so compartmentalised will
lack the integrity required by genuine moral agency - such potential malleability means that 
under certain conditions, role demands which are incompatible with the requirement of being 
a good person might be felt as compelling - but such a person is not necessarily manipulative 
in every role. Indeed, such a person may engage in particular practices with all the 
commitment to the canons of excellence required. We must remember that practices only 
allow us to account for virtues partially - narrative unity is also required. The unpleasant, 
'Emotivistic', elements of the character do not infect a person's whole life, even if 
compartmentalisation is a serious ill. 
Unless we have some further reason to accept MacIntyre's claim that character 
demands necessarily entail personality demands, the non-exclusivity of character demands 
might also be exhibited by the mere payment of lip-service to the character's demands, 
which, although it does alter relations with others who buy into the act, does not involve a 
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deep compartmentalisation. The person who pays lip-service to the demands of a character-
role might go along with the elements of that role that are good, neutral or occasionally a 
little unwholesome, but still be able to stop short when the demands are incompatible with the 
demands of being a good person. In this sense genuine compartmentalisation is avoided. Lip-
service to role-demands in roles that are liable to require morally dubious actions might be to 
risk complicity in evil, but such lip-service does not render genuine moral agency and 
integrity impossible.
The upshot of this discussion is that cultural centrality is again insufficient to ensure 
that personality and role are fused. On this view, such a claim would require a degree of 
empirical evidence that exceeds what MacIntyre provides. An account of each of the 
characters MacIntyre identifies in our present culture, and of other contenders for such 
status, is obviously beyond the scope of this thesis. In the following section we will examine 
the nature of modern management in order to assess the extent to which MacIntyre's critique 
of the manager is correct.
Our discussion so far suggests an individual therapist, for instance, can avoid being 
(the character of) the therapist. Now let us consider some further reasons why we might 
accept MacIntyre's claim that demands apply to certain roles in virtue of their cultural 
prominence. How might certain social roles require identification with the role, the ills of 
which were discussed in chapter 4, and how might those roles prohibit those who occupy 
them from partaking in the tacit communities of resistance discussed in chapter 5? We saw 
above that the fact that demands are external does not guarantee that the social expectations 
of those who occupy character-roles is more efficacious than the social expectations of those 
who occupy other roles. In support of MacIntyre's claim is the fact that the power possessed 
by characters changes their relationships with those who lack it.
Powerful roles do not have additional demands as such, but they do alter 
relationships, and the nature of these altered relationships allows us to retain something of 
MacIntyre's original formulation of his concept of characters. Characters are most plausibly 
regarded not as culturally central moral ideals but as representations of cultural power, both 
in the sense of possessing a significant degree of authority in a wider, political sense and of 
possessing personal power over others. The Priest might have some influence over small 
parts of society, but does not possess the wider power or significance that MacIntyre takes 
characters to possess. Such wider power allows for authority even when the legitimacy of 
that power is disputed. When the Priest was a character one can imagine a closet atheist 
deferring to his instruction, whereas that is hardly conceivable today. However, to 
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foreshadow our later discussion somewhat, a manager — who does not regard him or herself 
as an expert — can issue an instruction to a subordinate — who also does not regard the 
manager as an expert — and the result is exactly as it would be as if both parties believed in 
managerial expertise.
When we consider MacIntyre's examples of contemporary characters, there is a 
distinction to be drawn here between the manager and the therapist on one hand, and the rich 
aesthete on the other, which MacIntyre recognises
18
. While the rich aesthete is instantly 
recognisable in our culture, and possesses the power that wealth makes inevitable, the 
aesthete does not have to be appointed to his or her position as does the manager or the 
therapist. The emergence of the rich aesthete within a culture signals that the culture has 
become Emotivist, but there are not occupational constraints on the rich aesthete.  It is open 
to anyone who happens to be that character to mend their ways (and perhaps donate their 
money to charity rather than spending it on further means of mere aesthetic consumption, 
entertainment, etc.). There may be some cultural pressure on the wealthy to move towards 
becoming the character of the rich aesthete ('spending a fortune on antiques is just what one 
does when one has money'). The lottery winner may find himself consuming more helpings 
of Colchester oyster, cayenne pepper and Veuve Cliquot, to use MacIntyre's own example of 
a pleasurable culinary experience
19
, but may also genuinely appreciate them, and enjoy the 
practice of cuisine (at least in the way that a concert-goer is engaged in the practice of music). 
There is no requirement that someone who is rich becomes the rich aesthete, and someone 
may become rich quite by chance, so the existence of the rich aesthete is more straight-
forwardly symptomatic of Emotivism than are the more complex roles of the manager and the 
therapist. This is obviously not a result of a requirement that personality and role be fused, it 
is rather that once someone can accurately be described as a rich aesthete they have a certain 
personality by definition.
For the Manager and Therapist the matter is quite different. They are appointed to 
positions of power, and those in charge of making such appointments require certain things 
including a commitment to various elements of the roles in question. At the very least this 
will include a belief that the role is legitimate. Anarchists do not usually end up being police 
officers, or managers for that matter, because the role demands are incompatible with the 
demands of being an anarchist. Note that there are external demands on police officers too, 
and a sliding scale between mere occupational role and demanding occupational role of the 
kind MacIntyre describes as characters. Some police can reject role demands, e.g. those 
police officers who joined the Wisconsin trade union rights protest or the soldiers who joined
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'occupy wall street' protesters rather than attempting to disperse them. However, in low-level 
jobs it is neither as important nor as easy to know much about the personalities of candidates. 
Those who dislike challenges and working as part of a team can usually slip through the net 
by saying the right things and doing just enough to go unnoticed. Most companies have no 
motivation to root out the challenge and team-work averse — they cannot afford to have that 
many positions unfilled — and they trust themselves to be able to inspire their workforce 
sufficiently. Almost all therapists and increasingly many managers require formal training in 
order to take up their positions and to have forged medium term relationships with people 
involved in their appointments in some way (contacts, references etc.).
A particular manager might be sympathetic to some form of resistance practised by 
some quasi-community, of the kind described in chapter 5, which resists particularly irritating 
workplace directives, but it would be irrational for members of those communities to 
welcome the manager precisely because of the power relations involved. The conditions 
required for thick trust, as described in chapter 4, are absent. Ultimately the manager is 
responsible for ensuring that the directives are followed and so whilst a 'don't ask for fear of 
being told' policy can work, there may often be times when the methods of resistance must 
remain covert. As representatives of institutions which the quasi-community is attempting to 
resist, however minimally, the manager can be debarred from membership.
In the case of the manager who pays lip-service to the requirements of his or her 
powerful role, the strenuousness of the emotional labour is likely to be another obstacle that 
provides some support for MacIntyre's claim that characters are required to have certain types 
of personality. The least powerful and most powerful occupations are extremely demanding, 
albeit for different reasons, and the more conflicting the demands the harder the lip-service 
will be. Theoretically we can give a coherent story of how power can change relationships, 
how a role is thus perceived, and that this power is the essence of the additional demands of 
character-roles. The extent to which this really is true of managers will be addressed in the 
next two sections. McMylor notes that MacIntyre's argument aims to be 'culturalist' rather 
than empirical
20
, but even an argument that applies to our culture (rather than every manager) 
requires some empirical support, and it is to that we now turn.
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6.2 Management
[Managers] are seen by themselves, and by those who see them with the same eyes as their 
own, as uncontested figures, who purport to restrict themselves to the realms in which rational 
agreement is possible - that is, of course from their point of view to the realm of fact, the realm 
of means, the realm of measurable effectiveness.
21
This section will seek to address a series of related questions the answers to which will enable 
us to better assess MacIntyre's attack on the character of the manager: 1) What is 
management? 2) Is management tacitly committed to Emotivism? 3) Does the power and 
authority afforded to management within the large-scale institutions that dominate modernity 
depend upon managerial expertise? 4) Is this expertise possible? 5) Does management lead to 
or require compartmentalisation? 6) Is management culturally central in the way that 
MacIntyre's classification of the manager as one of the key characters of our era requires?
MacIntyre has argued that bureaucracies’ self-understanding is characteristically 
Weberian, that Weber’s account of bureaucratic organisations, for all its flaws
22
, does 
accurately describe how managerial authority is justified within organisations. “Bureaucratic 
rationality is the rationality of matching means to ends economically and efficiently”
23
– this 
characterisation of bureaucratic organisations underpins MacIntyre’s critique of management. 
There are two prongs to the critique: first is the moral criticism that management leads to 
moral compartmentalisation in particular and more generally that management embodies 
Emotivism in general and second that of lacking the social-scientific knowledge necessary for 
the manager's claim to authority. In the previous section I outlined some reasons to accept 
MacIntyre's claim that social centrality can lead to certain roles having additional demands, 
and in answering the following questions I will defend some of MacIntyre's key contentions 
but also explore ways in which his account of the bureaucratic institutions dominant in 
modernity is outdated.
1) What is Management?
The literature on management tends to treat a diverse array of particular role types as being 
homogeneous. However management is not only varied, it has no substantial essence and so 
is impossible to neatly describe or categorise. Like the notion of 'business', there is some 
conceptual unity to management, but not a great deal.
Management theorist Charles Handy says, in his Understanding Organizations
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At an opening session of a series of management seminars in one company I asked if there was 
any agreement on the essential part of a manager’s job. With few dissentients they said that 
‘making decisions’ was for them the vital part of the managerial function. We agreed, therefore 
that for our next meeting in a week’s time each of them would prepare a description of the most 
critical decision that he, as a manager, had taken that week… The next week a group of 
embarrassed managers faced each other. ‘It was strange, last week, somehow I didn’t seem to 
have any decisions to take,’ said one. The others looked relieved. All said they had found the 
same thing.
24
Handy found that managers did lots of smaller tasks that took around ten minutes, attended a 
few one-hour meetings, and were interrupted a lot. In short, according to managers 
themselves management is a rather vague notion: management can be "a licence to play all 
the parts in an ever changing drama"
25
. In this sense, management is similar to 'business' in 
not having clear and distinctive goods as would be required by practice-status.
But there is more to management than what managers (report that they) do. One 
feature of management that is essential is the power of the manager over subordinates - a key 
part of management is managing people. As Tsoukas puts in, using a phrase that sits nicely 
with MacIntyre's discussion of characters, "By reducing the study of managers to the study of 
individual actors on the stage, the script and the setting which enables actors to perform in the 
first place are neglected"
26
. Control is part of the nature of management. That management 
involves this control should not be regarded as a contentious claim. It is recognised by 
managers themselves, even if reluctantly. In Watson's In Search of Management one of the 
interviewees says "Gut feel says to me: in a managerial job you have some aspect of 
controlling other people - directing things. I don't like the words I'm using here but if I'm 
actually honest, it's about directing other people."
27
Bertrand Russell in In Praise of Idleness
said “Work is of two kinds: first altering the position of matter at or near the earth’s surface 
relatively to other such matter; second, telling other people to do so.”
28
2) Is Management tacitly committed to Emotivism?
For MacIntyre, the manager is manipulative, incapable of entering into a genuine moral 
argument, and matches means to given ends without assessing those ends. He claims that 
Weberian rationality is dominant within the modern corporation. Within our Weberian 
culture, so MacIntyre's account goes, Management is represented as a form of expertise that 
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can be applied to a wide variety of areas in order to bring them under rational control. 
Governments and Corporations can and do bring in managerial experts to remedy 
inefficiency of any kind, so the Manager occupies a crucial place in the justification of the 
dominant institutions of modernity. In this process, the question of ends is separated from 
rationality, and so Emotivism is embodied within our culture.
According to MacIntyre "Weber’s thought embodies just those dichotomies which 
Emotivism embodies, and obliterates just those distinctions to which Emotivism has to be 
blind"
29
.  For MacIntyre, the Weberian view is committed to holding that "Questions of ends 
are questions of values, and on values reason is silent; conflict between rival values cannot be 
settled."
30
Weberian rationality is unable, thinks MacIntyre, to distinguish between 
manipulative and non-manipulative social relations. According to Weber, in modern societies 
means become "increasingly more precise in calculating the methodical attainment of given 
practical ends" and so practical rationality is simply the "methodical attainment of a 
particular given practical end through the increasingly precise calculation of adequate 
means"
31
. So from a Weberian point of view, ends are not set by rationality, only means. 
Therefore genuine persuasion and manipulation (which appears to be persuasion) are, 
provided they are equally efficient, indistinguishable. In order to better understand 
MacIntyre’s critique of the manager we need to understand what he means by 
‘manipulation’.
Here MacIntyre's historical thesis is instructive because it better enables us to 
understand exactly what he means by 'manipulation'. One of the most notable and distinctive 
features of post-enlightenment morality according to MacIntyre is the notion of the 
autonomous individual. The autonomous individual becomes prized by post-enlightenment 
culture in a way that would have been unthinkable in the past.
Contemporary moral experience as a consequence has a paradoxical character. For each of us is 
taught to see himself or herself as an autonomous agent; but each of us also becomes engaged
by modes of practice
32
, aesthetic or bureaucratic, which involves us in manipulative 
relationships with others. Seeking to protect the autonomy we have learned to prize, we aspire 
ourselves not to be manipulated by others; seeking to incarnate our own principles and stand-
point in the world of practice, we find no way open to us to do so except by directing towards 
others those very manipulative modes of relationship which each of us aspires to resist in our 
own case.
33
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What this passage suggests is that manipulation is, to some degree, unavoidable within the 
present order
34
. This may be further evidence that the modern order is morally flawed but 
read in this way, manipulation need not be the inexcusable moral failing it initially seems to 
be. Manipulative relations are to be avoided and remain a threat to the virtues, but we should 
note that manipulation per se is not so much the problem as the purported inability of 
management to be any other way. A particular mechanic might be manipulative, but 
manipulation is not central to that role. Management is not always manipulative in practice, 
people may regard their work as worth doing and so do not need to be manipulated, but 
Management does tend to "smooth over or squash conflict... and the language and ideology of 
the workplace make it difficult to articulate problems that do arise"
35
. More telling however is 
the fact that rational persuasion about ends is inappropriate in the contemporary workplace, 
so the assertion of will is all that remains. Those who do not identify with their working roles 
become targets of manipulation.
3) Does the power and authority afforded to Management depend on a belief in Managerial 
expertise?
Given the scope of corporate power, MacIntyre argues that it could only be justified by the 
ability to control events. If this is so, success will be portrayed as rational and inevitable, and 
failure will be portrayed as an aberration. Here is an expression of the view from one of Studs 
Terkel’s interviewees, a business consultant:
Corporations always have to be right. That's their face to the public. When things go bad, they 
have to protect themselves and fire somebody. 'We had nothing to do with it. We had an 
executive that just screwed everything up'.
36
In this sense, even executives within a corporation can feel the same insecurity, the same 
disconnection between merit and reward, that rank and file workers feel. This quotation also 
suggests that corporations rely on maintaining an image that involves expertise at the top. 
They must be thought of as possessing this scientific competence and when they clearly do 
not, it is portrayed as being the result of a few rogue elements. Even when presented with 
evidence that suggests a lack of expertise, such as that reported by David Craig
37
who claims 
that of 170 organisations who used management consultants and were studied in the 1990s by 
the Cranfield School of Management only 36 per cent of clients thought they had brought any 
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value, the faith in managerial expertise is unwavering and the market for consultancy 
continued to grow.
The belief that management requires a kind of scientific expertise is tacitly accepted 
by the most influential business educational institutions. This is evident in Harold James' 
description of the history of business schools:
...as they developed in the course of the twentieth century, graduate business schools aimed at 
professionalising management. Especially in the United States, they were designed to give 
modern managers a new status that would be commensurable with a changed and enhanced role 
in an evolving and improving economy. The new institutions were sharply distinguished from 
the older commercial schools which emphasized practical and vocational training. Their 
founders wanted a higher prestige and a more abstract and academic education for managers 
who would form an elite.
38
Rakesh Khurana, in From Higher Aims to Hired Hands, claims that the desire to 
professionalise management was 
associated with the need to transmit a particular and specialised knowledge that would serve as 
a boundary to the profession and exclude amateurs. Unlike in medicine or engineering, it was 
never quite clear what the basis of that specialized knowledge was, since accounting, finance 
and marketing might just as well be taught by the older commercial schools
39
So the approach adopted by business schools sought to use quantitative social scientific 
methods to give the veneer of academic respectability. The result is that management came to 
be viewed as a scientific enterprise. As Business-scholars Freeman and Newkirk put it, 
"Implicit in much of the management discussion is a mechanical, deterministic, positivistic 
view of business – a financial engine controlled by the machinery of scientific 
management"
40
. This mechanistic picture of the world has philosophical origins as far back as 
Hobbes (and probably further) and informs that great statement of managerial expertise, FW 
Taylor's The Principles of Scientific Management. But the problem is not merely that 
management came to be viewed by academics as mechanistic, but that these views came to be 
applied:
Molecules do not read chemistry books; but managers do read books on organisation theory. 
Such books therefore, whatever the intentions of their authors, never merely describe; they 
133
provide models for future behaviour, and if they become sufficiently successful texts in 
influential business schools, some original descriptive inadequacies may gradually disappear as 
organisational behaviour conforms more closely to the books which managers read.
41
The way management was and largely is taught, the way it is practiced and the
prestige the Manager has acquired in contemporary society depends upon the belief that 
managerial expertise is real. Further evidence for this comes in the shape of the preference for 
quantitative methods and for new technology even though some evidence suggests it can be 
counter-productive
42
. Both Henry Mintzberg and economist Ha-Joon Chang claim that the 
importance of ever newer technologies has been grossly exaggerated. The notion that 
everything must be new and as technologically advanced as possible is consonant with the 
notion that management depends on expertise and the Weberian technicist account of 
bureaucratic authority. The fact that the life-cycle of management fads has shrunk from 10 
years to 1
43
further suggests the world of management is one that regards itself as cutting-
edge. MacIntyre’s claim that governmental responses to demands that government become 
more scientific take the form of claiming to indeed have become more scientific is borne out 
by the political history of the decades since After Virtue was first published. As Bradley et al 
note, 
there is a current fashion for the techniques of scientific management, which is exemplified in 
the use of industrial and management experts as advisors to New Labour. Such advisors 
promote the application of scientific rationality to the control of people, to be further applied to 
the activity of government itself.
44
Whatever one makes of Labour's policies on science funding
45
- a commitment to scientific 
rationality is not a commitment to the value judgement that research in the natural sciences is 
valuable - it is clear that they put a good deal of faith in expert advisors and management 
consultants. 
At the end of chapter 8 of After Virtue, MacIntyre concedes that managers and 
bureaucrats will likely reply to his criticisms that they are as sceptical as he is about the 
possibility of law-like generalisations and fully scientific knowledge in the social sciences but 
that nevertheless they are entitled to be acknowledged as experts for the more modest 
competences that they do possess. MacIntyre’s response is to acknowledge that this may be 
the case but to argue that "claims of this modest kind could never legitimate the possession or 
134
uses of power either within or by bureaucratic corporations on anything like the scale on 
which that power is wielded"
46
. That examples of managerial control within the workplace 
are so common, it can be plausibly claimed that some corporations have greater power than 
nation states, and such is governmental faith in their ability to achieve their aims, suggests 
that this is so
47
. However, as we will see in the following section, the claim to expertise is 
often now eschewed by the holders of positions of great power so for now we must leave the 
question open.
4) Does this expertise exist?
MacIntyre claims that the sort of knowledge that would be required to justify bureaucratic 
authority is impossible. Non-trivial scientific predictions in social science are all but 
impossible and any serious predictive capacity is certainly not as widely available or reliable 
as in the natural sciences and nor could it be. Both in the decades from which MacIntyre 
draws his examples and the present day the predictions issued by such apparent experts as 
economists are notoriously faulty and more modest, grounded, common-sense predictions 
tend to be more reliable because they are not couched in terms appropriate only to the natural 
sciences. MacIntyre's examples include the fact that economic predictions using the most 
advanced methods were less successful than predictions based on assuming that the next six 
months will resemble the last and that growth is best forecast by taking the average over the 
last ten years
48
. A more recent example is that the East Asian economic miracle depended 
upon policies invented by lawyers and engineers rather than economists and a yet more recent 
example is the failure of mainstream economists to predict the 2008 financial crisis.
Tom Peters' popular management book In Search of Excellence is one of the more 
successful books in its genre, and its author is one of the most renowned of management 
gurus. According to Lars Svendsen 
Five years after the publication of the book, it turned out that the companies he had described as 
“excellent” did significantly worse than those he had described as seriously lacking in 
“excellence”. Satisfying Peters’ six “measures of excellence” was a great recipe for being a 
loser in the market.
49
To be fair to Peters, this disastrous analysis is not best read as a rebuttal of the claim that 
managerial expertise exists as Peters' conception of management is not that of a science, even 
if it provides yet more evidence that management could not be scientific. His work pertains 
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more directly to the concept of leadership discussed in the following section. One business 
commentator, even a highly successful and respected one, making a prediction that turned out 
to be considerably worse than drawing names out of a hat, is hardly a decisive blow to the 
notion of managerial expertise. However, Graef Crystal studied the 2009 pay of 271 CEOs 
and found no correlation between performance and pay, and Daniel Kahneman reports that 
there is no year-to-year correlation in the ranking of financial advisors and concludes that the 
"illusion of skill is not only an individual aberration; it is deeply ingrained in the culture of 
the industry"
50
. Such data does not suggest we are dealing with a field in which expertise is
possible. If there were no correlation between the pay and results of lawyers (which, when 
well-institutionalised, is clearly a practice), or no correlation between year-on-year 
comparisons between them, we should be amazed.
If the kind of expertise upon which MacIntyre takes claims of managerial authority to 
rest were possible, then we would expect MBA programmes to be akin to medical degrees: 
training for which there is no substitute. This is not the case. Indeed, according to one study 
managers in possession of any other Masters degree outperformed those who held MBAs
51
. If 
it turned out that medical degrees were not the best way of training doctors, if it turned out 
that Archaeology MAs yielded more capable practitioners of Medicine, we would again be 
amazed.
There is, nevertheless, an illusion of effectiveness and expertise. MacIntyre would 
respond that management is effective because people defer to the powerful, and so 
effectiveness is exercise of power: a display not of expertise but of control. Those in positions 
of authority are more able to make others do as they wish, so authority explains effectiveness 
not vice versa. Furthermore, much research is likely to be very much biased in favour of 
manager’s perspective given that it is management who usually commissions research. 
According to Bradley et al "the agenda is increasingly set by management concerns. 
Interviews with managers... have become the prevalent methods of investigation, while 
studies that involve interviews with workers are becoming few and far between"
52
. 
As we saw above MacIntyre does not need to deny a limited competence. It is 
undeniable that some people in charge of managing institutions do possess some skill and 
ability, to negotiate or communicate (or to charm or manipulate, or perhaps all of these) for 
instance. What MacIntyre is denying is that this is the sort of expertise that can justify the 
power and authority afforded to the manager.
MacIntyre essentially accepts Quine’s claim that if a social-science were to be 
genuinely scientific it would have to eliminate all reference to reasons, beliefs, desires etc.
53
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and claims that such a social-science would be worthless because such phenomena are 
ineliminable in any serious account of human behaviour. However, although we saw above 
that the possession of management authority is often accounted for in terms of possession of 
expertise, in the following section we will consider leadership as a new form of management 
that does not invoke scientific expertise.
5) Does Management lead to or require compartmentalisation?
There are elements of managerial work, as it is carried out within modernity, that increase the 
risk of compartmentalisation. Let us consider the difference between the fisherman and the 
Manager. Fishing is hardly freely creative, and those engaged in fishing in Europe today 
often bemoan what they take to be the excessive intrusion of EU regulation, rightly or 
wrongly. A squeeze on fish prices may mean that fishing crews must think very carefully 
about how to ensure they make sufficient profit. The difference between fishing and 
management is not that the former is always creative and richly rewarding and free from 
pressure to increase profits, and the latter always tedious and alienating. The difference is the 
potential fishing possesses qua practice to be an education in the virtues. Fishing, where it 
can be a genuine practice, involves a relatively permanent community and a whole way of 
life, rather than a temporary identification with a role. The whole way of life is crucial as it 
affords the fisherman a perspective from which to evaluate any particular demand that is 
made of him. It is therefore compatible with rejecting atomistically role-structured behaviour, 
even though it is clearly a structured role.  The lives of fishermen and managers can be good 
or bad, but fishing as a practice tends to be good unless thwarted (by, say, inadequate 
institutionalisation) because at its core it possesses internal goods. Management has no such 
core, it is essentially amoral. The person who manages the affairs of a fishing crew in order to 
protect the practice serves the pursuit of internal goods, but management qua pursuit of 
efficient means can just as easily serve any end. 
This does not imply that all managers are compartmentalised, but it does suggest that 
management is inherently compatible with compartmentalisation. The demands of 
management depend almost entirely on the ends of the organization in which it is employed, 
and so unlike the life of a fisherman, there is not a distinctive kind of life lived by a 
manager.
54
Of course, in an era of flexible specialisation the ends of an organization can 
change quickly, and therefore so can the ends of a manager. In this sense management is 
merely a role, it is not perfective of those who play it and it is structurally cut off from the 
other roles that partially make up a person's life. MacIntyre says:
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What happens too often is that the precepts of the virtues come to be understood as 
prescriptions for habit-formation in the interests of achieving effectiveness in this or that 
particular role. And in so being heard and understood the crucial distinction between a virtue 
and a skill is obscured, if not obliterated... virtues, unlike skills, direct us only to good ends. But 
in social structures informed by role compartmentalization the ends of each role have already 
been to a remarkable degree socially and institutionally predetermined, so that virtues come to 
be understood only as more or less effective means to the achievement of those pre-determined 
ends, that is, as socially relevant and effective skills.
55
What this quotation suggests is the role of the manager is more liable to be a role in which the 
distinction between virtues and skills, as these traits are conceived of by MacIntyre, is 
obscured. The ends of any particular practice are always open to development and extension 
by those engaged in that practice, but the ends of management are not so available for 
scrutiny. However, this criticism would not apply to, for instance, the chess club treasurer 
who is, in fact, a manager of sorts. Institutionally safeguarding a practice is a form of 
management, so the thrust of MacIntyre's critique clearly focuses on the most culturally 
central (even if not the most common) forms of management — those within large-scale 
bureaucratic institutions — and their particular characteristics. Such institutions do not focus 
on safe-guarding the goods of practices, but instead put pressure on those within them to cut 
corners to 'get ahead'. 
Whereas there is no point in cheating at a practice where the engagement is genuine, 
there is every reason to do so within such institutions. Indeed, there is much evidence to 
suggest that the pressures to succeed qua-manager are corrupting. These pressures encourage 
otherwise good people to separate managerial demands from their other commitments. 
According to a 1997 survey of over 1300 American employees 48% complained that 
management pressured them to engage in "unethical and illegal activity" in order to boost the 
bottom line
56
. In the late 1980s a survey of 671 executives found that around 25% believed 
ethics can impede a successful career
57
. MBA students cheat more than other graduate 
students
58
. I could go on, but I think it is clear that, at the very least, modernity's dominant 
institutions create a pressure to compartmentalise. Success in the roles common in such 
institutions requires that the concerns central to other roles be temporarily silenced. As Al 
Gini puts it, in his philosophical account of work My Job, Myself, "we often lead 
schizophrenic lives because we either choose or are forced to abandon our personal beliefs at 
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the door when we enter the workplace"
59
. This view has also been endorsed by renowned
lawyer and jurist Alan Dershowitz: "I would never do many of the things in my personal life 
that I have to do as a lawyer"
60
. So the answer to our question is not that all management 
leads to or requires compartmentalisation as a matter of necessity, but that there is 
nevertheless both a greater possibility of such compartmentalisation in non-practice-based 
roles and that contemporary bureaucratic institutions either attract or produce 
compartmentalised agents.
6) Is Management as culturally central / powerful as MacIntyre's account requires?
It is not ultimately important whether individual managers think they have this expertise –
they used to, some still do, but many do not – but that their powerful position depends upon 
something very much like this belief being enshrined in our culture as a justification of 
managerial power. According to MacIntyre the political legitimacy of capitalism depends 
upon management, or more specifically, on the existence of managerial expertise. The 
exclusion of the mass of the population in political decision making is either a testimony to a 
lack of democracy, or it is justified by the existence of bureaucratic experts
61
. Corporations 
wield a great deal of power, that much is certain, and so the justification of this authority is a 
pressing question. However, to answer this question adequately, and indeed to complete our 
answers to the earlier questions in this section we need now to turn to more recent 
developments in management. 
On the basis of the account developed in the current chapter so far, there remain three 
outstanding problems: 1) the claim made in 6.1 that the payment of mere lip-service to the 
ends of management is possible has not been entirely rebutted by either the points about 
power later in 6.1 nor in the account of management offered here, 2) many people who are 
managers work in SMEs, with people they've known for some time, and do not possess and 
are not drawn to acquire an MBA, and 3) management even of large bureaucratic 
organisations has diversified in the period since After Virtue was published in 1981.The first 
of these problems suggests the kinds of modifications to MacIntyre's account of characters
put forward in 6.1, but is not of critical importance to MacIntyre's overall account of work 
once we realise that it is the power and legitimacy of management that is most central. The 
second problem is similar in this regard, and we will turn our attention to how workplaces 
should be governed in the next chapter. The upshot of the third outstanding problem is that a 
MacIntyrean account of work must say more about management. In the following section we 
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turn our attention to leadership - a distinctly non-scientific strand of management which has 
risen to prominence since the publication of After Virtue.
6.3 Leadership
What is killing us is the illusion of control: that things can be predictable, consistent and 
forever under control. What is also killing us is that followers require their leaders to be in 
control, on top of things, and to take the blame when things go wrong. Nearly all the new 
management programmes on TQM, re-engineering, right-sizing, just-in-time, this or that, are 
really old wine in new bottles - more efforts to design control systems that ask the workers to 
try harder; do better and be even more productive.
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If the conception of the manager-as-bureaucratic expert was dominant in the middle of the 
20th century, in the past few decades the paradigm has shifted somewhat, although as the 
above quotation suggests not entirely. According to numerous commentators, including 
influential management theorist Henry Mintzberg, who will be the central focus of this 
section, in the latter part of the 20
th
century, the concept of ‘Leadership’ overtook the concept 
of ‘Management’
63
. John Arnold notes that early management research focused on the leader-
as-tactician whereas more recent studies focus on the leader-as-inspirational figure
64
, Charles 
Handy notes that "recent years have seen a renewed interest in leadership as opposed to 
management"
65
, and Wendy Hollway notes that in recent literature "the ghost of managerial 
leadership has come back to haunt the field" and that according to this literature "managers 
are not needed in organizations, only leaders"
66
. In this section, I will consider whether 
'Leadership' can take the place of 'Management' and can justify the power and authority of 
those in charge of modernity's dominant institutions. I will argue that Leadership is, like 
Management, an embodiment of emotivism and as such lacks legitimacy. 
The main distinction between the two concepts, as I will use them following 
Mintzberg, is that leaders 'deal with change' and 'managers cope with complexity'. Leadership 
is thus not a scientific concept, as MacIntyre takes managerial expertise to be. In this sense 
good Leaders require a certain ability but this does not count as expertise. The knowledge and 
charisma required to be an effective leader is not the same as the impersonal knowledge of 
law-like generalisations that was once thought to be required for bureaucratic expertise, but 
this does not mean that modern forms of corporate leadership avoid embodying Emotivism 
nor that they justify the authority afforded to the Manager.
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The most basic ways in which Leadership differs from management is that it does not 
involve slow and careful analysis or rational scientific method, but gut instinct, intuition, 
charismatic means of presentation and so on. As such it lacks the fallibilism characteristic of 
disciplines that aspire to the level of science. According to Tourish and Pinnington, many 
business leaders “develop a monomaniacal conviction that there is one right way of doing 
things, and believe they possess an almost divine insight into reality”
67
. Since the 1980s it is 
often thought that businesses do not have time for 5 year plans and so leaders, who are 
thought to instigate and cope with tumultuous change, are now called for. This picture is not 
entirely accurate however, and it would be an exaggeration to claim the emergence of 
leadership has involved a total shift away from old-fashioned management. The (business) 
leader, if not quite a character in MacIntyre’s sense because of the shift of emphasis away 
from rational authority, is certainly an important role and a cultural archetype that still 
expresses a distinctly Emotivist mode of thinking. Emotivism is so deeply ingrained in our 
culture that it emerges one way or another. If rational persuasion is impossible and instead
arbitrary will and manipulative persuasion is all, it makes sense to select the most charismatic 
person, or the person with the best ‘gut’, for the job. Scientific Management was 
manipulative in that it saw workers as tools to be expertly controlled, Leadership is 
manipulative in that it attempts to use inspiration in place of persuasion.
More traditional forms of management – the sort that ostensibly requires a unique 
expertise – are still with us, but the move towards emphasising leadership is a result of a 
partial recognition of the difficulties involved in achieving bureaucratic control. An article in 
Fast Company magazine captures this recognition well: “there’s this one big rub about 
management books… the world they seek to describe is so complex, so tumultuous, often so 
random as to defy predictability and even rationality”
68
. That ‘scientific management’ has 
now to compete with 'charismatic' CEOs and in some cases their near mystical approach 
suggests that the manager never possessed expertise in the first place. Weber's claim that 
capitalism is justified by its rationality – where rationality pertains to means and not ends – is 
obviously untrue of versions of capitalism that depend on modern Leadership.
Gimpl and Dakin draw parallels between Leaders' forecasting techniques and ancient 
superstitious fortune-telling rites used to determine the best hunting grounds and which gave 
random answers
69
. These rites were useful in that they enabled people to resist the temptation 
to return to the same hunting grounds time and again, thus preventing over-hunting in those 
areas, and management forecasting is useful in that it provides confidence in times of 
uncertainty. As Edwards and Wajcman put it, such management 'rituals' 
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encourage some sort of action rather than leaving people feeling helpless... in a random world 
the best action may be random, and magic may give meaning to randomness... Magic gives 
justification for actions that would otherwise not fit a discourse of rational decision-making.
70
Such methods invite challenges to the legitimacy of the dominant institutions of modernity 
even more than do illusory scientific methods.
It would be foolish to imagine that there exist two distinct poles of management 
theory with Frederick Taylor at one end and Tom Peters, who suggests a company’s president 
should be its “main disorganiser”
71
, at the other, with nothing in between. The new leadership 
meets the old management in the growing trend of organisations to regard employees coming 
to emotionally commit to their employers and to their products as being important in addition 
to the traditional goals of increasing organisational efficiency and control. Many of the 
companies we saw that Dobson listed as being new forms of communities, such as Google, 
Apple and Microsoft, in the previous chapter were the companies most active and most 
skilled in creating a fervid commitment amongst employees.
As we saw in chapter 5, business cannot be a practice, in part because of its 
heterogeneity. Management similarly lacks a distinctive internal good. Mintzberg recognises 
this and his acceptance that management is neither a science nor an art makes his account of 
managing significantly less vulnerable to the MacIntyrean attack outlined above. MacIntyre’s 
account as it appears in After Virtue focuses exclusively on traditional bureaucracies whereas 
Mintzberg’s account is far more diverse. In effect MacIntyre and Mintzberg are talking about 
different things. Mintzberg's focus on day-to-day actions suggests his focus is on ordinary 
middle-managers, who possess modest competences rather than expertise (and certainly do 
not possess the power and prestige that would make them dominant cultural figures). 
MacIntyre's critique of the Manager is squarely focused on the powerful elites in charge of 
large organisations. However, if we apply Mintzberg's common-sense approach to the 'power 
elites' the question of their legitimacy remains pressing.
Mintzberg’s account focuses on what is learned ‘on the job’, on common-sense, and 
on the unpretentious claim that to be a good manager someone should be an intelligent, 
rounded person rather than a person who possesses a unique expertise and ability to lead. 
Also, though he never puts it this way, implicit in Mintzberg’s account is a somewhat 
MacIntyrean emphasis on the local as well as on long-term face-to-face relationships. 
Mintzberg claims that the selection and promotion of managers should partly depend on the 
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opinion of those who have been managed by them
72
; that managers are not in themselves 
effective but only matches between managers, particular institutions, and particular working 
groups are effective
73
; and because executive impact should only be measured in the long 
run, bonuses should be eliminated. Above all, Mintzberg claims that managers should not be 
obsessed with measurement but should make room for ‘judgement’. This judgement should 
be balanced, varied, and heterogeneous. This means it is incompatible with managerial 
expertise and therefore the privileged cultural position of the manager, but it might enable 
those in charge of organizations to run them more effectively and more humanely.
One problem with Mintzberg’s account is that it ignores the structural features of 
management which MacIntyre is particularly concerned with. For instance, Mintzberg’s 
method of both interviewing and observing managers which, while preferable to doing one or 
the other, leaves him blind to the significance of the role-structured ends of management that 
set strict limits to the room available for judgement and discretion. He says that management 
is more about lateral relationships than hierarchy
74
and that managers have to balance the 
interests of the owners and/or higher managers with those of their subordinates. The 
MacIntyrean would disagree because the imbalance of power, and thus the lack of democracy 
within large scale corporations, means that the interests of the subordinates are liable to be 
ignored or moulded such that conflict is made to disappear instead of being resolved. If it is 
Marxism's mistake to focus only on the hierarchical relations, Mintzberg makes the opposite
mistake and pays no attention to the imbalance of power between the two groups which, as 
we saw in section 6.1, is crucial to understanding relationships and how roles can encourage 
compartmentalisation.
We can agree with much of what Mintzberg says because at the level of the SME or 
within a small team, intelligent, thoughtful, friendly managers can be a considerable boost to 
subjective satisfaction, to group cohesion, and even to a sense of community. Such an 
approach, coupled with Mintzberg's suggestion that the selection and promotion of managers 
be influenced by the opinions of those who have been managed by them is likely to prevent 
that most frustrating of working experiences: being over-managed. Research shows that 
autonomy at work is one of the most important factors in job-satisfaction
75
. However, 
management as it is currently practised is far from Mintzberg's level-headed ideal and many 
new initiatives come not from what is learned on the job, but from faddish management 
books. Furthermore, the life span of each fad has decreased in recent years so that any new 
good ideas are likely to be overturned and ignored before they have a chance to prove 
themselves (or otherwise).  According to Joanne Ciulla,
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The problem with management fads in that they are often uncritical and ahistorical. As a result 
management theorists discover the same things about work over and over and are equally 
excited every time they do so... [one] insight about work that management theorists keep 
discovering is that if you give people information and a say in how to improve their work, they 
can produce impressive results. The fact that managers are constantly amazed by this tells us 
something about the respect they had for their employees.
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This might not justify MacIntyre's claim that the bureaucratic manager sees subordinates as a 
chemist sees the substances used in his experiments
77
, managers would never discover that 
autonomy works if that were so, but it does suggest that ordinary employees lack the capacity 
to decide what works best, a capacity managers thus seem to arrogate to themselves almost 
exclusively. Freeman and Rogers found workers want more participation than they currently 
enjoy and they report that the typical objection to this is that the experts know best
78
. As 
Charles Handy says "Most managers feel more comfortable when... they can control the 
methods and therefore the results, the means and not the ends. To let go... to trust people to 
use their own methods... can be uncomfortable"
79
.
It remains the case that management within modernity's most powerful institutions is 
widely expected to possess knowledge that goes beyond know-how and clear-headedness. 
During a visit to the LSE in November 2008, the Queen asked Professor Luis Garicano why 
it was that no-one had foreseen the financial crisis. The response, when it came in the form of 
a letter dated July 22
nd
2009 from the British Academy, was that there had been a “failure of 
collective imagination”
80
with the implication being that if only the relevant experts had not 
been complacent they would have foreseen the crisis because they do in fact possess 
scientific expertise. Clearly, practitioners of the ‘dismal science’ consider themselves to be in 
possession of expertise and consider control to be possible, even if it requires more than 
simple data-modelling. We do not expect medical doctors to make correct diagnoses on every 
occasion because in addition to knowledge doctors need imagination to apply it in unusual 
cases. What would surprise us, however, is hundreds or thousands of doctors making an 
identical mistake.
Mintzberg’s picture of management might well deserve recommendation, but again, it 
is incompatible with the self-understanding of many bureaucratic corporations. For instance, 
here is a quotation from the Business Roundtable’s ‘Statement of Corporate Governance’:
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The notion that the board must somehow balance the interests of stockholders against the 
interests of other stakeholders fundamentally misconstrues the role of directors. It is, moreover, 
an unworkable notion because it would leave the board with no criteria for resolving the 
conflicts between the interests of stockholders and other stakeholders or among different groups 
of stakeholders.
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Mintzberg laments the fact that such a statement makes no room for ‘judgement’ but here we 
see that the intangible ‘judgement’ is regarded by the authors of the Business Roundtable 
statement, a group of CEOs from major US corporations, as being too vague, too imprecise to 
make the sorts of definite decisions that management is taken to consist in. There is a danger 
that judgement will hinder profit maximisation. The pre-given ends set by the stakeholders 
must remain sovereign, for if they are not there is "no criteria for resolving the conflicts" that 
may arise. Joel Bakan reports that Dodge v. Ford "still stands for the legal principle that 
managers and directors have a legal responsibility to put shareholders’ interests above all 
others and no legal authority to serve any other interest”
82
. In this case the Ford Motor 
Company was successfully sued by its minority shareholders for attempting to end special 
dividends and instead investing so as to employ more staff and lower the cost of cars 
produced (Ford had privately stated that his aims were philanthropic rather than strategic). 
This is not to say that short-term profit maximisation is enshrined in law, even if it is standard 
practice, because shareholders' interests might be better served by long-term planning. 
However, it does neatly capture the compartmentalised decision-making characteristic of 
large corporations, a compartmentalisation that ensures the will of the shareholders trumps all 
else.
So contemporary leaders and managers exist in an Emotivistic world, and often 
wrongly consider themselves to possess expertise. Contemporary firms require 
managers with charismatic personalities, displaying flexibility, dynamism, and interpersonal 
skills. As a result, the criteria for advancement across a broad range of management jobs 
become more intangible and implicit, more a matter of personal compatibility and 
perceptions.
83
According to several studies, the traits required by high-powered corporate roles are those 
associated with psychopaths
84
. There are two points to make about this. 1) The requirement 
for certain personality types is explicit here but such personalities must make decisions in a 
compartmentalised way so that apparent virtues effectively become manipulative skills. 2) 
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'Gut'-based decision making does not justify the authority of management because success 
still seems to be haphazard, and because such decisions still merely assume the legitimacy, 
rather than providing evidence for, the ends they are made to serve. For every Geoffrey 
Robinson there is a BBC reorganisation.
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Alimo-Metcalfe and Alban-Metcalfe 
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report that studies which have attempted to 
find a correlation between leadership style and outcome (e.g. productivity, stress, 
absenteeism) actually found no such correlation. They also found that such studies also 
generally fail to take subordinate behaviour into account. Such outcomes are unsurprising to 
the MacIntyrean. As we saw in our discussion of emotional labour in chapter 4, particular 
contextualising detail is of the utmost importance, so a single leadership style is unlikely to 
have the same outcomes in differing contexts. Nor is it any surprise to find that this is 
frequently overlooked given that it resists qualitative description and that any findings that 
take it into account cannot be formulated as universal law-like generalisations. Thus, this 
oversight in the literature is symptomatic of the belief in the possibility of just the kind of 
expertise MacIntyre takes to be impossible.
It is difficult to imagine that the role of the Manager in contemporary life would be 
deemed acceptable by most people if management simply consisted in clear-headed people 
doing their best. This would do no more to justify the 400:1 discrepancy between US CEOs 
and ordinary workers (in the Fortune 500) than there is at present.  We saw earlier that the 
results of market traders are almost purely determined by chance (incidentally, such highly 
prized workers are hardly rare: in 2007 more than 4200 financial sector workers received 
bonuses of over £1 million in the City of London alone
87
). With CEOs the situation seems to 
be little different. Take the example of Stan O'Neal. He received over $300 million from his 
time as the head of Merrill Lynch despite the company losing billions of dollars in that time. 
Whatever rare skills he possessed did not prevent the company's failure nor his being voted as 
one of the worst CEOs of all time in Portfolio magazine
88
. As business-scholar Phil 
Rosenzweig puts it
When a company is doing well, with rising profits and a soaring share price, most people infer 
that it has a brilliant strategy, a visionary leader, a motivated workforce, strong execution skills 
and more... But when the company falters, observers are quick to make the opposite 
attributions: they say the strategy was misguided, the leader became arrogant, the people were 
complacent, execution was sloppy, and more. In fact, little may have changed.
89
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Again, luck tends to be rewarded as if it is skill. The bureaucratic experts who govern modern 
life do not succeed on their own terms. At the very least the rare skills and 'excellent' 
individual performance that supposedly justify such high pay are un-testable.
However, deferral to the powerful is more pressing an issue than wildly inflated pay. 
The lack of moral legitimacy is more pressing than the lack of technical legitimacy. The 
deferral to the opinions of the 'experts' and their level of authority and wealth would seem to 
have no justification if they are not experts able to exert some level of genuine control over 
what happens or able to accurately predict the outcomes of policies. The government, the 
Bank of England, and the private corporations that play important roles in public life do seem 
to claim their legitimacy on the basis of becoming ever more scientific. Democracy, such as it 
is, invites people to periodically give some indication of their values but governments, along 
with their appointed bureaucratic experts, decide what is possible, how to most efficiently 
implement those values, and participation in the devising of most effective means is no more 
invited than it is in medicine. In the workplace, where even such periodic indication of 
preferences is often lacking, management imposes upon the workforce what it takes to be the 
most efficient means.
6.4 Conclusion
We have seen that MacIntyre's account of characters requires more empirical support, and 
that the key difference between character-roles and ordinary roles is one of power, both 
cultural and in immediate relationships. I have disagreed with MacIntyre's claim that 
character-roles require certain kinds of personality because of the possibility of paying mere 
lip-service to the role demands and because our culture is sufficiently fragmented for 
particular 'moral ideals' to lack normative force. In the following sections I have attempted to 
provide MacIntyre's case with some of the empirical support it needs. Management 
developments since the publication of After Virtue have seen a greater weight given to non-
scientific notions of Leadership. This however seems to be another manipulative mask, and 
co-exists with a continuing tendency for those in positions of power to attribute to themselves 
an ability to expertly control the institutions that dominate modernity.
Although I have disagreed with some of MacIntyre's claims about the character of the 
manager, in particular his claim that it necessarily influences the personalities of those who 
play the role, these claims nevertheless possess a certain plausibility that results from 
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MacIntyre's acute claim that our culture is emotivist. The passing of the character of the 
manager, and the emergence of the (putative character of the) leader is rendered intelligible 
partly because MacIntyre's critique of managerial expertise holds true. The leader is a 
replacement that is no less Emotivistic. Indeed its justification is more openly arbitrary than 
that of the manager because although the leader does not pretend to moral neutrality, it 
openly admits the lack of rationality supporting its value commitments. The Leader fits the
description of 'mask worn by a moral philosophy' even more neatly than does the manager. 
This chapter has focused first on the abstraction of MacIntyre's concept of characters, then on 
the cultural history of management, and then on contemporary corporate culture. In the 
chapter that follows, we will turn our attention to how workplaces can best be governed and 
regulated within this culture.
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Chapter 7: Governance, Regulation and the MacIntyrean 
Workplace
Having explored management in terms of expert knowledge and leadership in chapter 6, in 
this chapter we shall explore the governance of virtue in the workplace. We will begin in 7.1 
by examining Geoff Moore’s extremely useful but ultimately flawed attempt to codify 
MacIntyrean workplace initiatives. While governance is an especially important issue for 
MacIntyrean ethics, I will argue that Moore’s account is defective  because, as they stand, his 
recommendations are incompatible with MacIntyre’s account of moral education and in 
particular because he misinterprets MacIntyrean ethics in such a way that it becomes too 
close to the mere regulation of behaviour. In section 7.2, we will focus on the nature of 
regulation and the role it plays in working life and how regulation relates to MacIntyrean 
ethics. I will argue that we ought to recognise the importance of regulation, even if we accept 
MacIntyre's claim that regulation is primarily required when a society lacks the moral 
resources required to avert disaster. Clearly regulation cannot itself provide the moral 
education that MacIntyre claims is provided by practices. In 7.3, we will focus on whether a 
regulative approach can count as a genuine 'governance of virtue', that is, whether policy 
measures can transforms workplaces into centres of flourishing. I will argue that neither the 
'right' MacIntyrean position of Moore nor the 'left' MacIntyrean position of Knight can allow 
us to formulate means by which work can be an education in the virtues and that outside of 
practices governance is most effective and appropriate as a means of crowding out vice. I will 
conclude by reformulating Moore's workplace initiatives in line with the arguments of the 
previous chapters.
7.1 Moore and Governance
MacIntyrean ethics is characterised by an emphasis on the importance of the social sciences, 
specifically on the empirical knowledge of societies required to understand how moralities 
are socially embodied. One important element of this embodiment is moral education. Virtue 
ethics generally tends to place more emphasis on moral education than rival positions and 
because of its conception of practices as schools of the virtues, MacIntyrean philosophy is yet 
more concerned with the means by which virtues are acquired than most virtue theories. 
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Because practices, and therefore institutions, are central to MacIntyre's ethics, the question of 
governance naturally has a prominence in MacIntyrean philosophy. Indeed, the question of 
governance is especially important given that practices must be partially opaque to the 
uninitiated. Where work is practice-based, good governance might therefore aim to ensure 
that practices and practitioners operate without impediment. We can describe the internal 
goods of chess and the virtues that engagement in that particular practice might develop 
because we have all played chess, but it is harder, for me at least, to elaborate on the internal 
goods of Tae-Kwando because I have never engaged in it. 
While there will inevitably be differences in systems of governance across different 
workplaces, any putative MacIntyrean system of governance will aim to prevent the pursuit 
of external goods dominating institutions. Regulation differs from governance in that it is 
typically imposed from without. As such regulation is unencumbered by specificities and its 
focus tends to be on ensuring a minimal acceptable standard. The advantage of governance is 
that it can be designed within an institution with the practice that institution houses in mind, 
and thus can be sensitive to contextual requirements. The advantage of regulation is that its 
externality means it can be designed solely with public welfare in mind. In this sense 
regulation can be seen as an attempt to minimise the testimony problem discussed in chapter 
1. We are more likely to trust an officially certified dentist than a dentist who assures us that 
he or she is committed to the relevant internal goods.
Governance cannot transform non-practice-based institutions so that they house 
practices, but it is of vital importance to prevent the corruption of practices within the 
relevant institutions and the corruption more generally which undermines working 
communities. This is the very least governance can aim at. Moore claims that governance can 
do a good deal more and argues that certain measures can incentivise virtue
1
.
Moore suggests that MacIntyrean theory can provide both a better diagnosis of 
phenomena like the recent economic crisis and of the question of legitimation than can views 
which either suggest that capitalism is inherently corrupting or that it is inherently virtuous. 
According to the former view, capitalism will self-destruct because it tends to destroy the 
very values that sustain it. According to the latter view, termed doux-commerce
2
, the market 
is ethically self-sustaining because it calls for trustworthiness; dishonesty is held in check by 
the need to cultivate a reputation for trustworthiness, prudence is rewarded in the long term, 
and so on. For Moore, MacIntyrean philosophy allows us to see the truth in both theories and 
provides a better prescription than either alone is able to. Instead of merely suggesting greater 
regulation
3
or recommending an ethical code without outlining how it might be brought into 
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existence
4
, MacIntyrean philosophy (as Moore understands it) provides an empirically 
engaged philosophical framework that can help us to assess and transform real institutions.
Using MacIntyre’s account of virtues and practices, Moore suggests eight desiderata 
through which virtue might be ‘crowded in’ in the workplace. These are: 
1) A focus on the purpose of the organisation rather than the bottom line, though this policy 
can only apply where these differ.  Moore says, “At the most senior level of governance 
discussions there will be a need to address the goodness of purpose of the organization which 
is the extent to which the internal goods of the practice are at the core of the organization”
5
. It 
is however hard to imagine the board of a cigarette company having this discussion and 
concluding that they ought to close down. Moore seems to optimistically assume that all 
work is practice-based. We will address the issue of attempting to persuade non-
MacIntyreans below, in section 7.2.
2) That governance systems require people with pro-social intrinsic preferences. Character 
assessment and development is crucial, and virtuous candidates should be given jobs. After 
appointment, character should continue to be nurtured.
3) Job design. "[A]ttention needs to be given to job design, so that intrinsic motivation is built 
in to the greatest extent possible"
6
. Here again we can see that Moore takes it as read that 
employees are practitioners, he says that work should be designed so that “employees 
(practitioners) ought to find the greatest opportunity to engage in the practice, exercise virtue, 
pursue excellence and so produce good products and perfect themselves in the process”
7
.
4) Fixed and fair salaries, a policy that helps the rank and file avoid the conclusion that the 
senior figures within an organisation are concerned solely to achieve large bonuses.
8
5) Use of decision making procedures that strengthen both participation and self-governance. 
We will consider self-governance in section 7.3 when we turn our attention to moral 
education at work.
6) Low levels of legal contractual enforcement. The purpose of this is to allow trust to 
flourish, the importance of which was discussed in chapter 4. We should note that this cannot 
be an explicit governance aim because we cannot draw up a code of conduct that obliges us 
to avoid having to implement that code of conduct (or at least we cannot do so sensibly), but 
it might be a good way of measuring the success of an institution.
7) Encouraging group identity. This is a fairly natural result of implementing the previous six 
measures according to Moore. We saw in chapter 5 that communities can exist even without 
such measures, although as Moore rightly notes, an organization which has the features he 
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lists "will find encouraging group identity easier than one which tends not to have these 
features."
9
8) Transparency. This again is something that flows from the other measures, according to 
Moore.
Moore is right to note that MacIntyrean philosophy provides resources that enable us 
to formulate a better response than to either implore people to act more virtuously or to 
merely attempt to offer incentives to behave well. But there are five notable problems with 
his account. Three of them are relatively minor problems which pertain to details of his 
account that could be altered without significant loss, and two are more serious problems 
which throw his whole approach to the governance of virtue into question.
The minor problems are: 1) Moore’s apparently uncritical assumption that all work is 
a practice (or might be if institutionalised correctly), he says “the failure to possess and 
exercise the virtues ultimately led to the inability of practices to retain their integrity – and 
hence, in a number of cases to the demise of the institution as it no longer fostered the 
practice on which it was founded (Northern Rock, Lehman Brothers, AIG and others)”
10
, and 
thus that a focus on internal goods is always possible even in institutions solely geared 
towards the pursuit of external goods, 2) his failure to address the problem of scale, and 3) 
the fact that most companies do already pay lip-service to focusing on the purpose rather than 
profit, select people with pro-social attitudes, etc. Were the situation otherwise it would be 
extremely difficult to persuade employees to adopt corporate identities. Role-structured 
activity might be corrupting, but no one seeks out corrupting roles. We saw in chapter 1 that 
although practices admit of degree, it is simply impossible to regard the concept as applying 
to every activity or even to every enjoyable activity, and we saw in both chapters 4 and 5 that 
day-to-day interaction and a relatively small-scale are essential to MacIntyrean communities, 
and so will not discuss these issues here. In any case, it is clear that Moore’s account could be 
modified so that disparities in pay are less extreme than a 75:1 ratio, that genuine practices 
are preferred, and that the focus on organisational purpose is more challenging that he seems 
to allow and certainly not something that can be simply stipulated. 
These points only require a slight alteration to be brought closer to the spirit of 
MacIntyre's works. For instance, we could restrict some of the more substantial requirements 
to practice-based work. Where work is practice-based a focus on the purpose of the 
organisation means a focus on goods internal to that activity, and a preference for virtuous 
candidates can have a deeper and more genuine application. Bravery is called for in a fire-
fighter but would be irrelevant as a selection criterion for a data-entry role, so in reality the 
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selection of the virtuous would be highly particular. Similarly, democratic participation 
would benefit budding farmers and the farms on which they work, but it is not something that 
can have application in mere turnip planting.
11
Such alterations do nevertheless give us 
reason to be less optimistic than Moore himself about the prospects of MacIntyrean 
institutions becoming widespread within the present order.
The two larger problems are that Moore’s account seems to underplay the distinction 
between virtue and acting in accordance with virtue (and between acting in accordance with 
virtue because one wants to be virtuous and acting in such a way because one wants to 
deceive others and be regarded as virtuous without actually being so), and, similarly, reading 
MacIntyre as being too socially deterministic. Let us consider these problems in more detail:
a) the notion of ‘crowding in’ virtues by providing external goods as incentives 
certainly seems to be consonant with MacIntyre’s treatment of both the relation between 
internal and external goods, and thus the development of virtues in After Virtue, and the 
notion that reward be related to merit. However, Moore frames his discussion in a way that 
suggests he accepts, in principle, methods of governance that effectively promote acting in 
accordance with virtue, or even merely appearing to act in accordance with virtue. The mere 
fact of co-operation does not necessarily indicate fellowship because such co-operation may 
be a result of coercion or mere appeals to narrow self-interest (though MacIntyre realises that 
enlightened self-interest entails a concern for others). Furthermore, the 2
nd
of Moore’s 
desiderata, the selection of virtuous employees suggests again that the appearance of virtue, 
the ability to charm counts for too much. Decisions about whether someone is virtuous tends 
to require more time and experience than is typically available to those in charge of 
appointments, and as we saw in the previous chapter, positions of power involve a greater 
risk of compartmentalisation. Where compartmentalisation exists the decisions about which 
candidates are virtuous is likely to be governed by the role demands. This requirement also 
sits uneasily with the notion that practices themselves are schools for the virtues and the 
notion that excessively acquisitive institutions can be alienating. 
Within a practice there is already good reason to develop the virtues, but outside of 
such contexts the point and purpose of the virtues is less clearly apparent. Moore also seems 
too ready to accept evidence from research into game-theory as providing genuine insights 
into human behaviour, and cites research that divides the population into ‘strong 
reciprocators’ – 15%, ‘conditional reciprocators’ – 50%, and ‘free-riders’ which make up the 
rest
12
. This is something MacIntyre would be sceptical about given that such research 
methodologically rules out any substantial contextualising detail. The most exploitative and
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lazy of free-riders in a hypothetical, abstract situation may behave quite differently within a 
real, practice-based community. Outside of practices, and within contexts in which there are 
pressures to compartmentalise - for instance where there exists a pressure to exaggerate the 
focus on the purpose of the organisation for PR purposes - people will likely be more cynical 
about strong reciprocation than would be the case were they to be genuinely engaged in a 
practice. This failure to address context is in essence is what makes Moore guilty of:
b) Making MacIntyre's position appear to be more deterministic than it is. Now, 
because Moore is attempting to formulate concrete workplace governance policies from 
MacIntyre's theory, it is clear that he is not interpreting MacIntyre as a communist 
revolutionary. However, there is something paradoxically Marxist about Moore’s take on 
MacIntyre. This is indicated by his failure to address the problem of scale. Moore notes that 
large scale reforms at the macro-economic level are necessary for a good society and says 
that it is also important to consider how best to organise individual firms, he never considers 
that large scale firms might be intrinsically problematic. MacIntyre's awareness of this 
problem is one of the key differences between his position and Marx's, as we saw in chapter 
3. Moore’s account also seems unable to adequately distinguish between virtuous behaviour 
and suppression of vice. According to at least one strand of Marxist thought (and in line with
MacIntyre’s interpretation of Marx in his ‘Theses on Feuerbach: A Road Not Taken’), it is 
better to have a well-structured society of knaves than an ill-structured society full of virtuous 
individuals, for in the former avarice might be desired but is impossible, and in the latter 
well-intentioned people cannot help exploiting (in Marx’s sense) and otherwise harming 
others. MacIntyre does not accept this dichotomy between ethics and politics. It follows from 
MacIntyre’s Eudaimonism that the notion of a ‘good’ society populated by bad people is 
simply incoherent, and that exploitation, for instance, is worth being rid of precisely because 
it would better enable people to become good and so flourish.
Moore does not explicitly interpret MacIntyre in this way and would probably defend 
himself by pointing out that he frequently refers to practices, virtues, and how the 
institutional reforms he recommends are designed to facilitate practices through which the 
practitioners perfect both their ‘products’ and themselves. If he makes this move, then one of 
Moore’s minor problems becomes a major one. The reason this defence must fail is that 
Moore treats the term ‘practice’ too casually and writes as if almost every job is a practice. 
This is needed if Moore's account is to have MacIntyrean ethical content, but it would render 
his account implausible.
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As we saw in chapter 1, and again with specific reference to Moore in chapter 5, the 
concept of a practice does not cover every activity. No amount of institutional reform is going 
to transform a work that is not characterised by complex internal goods into a practice, but it 
might be possible to transform an organisation such that it prevents vice. This is the question 
of regulation. We have seen in this section that Moore's account has severe limitations, 
chiefly because, in attempting to show how workplaces can be made MacIntyrean, Moore is 
attempting to get too much out of an account of mere governance. As an account of 
regulative governance that, instead of aiming to ensure that work is conducive to virtuous 
flourishing, aims at preventing the more serious threats to flourishing at work there might be 
more room for optimism. In the following section, we will consider the topic of regulation.
7.2 Managing Virtue and Regulation
It is obvious that it is better for managers to be morally sensitive, morally upright individuals 
than the converse. It is better too for vice to be prevented and in some cases punished than the 
converse, and it is better for both virtuous behaviour to be encouraged and virtues to be 
inculcated than the converse. But habituation is not enough for MacIntyre, hence his 
invocation of practices, narrative unity and traditions when defining the virtues. 
Given his emphasis on goods internal to practices we might expect a MacIntyrean 
account of work to have a hostile attitude to regulation. However, the fact that practices are 
no longer central to social life means that it is prudent for the MacIntyrean to accept the 
crucial utility value of regulation. I put it this way to emphasise the alien nature of regulation 
from the point of view of practices, but that does not, so I shall argue, undermine the basic 
point.
It seems then that where work is not practice-based, good management will for the 
most part be negative in character and be concerned with removing obstacles to the formation 
of practice-like elements in the hope of fostering the trust and local friendliness required by 
communities. These elements will often be extrinsic to the actual tasks the work itself 
involves. Given the fact that practices are always liable to emerge (i.e. given that people are 
naturally interested in internal goods and communities of practice) protecting work from the 
domination of external goods is more important than trying to reconfigure institutions to 
bring out possible internal goods. This is because where there may be such goods it is more 
likely they will spontaneously become apparent than it is that threats will spontaneously 
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wither away and because threats to practices and communities can be understood by external 
perspectives more readily than can the relevant internal goods. While people can engage in 
practices when there are obstacles, it is likely to be more effective to remove these obstacles 
than to encourage people to see beyond them. 
Any attempt to 'crowd in' virtues that does not focus on practices risks appearing to be 
empty, moralistic rhetoric but within a tightly-bound practice-based community it may be 
possible for members to simply ignore obstacles and accept injunctions to act virtuously. 
Where such communities are looser, more help is required to ensure a focus on internal goods 
is maintained. 'Law', in the form of governance or regulation, may be the only way to ensure 
serious ills are averted but, according to MacIntyre, law works best when it is least needed, 
when it is least invoked.
13
When fear or narrow self-interest is the motivation, the law tends 
to be morally discredited.
14
But when there are no genuine moral resources, regulation is 
necessary:
What then are we to say of regulation? When we are concerned with those regulations that deal 
with the quality and safety of goods and services, we ought to be clear that we need regulation 
only because human nature is gravely defective when embodied in the modem corporation-
regulation, remember, applies primarily to the activities of corporations and only secondarily to 
the activities of individuals
15
MacIntyre goes on to provide an example:
Think of the thalidomide case. The recent book on thalidomide, Suffer the Children, provides 
the evidence. What Grünenthal Chemie in Germany and what the Distillers Corporation in 
Britain were willing to do, as the developers and the licensees for thalidomide, shows very 
clearly that large corporations are collectively quite willing to undertake courses of action that 
individuals in the corporation would be deeply shocked by if it was proposed that they as 
individuals should do what the corporation does. The individuals who staff Grünenthal or 
Distillers are generally no worse than the rest of us. It is simply the case that in a corporate 
society one of the ways in which moral relationships have been eroded is by the substitution of 
corporate for individual responsibility.
16
The correction of the preconditions of such cases is a long way off. Indeed, if MacIntyre’s 
interpretation of modernity is correct, agreement on the premises through which a rational 
solution to the problems of modernity is possible is itself a long way off (which again shows 
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us how challenging an attempt to substantially ‘crowd in’ virtue is likely to be). What then 
are we to do about the practical impossibility of persuading everyone to accept a MacIntyrean 
perspective, or somewhat more neutrally, about the effects of a morally fragmented culture? 
Regulation might be a substitute for morality, though it is sometimes simply the enforcement 
of common-sense, but where rational argument and persuasion, and thus communal 
agreement are impossible our response ought to be: three cheers for regulation! MacIntyre 
admits it is the best we can do given the moral culture we inhabit
17
. The grave defects of 
corporate responsibility force us into a struggle of manipulation. Even waiting for the next St. 
Benedict, MacIntyre's bleak recommendation at the end of After Virtue, has pre-requisites 
and the only way these might be achieved and protected is through mainstream politics. 
Because mainstream politics is, from MacIntyre’s perspective, characterised by a deep moral 
incoherence, the MacIntyrean is forced to use the same tools of manipulation and leverage 
that are widely used within modernity as we noted in chapter 6. To admit this is to admit that 
two ‘intolerable’ alternatives
18
are rarely equally intolerable, and within the bounds of the 
tolerable, evils admit of degree.
Individualism is, from MacIntyre's perspective, irremediably flawed, but this does not 
undermine its social power. Evidently, the truth is not quite enough to set one free: even 
though of us who reject individualism must co-exist with an order deeply influenced by it. 
What we need therefore, is to protect communities which sustain the virtues from a hostile 
culture given that there is little hope of us reaching agreement. These considerations suggest 
that unless the work engaged in is genuinely practice-based, it seems that governance will be 
akin to regulation. This is a problem for Moore, who considers a merely regulatory approach 
to be "too shallow for the prescription to be effective in the long term. It is, in other words, 
governance without ethics."
19
We can agree with Moore in this judgement about a merely 
regulative approach, but unfortunately, because his account fails to address the wider context 
and fails to distinguish between measures appropriate to institutions that house practice-based 
work and measures appropriate to those which do not, we are compelled to make a similar 
judgement about his prescription, as it currently stands.
Governance in this sense will be unable to sufficiently 'crowd in' virtue so that work 
provides a moral education, and so will be compatible with agents becoming corrupted by the 
absence of a focus on substantive internal goods. Governance is necessary for the 
MacIntyrean, which means something like Moore's account is important even if it cannot 
have the effects Moore desires. Moore's optimism is not justified, but his account is not 
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without merit and his list of desiderata can provide the foundation of a MacIntyrean account 
of workplace governance and of the good, negative elements of management. 
MacIntyre’s own writings on regulation are concerned with the macro-level because 
of the lack of corporate culpability for serious problems, such as the thalidomide case. Those 
in positions of power at Grünenthal Chemie were incapable of putting public well-being 
ahead of profit and so the decision should have been taken out of their hands. We saw above 
that Moore’s account is inadequate as an account of how to foster MacIntyrean institutions, 
but regulation has an important part to play in weakening threats to existing MacIntyrean 
institutions. In this sense, variants of Moore's suggested measures might be used to minimise 
workplace grievances.
Imagine that a government were elected that had quasi-MacIntyrean leanings in that it 
acknowledged a commitment to a certain conception of the good life for its citizenry, without 
being inclined to abandon most of the basic free-market policies typical of western liberal 
democracies. If this government decided that it wanted to take some steps towards restoring 
philosophy to its once central place in public life and made it compulsory for business 
executives to attend a public lecture given by MacIntyre about rationality and the good life, 
few would expect them to be persuaded, much less to voluntarily change their behaviour so 
that it were consistent with MacIntyre’s moral philosophy. Sadly, this would probably be the 
case even if the executives were forced to attend two such lectures by MacIntyre. Even where 
such a change might be desired, the present situation, in many ways akin to the prisoner’s 
dilemma, means that regulation is required in order to provide an adequate impetus for 
morally acceptable behaviour. In the case of really existing regulation the goal is neither so 
grand, nor the implementation so straight forward. Because there is no shared comprehensive 
moral framework in our culture, regulation, if it is to be effective, must ensure that the 
punishments for infringements are sufficiently unattractive that compliance is attractive, and 
that the means of detection are sufficiently effective that breach constitutes a genuine risk. 
Even if human nature is such that people tend to prefer engagement in practices and related 
focus on internal goods, the structure of capitalist competition means that it is often difficult 
or impossible to choose what one knows one really wants (for fear of being driven out of 
business because competitors refuse to implement such measures, for instance).
However, because regulation often involves external regulators on the grounds that it 
most applies to those, in some sense, incapable of exercising restraint either individually or 
collectively, the relatively MacIntyrean workplaces need not worry as such workplaces will 
tend to exceed the minimal demands that regulation makes of them. So it might be argued 
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that from the point of view of workplace studies, it is not a problem. Is this correct? Not 
quite, for the political cannot be so neatly divorced from working life. Precisely because there 
is no natural allegiance to the ends regulation is designed to achieve, organisations primarily 
concerned with the pursuit of external goods will always have reason to discover loopholes, 
exceptions, and the like that allow the letter of the law to be followed, but the spirit to be 
disregarded. This is one of the ways in which pressure to compartmentalise is present within 
the large scale firm. As an employee loopholes are to be sought, but as a private citizen 
regulation is a force for good.
Our discussion of regulation allows us to see why MacIntyre has been both claimed 
and rejected as both a conservative and a socialist by representatives of both of those 
positions. On the one hand, the socialist-statist answer of intrusive government is appealing 
because a great deal of regulation is required to curb the questionable behaviour of some 
corporations on the grounds that they lack legitimacy and inevitably are frequently tempted to 
use immoral means to pursue their ends. But this ‘solution’ is also repugnant to MacIntyre 
because he regards the modern, regulatory state itself as illegitimate. However, within the 
workplace regulation can be part of the solution to the problem of creating MacIntyrean 
institutions, but we must now turn our attention to moral education, and what might be 
achieved through good governance and good regulation. We have seen in section 7.1 that 
Moore's account of the governance is unable to crowd in virtue in such a way as to ensure 
workplaces are MacIntyrean, but against a purely pessimistic interpretation of MacIntyre's 
philosophy, the importance of regulation - explored in the present section - suggests that the 
outline of Moore's account might be salvageable. In the following section, we will explore 
the extent to which  governance and regulation can play anything other than a negative role.
7.3 Moral Education and Workers' Control
In this section we will explore the possibility of transforming workplaces into centres of 
virtuous flourishing. On this topic governance and regulation cannot be adequate partly 
because of the inherent richness of the notion of flourishing, and also partly because of 
MacIntyre's emphasis on whole lives. Workplace governance is in this sense rather narrow, 
and so even where it appears to be broadly MacIntyrean it might not achieve its intended 
effects.
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Many MacIntyrean and quasi-MacIntyrean measures are no doubt already in place in 
some workplaces. Where work contains internal goods, it is better for both the workers 
themselves and for the managers if people are committed to those goods
20
. There are likely to 
be ‘bottom line’ advantages to dividing a workforce into teams, as increases in organisational 
identity and commitment lead to improved performance overall and lower staff turnover
21
, 
even if the often made claim that job satisfaction leads to better performance is spurious
22
. 
The improved overall performance is not necessarily a matter of individuals working harder 
or even more effectively, but may be a result of reducing the cost of supervision
23
. However, 
if the arguments of chapter 5 are correct, we should be unsurprised to find that efforts to 
introduce measures that foster self-surveillance and socialisation that produces role-identity 
can fail because of employee resistance or suspicion
24
. Ever since the advent of modern 
organisational study there have been calls for a reduction in bureaucracy and for a greater 
degree of worker autonomy
25
and insofar as it is a result of the flattening of organisational 
bureaucracy, such a reduction has come to pass. But there are various ways in which 
apparently good or well meaning measures can go wrong. 
James R. Barker, in his paper ‘Tightening the Iron Cage’, describes how allowing 
teams to be self-managed can result in “a form of control more powerful, less apparent, and 
more difficult to resist”
26
than traditional forms of bureaucracy. Barker’s longitudinal study 
of a small manufacturing company shows how what he calls 'concertive control' can lead to 
stronger norms. This is because the teams develop policies by reasoning from the company’s 
value-laden premises and the edicts which follow naturally from those premises are then 
regarded as having been self-chosen, so the possibility of dissent and disengagement 
disappears. Here the decision takes place within one particular compartmentalised role rather 
than being available for deeper reflection and deliberation. In one case described by Barker, 
members of the group began pressurizing each other to conform to the organisation’s rules in 
a way that they had not and would not have before the new team structure was introduced. 
According to Barker, on one occasion the members of the group made a team member, 
Sharon, cry because she had a poor absence and lateness record. This is hardly overwhelming 
empirical evidence, but Barker's study captures something of the petty tyranny all too 
possible in such situations.
What this means is that one of the preconditions of a workplace being MacIntyrean 
can be a threat to flourishing. This should not be surprising. Being relatively small-scale is a 
precondition of a political community counting as MacIntyrean but clearly not every small-
scale community will be conducive to flourishing. The MacIntyrean perspective, which 
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emphasises the importance of narrative unity of a whole life, was never in danger of 
supposing that freedom from direct bureaucratic control would automatically yield practice-
based work. Only in a perfect world could there be perfect workplaces, but this impossibility 
should not discourage us. It would be an unnecessarily bleak conclusion to say that only in a 
perfectly harmonious, small-scale MacIntyrean polis can we create work-places conducive to 
flourishing because there is still a great deal that can be achieved outside of such a context. 
Modern workplaces often cannot be the sites of local community in which shared deliberation 
and pursuit of the good can take place, and so in terms of general recommendations, a 
regulative approach might be the best that can be hoped for. The deeper moral of Barker's 
story, from a MacIntyrean perspective, is that for any workplace to be conducive to 
flourishing what is needed above all is that those who work there possess the virtues.
Virtues enable us to flourish, and our desire to flourish is one key reason to seek to 
cultivate the virtues. This does not mean that happiness is always to be sought and 
unhappiness always to be avoided. From the MacIntyrean point of view, to say that a measure 
might decrease employee satisfaction is not a decisive criticism of it. Where satisfaction 
depends solely upon pursuit of external goods then anything like Moore’s notion of 
crowding-in virtue may come as a blow to morale, and anything that resembles a genuine 
focus on goods internal to a practice, such as implementing fair and fixed salaries, will 
obviously be unpopular. In MacIntyre’s brief discussion of the virtue of patience, he raises 
the question of what is to be done when the end that justifies the patience simply is not 
forthcoming
27
. Someone who is not sufficiently adept at a practice – the clumsy would-be 
surgeon, the sea-sick would-be fisherman, as well as the lazy and intemperate in all practices 
– may justly receive criticism, and may find that master-practitioners justly lose patience with 
him or her. But practice-status and conduciveness to flourishing are not easily measured, or 
even adequately discerned by someone outside the putative practice, certainly not as easily as 
subjective satisfaction.
So a MacIntyrean theory of work does not need to regard the apparently unpleasant 
aspects of concertive control as being necessarily bad. What makes them so is the ends they 
serve. When MPs in the UK were forced to declare their outside earnings in July 2009 many 
elected to give up their positions rather than have their extra-parliamentary incomes 
publically known, despite the fact that the sums were significant - many of those who did not 
give up their outside positions were revealed to earn tens of thousands of pounds for just a 
few hours advisory work a year. This move is unlikely to have made those MPs happy, but is 
necessary if the Houses of Parliament are one day to host practitioners. Where work is not a 
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practice, concertive control, official 'group identity' that leads to compartmentalisation, and 
so on, must be resisted and quasi-communities of disengagement are the best hope for 
employees to avoid the corrupting effects of such work. Where work is practice-based, or 
possesses significant practice-like elements, and the institution is practice-focused, then 
commitment to the workplace, the passing of honest and sometimes harsh judgements, and 
subordination to the relevant canons of excellence, are all good even when they are difficult. 
The reason Barker's tale of an upset worker is worrying is precisely because most workers 
have not signed up to subordinate themselves to the good of a practice, which is inevitable 
given that most modern work is not practice-based.
In attempting to bring about regulatory and governance measures that can best protect 
and perhaps even bring about flourishing in the real world, we must recognise that “Moral 
education will be ineffective if it sets too high a standard too quickly”
28
. Legislation should 
therefore concern vices that undermine social life and harm others. This importance afforded 
to social life is not quite the same as Moore's 2nd requirement, that governance systems 
require people with pro-social preferences (one suspects that the extremely unsociable would 
apply to work alone in any case). In fact, its spirit is complementary to the defence of long-
term day to day relationships recommended in chapter 4 and the account of workplace 
communities put forward in chapter 5. We can rely on the fact that most people have pro-
social preferences and ought to implement governance policies that minimise factors that 
undermine such relationships such as cultures of excessive competitiveness and job 
insecurity. 
Aquinas, whom MacIntyre approvingly quotes, gives the examples of murder and 
theft as the sorts of crimes that most seriously undermine social life. Although hardly rivals to 
stress and absenteeism as workplace problems, it is instructive to consider Aquinas' 
reasoning. Aquinas disagrees with both puritans and liberals: “Like those puritans and unlike 
those liberals, he understands the law as an instrument for our moral education. But, like 
those liberals and unlike those puritans, he is against making law by itself an attempt to 
suppress all vice”
29
. Note that the focus here is not on the vicious, who may or may not avoid 
murder and theft for fear of reprisals, it is on the security of the knowledge that one is very 
unlikely to be murdered and that one’s property is relatively protected by the law. The 
intended result is that people need not worry excessively about crime. Regulation does not 
always have this effect; fear of crime can rise as crime falls. Similarly, fear of unemployment 
can be disproportionately high, and a sense of uneasy competition can exist in workplaces 
where the focus really is on the goods internal to a practice (which itself can lead to those 
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lacking the relevant skills being laid off). This gives us some reason to believe that even 
ensuring that work takes the form of a genuine engagement in a practice, organisational 
culture requires careful consideration. So, as regulation is more restricted in scope than law, 
and is concerned primarily with the suppression of unacceptable behaviour, what are the 
characteristics of a good regulator or governor?
MacIntyre says “Insofar as human beings have the capacity to become good, they also 
have the capacity to exercise the prudence of a ruler.”
30
So those who do become rulers have 
no special capacity. Therefore, “those who arrogate to themselves an exclusive, 
professionalised authority of a certain kind by that very act of arrogation discredit their own 
claims to legitimate authority”
31
. This is because such an attitude is liable to prevent the 
governed from learning from one another and from effectively deliberating. In essence, it is 
to underestimate the abilities of ordinary people to such a degree as to make the claimants 
incompetent as governors of those ordinary people. We saw in the previous chapter that the 
culture of management relies on just these kinds of claims to justify its own prestige and 
power.
At first sight, however, this is a puzzling set of claims and seems to overstate 
MacIntyre’s arguments against managerial expertise. MacIntyre’s notion of practices and the 
related authority of master practitioners mean that, ostensibly, this claim does not sit well 
with the rest of his theory. Even if management is not a practice, politics is and it would be 
natural to assume that like other practices there is room for 'master practitioners'. Politics is 
however an unusual practice. Institutionally sustaining a practice-based community is the 
practice of politics, and it seems intuitively plausible that MacIntyre would allow that there 
can be distinctly excellent rulers, even if this excellence does not take the form of ‘expertise’. 
There are two obvious possible responses to this: a) the practice of ruling is not 
identical to institutionally sustaining a practice-based community, which would lead to a 
bivalent account of politics, which would suggest that mainstream politics consists more in 
managerial manipulation than genuine politics, or b) the practices of ruling and communal 
sustenance are the same, and happen to be a practice that all humans (insofar as they can 
become good) are capable of. This part of MacIntyre's theory poses a challenge perhaps 
greater than that of the denial of the manager's authority because instead of simply being 
mistaken in their judgements, managers who claim such expertise are disqualified from 
'governing' on the basis of this 'anti-social preference'. It appears that the MacIntyrean must 
accept the latter of these alternatives and hold that unlike practices that require a distinctive 
technical skill, such as painting, or intellectual prowess, such as physics, ruling requires only 
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those skills of thought, communication and recognition of the virtues that all potentially good 
human beings can possess. Man is by nature a political animal, and this means more than the 
claim that humans naturally form political communities. 
There is a difference between ‘exclusive, professionalised authority’ and rational 
authority. All rational, adult human beings are capable of sustaining communities and almost 
all have in fact done so to varying degrees through participation in family life. The best 
cabinet maker has authority within the workshop, but politics is not like the practice of 
furniture making because the latter is only actually engaged in by a small set of people, 
whereas politics, in MacIntyre’s sense, is universal. Politics in this sense requires virtues such 
as prudence, diligence, justice and without those virtues participation in any practice will be 
threatened and insofar as human beings are capable of thinking rationally, engaging in 
practices, and developing virtues they are capable of becoming good at politics. We should 
note that those who publically claim a professional authority may well be merely lip-service 
to the role and unthinkingly employing a manner of speach that is standard for their 
profession, without really believing they possess unique expertise and even without really 
acting in such a way that such a belief would entail, just as all interviewees claim to work 
well on their own and as part of a team. Nevertheless, the existence of exclusive 
professionalised authority is a common assumption that will always be an obstacle to the 
establishment of MacIntyrean workplaces.
However, while everyone has had some experience of sustaining practice-based 
communities, and while everyone has the potential to do so well insofar as they are able to 
become good, not everyone realises this potential. Not every parent is a good one. Sometimes 
people may be reluctant to develop the skills needed to rule, this means that those who do 
happen to rule (i.e. possess power within institutions, especially those that serve practices) 
must exercise a special degree of moral sensitivity and a respectful concern for those they 
work with. All people might have the potential to rule, and one characteristic of good 
institutions will be that they attempt to develop this potential in people, but if we are to take 
alienation seriously we must realise that not all people are concerned to develop that 
potential. As we saw in the previous chapter this requirement may be a difficult challenge to 
meet given the cultural pressure on managers to attribute to themselves an exclusive 
professional authority to rule.
We must be wary of diluting the radical nature of MacIntyre’s critique of modernity. 
However, the recognition that the pursuit of flourishing might entail some unhappiness is not 
the same as disregarding job dissatisfaction. Nor are means justified simply because they 
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have good ends. We must also be wary of supporting distinctly ‘business’ interests and 
managerialism. Finally, we must be wary of putting these two concerns together and drawing 
unduly pessimistic conclusions. In chapter 3 we examined some reasons to resist 
amalgamating MacIntyre and Marx, and we should note that seemingly small improvements 
in conditions can be enormously dignifying, and being able to avoid the alienating effects of 
drudgery better enables workers to form the tacit workplace communities discussed in 
chapter 5. So what does this imply for a MacIntyrean account of work?
Knight claims, in his account of ‘Goods’, that the problem with modern work is that 
workers lack control over their work. Control implies autonomy and democracy, and so is no 
doubt conducive to practices functioning well. Freedom from arbitrary control or unjust 
power is no doubt a good, but against Knight I suggest that worker control cannot be 
necessary for work to be good. Knight says, 
Work cannot provide an education in the virtues because it is not something over which 
workers have control or responsibility. As Marxists, guild socialists, distributivists and others 
have argued, when workers do not own the instruments or products of their labour, and when 
they have to sell their labour, then they are alienated from their own activity
32
From this perspective, governance cannot help us to avoid alienation, and any 
governance/regulatory account of how workplaces might be made MacIntyrean is 
misconceived. However, workers lacking control is not necessarily the problem. The lack of 
practice-status typical of modern work, role-demands that lead to compartmentalisation, 
radical re-organisation or excessive managerial control that undermines the existence of 
workplace communities, these are the problems with contemporary working life. A student 
has little control of a university, indeed allowing students too much say in the running of a 
course (not the same as carefully considering feedback) would be a mistake, a new member 
might have little say over how a chess club or orchestra is run, but this does not make those 
forms of activity alienating. Other examples might include journalists and lawyers. Such 
professions are clearly practices, and can therefore provide an education in the virtues even 
outside optimal working conditions, though there are limits to the conditions a practice can 
survive. It is this kind of work that would most obviously benefit from the application of 
Moore's proposals. A journalist owns neither the means or products of his or her labour in 
most instances, but the life of a journalist is likely to be richer than that of a self-employed 
turnip-planter, and this is despite the possible pressure to churn out piece after piece, or to toe 
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the editorial line, or even to procure information illegally (though such pressures may corrupt 
the practice).
Too little a degree of control over one's work will ensure that it remains an imposed 
burden, but control and responsibility are not the panaceas Knight seems to take them to be: 
Zimbardo’s students had control, and Bach, working at a frenetic pace set by his paymasters, 
lacked it. The students who played prison guards in Zimbardo’s famous Stanford prison 
experiment, sadly now taught only as a guide to unethical methodology, had control over
their work but a compartmentalised identification with their role prevented them from 
exercising moral agency
33
. Clearly, they were not engaged in a practice. On the other hand, 
when he moved to Leipzig, leaving behind a relatively comfortable position at Köthen, Bach 
certainly lacked control over the pace of his work: he had to produce cantatas on a weekly 
basis as well as teaching students and fulfilling a variety of administrative duties. By all 
accounts, Bach's life was, to put it in contemporary terms, rather stressful at this time, but 
because he was engaged in a practice his work was still an education into the virtues. 
It is the case that all workers are capable of ruling and institutionalising a practice, but 
it does not follow from this that the inexpert can and should control a practice. What does 
follow is that ordinary workers can control practices only once they have a rich and detailed 
appreciation of the practice itself. In some cases expertise is required, the expertise of a 
master-practitioner. If Moore interprets MacIntyre in a way that is incompatible with 
MacIntyre's own rejection of Marxism, then Knight reads MacIntyre as being too Marxist in 
substance and so adopts the Marxist concept of alienation in such a way that is at odds with a 
MacIntyrean account of work. Moore is right to focus on participation and democracy as they 
are more intrinsically connected to flourishing than ownership or outright control. As we saw 
in chapter 3, much of Marx's own account of alienation, (in particular his accounts of 
alienation from product and process, which seem to fit best with Knight’s remarks about 
worker control) do not apply to modern forms of work and underplay the extent to which we 
can engage in practices even within capitalism. Moore is mistaken in thinking that the task of 
creating virtuous institutions is essentially managerial, and Knight is mistaken in thinking 
that it is solely political.
So having seen that regulation is a critically important topic for the MacIntyrean in 
section 7.2 and some problems with applying any form of regulation or governance in an 
ethically significant positive way in the present section, let us re-assess and reformulate 
Moore's list of desiderata: 
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1) A focus on the purpose of the organisation. As I have repeatedly argued above, this 
makes sense only within practices. It would be better if all work was such an engagement. In 
the offices of a newspaper a focus on the purpose of journalism would be ideal, but in more 
humdrum occupations, which might have socially useful purposes but lack rich, stimulating 
goods or the standards of excellence characteristic of practices, it will be more important to 
foster friendly, trusting communities. Profit maximisation is more widespread as an over-
arching purpose of organisations than Moore allows. Practically this might suggest that 
flourishing is more likely to be available outside of plcs and instead inside small companies, 
which the argument presented in chapter 4 also supports. This requirement does not add 
anything to MacIntyre's claim that all practices require institutions
34
, and my argument in 
chapter 1 that practice-like jobs are especially dependent on being well-institutionalised. I 
argued there that certain virtues – for instance justice, courage, humility and honesty – enable 
practitioners to well-institutionalise their practices. Good institutions will help to produce 
these qualities and will require them.
2) Governance systems require people with pro-social intrinsic preferences. The 
status of this requirement depends on exactly what is meant by 'pro-social preferences'. In one 
sense, it does seem that this is already the case in almost all workplaces. Moore uses this 
requirement to recommend that virtuous candidates be appointed and character be assessed 
and developed. As a governance measure, this seems rather too intrusive. Within an already 
existing local community, character assessments are well-grounded and have a clear function; 
within an organisation that houses a practice, a preference for the virtuous and agreement 
about what counts as a virtue also makes sense, but again outside of practices and within a 
morally fragmented society to attempt to prefer virtuous candidates in anything other than a  
minimal sense would be arbitrary and possibly worse. However, even within practices it is a 
governance measure that can hope to have only limited application. In discussing 
contemporary academic philosophy MacIntyre claims that
enquiry into the moral character of candidates for academic appointments would be thought at 
best irrelevant, at worst persecutory. And, because the office holder of an academic philosopher 
in our society is what it now is, such an enquiry would in fact be irrelevant and perhaps 
persecutory.
35
To discourage and even punish those who threaten social relations on the other hand 
can make sense as a method of regulatory governance, as does allowing working teams to 
169
stay together in the long term in order to facilitate the develop of thick-trust. As MacIntyre 
points out
36
, someone might join a fishing crew for the money and stay because of the 
internal goods even when greater financial rewards are available elsewhere. It would be 
unreasonable to expect someone to be precisely constituted to appreciate the goods of a 
practice in advance of engaging in that practice: typically it is engagement that enables us to 
develop the virtues required to appreciate those goods. If we dilute this requirement so that it 
avoids this error then there is a danger of it merely describing current practice. Existing 
evidence of anti-social attitudes does already debar people from many jobs. Moore's point 
would be stronger if he were more explicit about MacIntyrean conceptions of sociability 
differing from ordinary conceptions. The pro-social preferences exhibited in genuine 
friendships, in practice-based communities, in friendly and courteous workplaces, in quasi-
communities of tacit resistance, and in damagingly competitive but not entirely hostile 
environments differ vastly.
3) Attention be given to job design. This is another measure that is already widely 
employed. It makes most sense outside of practices, which cannot be managed as easily as 
practice-based work. Practices develop and in some sense have a life of their own as long as 
they are institutionally safe-guarded, so there will often be no need to design jobs. Other 
things being equal, the architect has enough autonomy and enough intrinsic motivation that 
further design is unnecessary. Furthermore any attempt to impose further variety on 
practitioners would be to run the risk of hindering the development of mastery of the practice 
and so of related excellences. Outside of practices, attention to job design is an important way 
of making work more interesting and enjoyable. In the many cases where work is practice-
like, then, a balance should be struck between subjective satisfaction and the prioritisation of 
the internal goods, and here worker control will be vitally important.
4) Fixed and fair salaries. About this, we can happily agree with Moore, although 
what counts as fair is an open question. The level of inequality that produces deference and 
threatens friendship is the level which should not be reached. This is not an easy thing to 
measure and calls for great sensitivity and contextual knowledge.
5) Use of decision making procedures that strengthen participation and self-
governance. Outside of practices, this is a measure that will help to prevent certain ills. 
Within a practice, this will be more powerful a tool for good as people can reason from more 
substantial shared premises. In either case, the excessive power possessed by the kinds of 
managers who fit MacIntyre's description of the character of the manager is to be avoided.
Highly concentrated but non-centralized power will tend to rule out such procedures, which 
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again counts against corporate monoliths and in favour of the local, small-scale work 
environment. One corollary of our discussions of compartmentalization is that participation 
will be a force for good principally where working roles are not distinct and cut-off from the 
rest of someone's life. In this sense, work-life harmonisation must be a goal. Once again, 
outside of practices self-governance can be dangerous, as we saw above in the case of
Barker's study of concertive control, and as we saw in the 2008 financial crisis.
6) Low levels of contractual enforcement. This may be a useful way of assessing how 
healthy a workplace community is. We saw in chapter 4 that low levels of contractual 
enforcement enables thick trust, which in turn will be characteristic of good workplaces. 
However, this again depends upon the kind of work an organisation houses. Those engaged in 
dirty and/or dangerous work would probably benefit from a higher level of contractual 
enforcement. Anyone who has ever worked in a warehouse will know that after watching 
several hours worth of health and safety training videos the sort of precautions advised, and 
indeed required, are ignored in order to complete the day's tasks in a sufficiently timely 
fashion.
7) Encouraging group identity. Here again we see the need for a dualistic account of 
work. Within practices, some form of group identity will be a good thing, and will itself be a 
likely natural development given that workers will have shared aims and shared 
commitments. Here the scene of conflict can be the scene of resolution, and thus bolster 
community, as we saw in chapter 3. Outside of practices, it is liable to lead to a damaging 
pressure to compartmentalise. Because there is a gradation between practices and non-
practices to know whether encouraging group identity is a good or an ill will require a 
detailed knowledge of the particular context in question, and so should not be a uniform 
measure in such places where governance is largely regulative.
8) Transparency. It would be hard to find someone willing to advocate more opacity 
in organisations. Transparency, for the most part, is clearly a good. In one sense, Moore is 
right to think that it follows from the rest of the list, but once again there is a difference 
between transparency within practices and without. Transparency about basic corporate 
policies is no doubt to be encouraged, but within practices the matter is not so straight 
forward. Within a practice, "Those who lack the relevant experience are incompetent thereby 
as judges of internal goods"
37
, so while transparency is a good there is a limit to how 
explicable the decisions of master-practitioners will be to the uninitiated. Furthermore, 
transparency seems to be an unrealistic goal for the large-scale institutions that dominate 
modernity. If we publish the minutes of cabinet, we guarantee that cabinet is not where the 
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real discussions take place. One conclusion to be drawn from this chapter and from the 
preceding chapters is that MacIntyrean workplaces are possible within modernity, but we 
should not be optimistic about them becoming the norm. 
7.4 Conclusion
We have seen that governance is of special importance for MacIntyrean ethics, but that 
governance outside of practices and in a political order that is blind to the importance of 
practices is insufficient. This is not a criticism of governance per se, but where governance is 
bound to be ineffective, regulation is very much needed. In a context hostile to practices, 
regulation can protect workers, would-be practitioners, and indeed full practitioners from 
threatening external forces. But regulation cannot and should not hope to replace morality or 
provide a moral education to workers. In the present chapter, we have seen that the 
importance of practices cannot be overlooked, and that one corollary of this is that a fully 
persuasive account of how workers might coexist with modernity is too big a task for 
workplace studies alone, and indeed for philosophy alone. Workers’ control might, like 
reducing the size of work organizations, on balance tend to help us avoid 
compartmentalisation, alienation, pressure to pursue external goods at the expense of internal 
goods, etc. but it can have the opposite effect. Even when we can explain what is wrong with 
corporate monoliths or Zimbardo’s guards in theory, we can hardly hope to account for what 
is good about Bach’s practice to a sufficient degree to inform the behaviour of real agents, 
especially given the particularity of each person's narrative. Good governance and sensible 
regulation are required to ensure that as many workplaces are as good as is possible in the 
suboptimum context of the present, but any such list is inevitably insufficient: what is needed 
above all is the virtues to decide what work to do, to do good work, and to ensure that good 
work can be done. 
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Conclusion
In a sense some of the key conclusions of this study are to be found in the closing pages of 
the final chapter, where I outlined a list of MacIntyrean governance measures inspired by and 
in response to Moore. That list drew on the arguments of the previous chapters and revealed 
that good but non-practice-based work has very different requirements than practice-based 
work. But the final conclusions this MacIntyrean philosophy of work is able to draw are 
necessarily incomplete, not just because 'workplace studies' names a vast array of disciplines 
and sub-disciplines, though that is an important reason, but also because of the arguments 
advanced in, most notably, chapters 2 and 4 about the importance of whole life and about 
detailed context. Also, as I argued in chapter 4, there are no 'business virtues' (etc) and so we 
must recognise that a MacIntyrean account of work is simply MacIntyrean ethics as it 
pertains to our lives within corporate modernity. It cannot be a distinctively 'business' or 
workplace ethics, nor can it allow the standards by which we judge our whole lives to be 
ignored in favour of some distinctively workplace-based judgement.
What we have seen, however, is the basic shape of a MacIntyrean philosophy of 
work, that such an account survives numerous criticisms, and that MacIntyrean work and 
MacIntyrean workplace-communities are available within modernity.
Summary
I began, in the first two chapters, and to a lesser extent the third, by providing a theoretical 
defence of MacIntyre's ethics. In chapter 1 I was concerned to give a clear account of 
practices and show that practices can be productive, and to assuage the worry that the 
epistemological closure of practices deprived the notion of normative force. In chapter 2 I 
continued my defence of MacIntyre's ethical theory, and argued that his conception of 
narrative unity is workable. 
In the third chapter I contrasted MacIntyre and Marx and began to explore the nature 
of contemporary work. Sennett's account shows that dominant forms of modern work are 
characteristically hostile to MacIntyrean work. In the fourth chapter I began to explore some 
of the details of a MacIntyrean account of work. There I argued that in order for healthy 
emotion work to take place, workplaces must be small and allow for regular face to face 
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interactions, in which thick trust is possible. One of MacIntyre's most fundamental criticisms 
of the modern order is that its scale is simply incompatible with the good life, and I have tried 
to further support this criticism. I also argued that compartmentalised role-ethics is deeply 
flawed.
In chapter 5 I argued that MacIntyre's remarks on work ignore the possibility of quasi-
communities united through their tacit rejection of the goal of 'careerist' success. This does 
not mean that modern firms are new forms of MacIntyrean community, but it does suggest 
that moral agency is better able to co-exist with modernity than MacIntyre himself sometimes 
thinks. In the sixth chapter I probed MacIntyre's definition of characters. Although lip-service 
to role-governed ends means that management roles do not require certain personalities, I 
argued that MacIntyre's central claims about the Manager, that it is committed to emotivism 
and depends on a false belief in managerial expertise, is correct and largely applies to 
leadership too.
In chapter 7 I outlined why the MacIntyrean should be glad of regulation, as well as 
exploring possible MacIntyrean workplace measures. We saw that what is to be 
recommended within practices is not what is to be recommended outside practices. That some 
work may be described as practice-like further complicates matters: the variety in work 
means there must be a variety of strategies. Ultimately I hope to have largely defended 
MacIntyre, to have contributed to MacIntyrean enquiry by deepening our understanding of 
what a MacIntyrean philosophy of work must be, and in so doing to have also contributed to 
our understanding of how we might flourish at work, even within modernity.
Post-Script: Which Job? Whose Research Project?
The simplest answer to the question of what a MacIntyrean philosophy of work recommends 
we do is: 'find practice-based work'. Unfortunately it is not as simple as that. At the time of 
writing, 'find work' is a piece of advice that increasingly many are finding it hard to follow. 
Practice-based work is scarce, often difficult, and at threat from acquisitive institutions for 
whom cost-effectiveness must always trump internal goods. Within healthy and well-
institutionalised practices there is evidently a "close connection between being a good human 
being and doing good work"
1
that is absent from most productive work carried out under the 
present order. Ultimately, politically, our aims must include promoting a social and political 
order in which this connection is recognised, i.e. in which practices are central. But this is of 
no use to someone who (impatiently, perhaps) seeks flourishing today! For such a person 
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even the injunction to find a workplace that is small, friendly and trustworthy in which one is 
safe from the elitist ideology of managerial expertise, allowed a measure of autonomy, and 
can enjoy the practice-like, enjoyable elements is not necessarily compelling. As I suggested 
in chapter 5, disengagement from work is widespread. Given that working for SMEs often 
involves harder work, for less money, and probably less security, the actor who waits tables
so that he can act, may have a good reason to leave his local, independent cafe for a faceless 
corporate monolith. In which case he will be glad of regulatory and governance measured 
recommended in chapter 7.
The field of MacIntyrean enquiry is in a healthier state. The number of publications 
and conferences devoted to MacIntyrean enquiry is growing and attempts to answer the two 
principal questions raised by this thesis (in addition to the obvious task of dealing with the 
further objections that might be made to the arguments contained herein), the empirical 
question of how to recognise and account for practice-based institutions, and the theoretical 
and practical question of how to develop a convincing MacIntyrean politics which, among 
other things, might render our actor/waiter's choice more palatable, are already underway. I 
direct the interested reader to Beadle and Coe's 'Could We Know a Practice-Embodying 
Institution if We Saw One?' (2008), and Blackledge and Knight's Virtue and Politics
respectively.
                                                
1
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